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	GLAIMLANGUAGE	CLATMOF INFRINGEMENTAL SEA
4 5	155.	Products infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader Activation feature.
•	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
7	(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running a Microsoft product containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002. Reader using its activation feature.
8	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
9	(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
10	(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
11	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said main	Microsoft Product Activation software
12	memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software	
13	comprising:	
14	(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more aspects of said host processing	Product Activation software generates hardware information relating to the host processing environment as part of the
15	environment,	activation process
16	(2) one or more storage locations storing said information;	hardware information is stored in the computer's storage
17	(3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
18	programming to derive said information,	initial activation, Product Activation checks the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
19 20	(ii) compares said information to information previously stored	each time the Microsoft program starts up after initial activation, Product Activation checks
	in said one or more storage locations, and	the originally derived hardware information against current hardware
21	(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said	Product Activation software indicates whether the test has passed or failed
22	comparison; and	
23	(4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;	
24	(i) said one or more actions	Product Activation software will allow system
25	including at least temporarily halting further processing.	startup procedures to continue, if test succeeds, or discontinue startup and offer user
26		opportunity to reactivate if the test fails

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4 5	156.	Product Infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader
3		Activation feature.
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
U	(a) a first host processing environment	computer running a Microsoft product
7	comprising	containing the Product Activation feature, including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002 and Reader
8	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
_	(2) main memory operatively connected	main memory of computer
. 9	to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
10	(3) mass storage operatively connected	hard disk or other mass storage contained in
10	to said central processing unit and said	computer
11	main memory;	oompator
11	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant	Microsoft Product Activation software
12	software designed to be loaded into said	·
	main memory and executed by said central	
13	processing unit, said tamper resistant	
	software comprising:	
14	(1) machine check programming which	Product Activation software generates
l	derives information from one or more	hardware information relating to the host
15	aspects of said host processing	processing environment as part of the
	environment,	activation process hardware information is stored in the
16	(2) one or more storage locations	1
17	storing said information; (3) integrity programming which	computer's storage
1/	(i) causes said machine check	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
18	programming to derive said	initial activation, Product Activation checks
10	information.	the originally derived hardware information
19	indimental,	against current hardware
·	(ii) compares said information	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
20	to information previously stored	initial activation, Product Activation checks
	in said one or more storage	the originally derived hardware information
21	locations, and	against current hardware
1	(iii) generates an indication	Product Activation software indicates whether
22	based on the result of said	the test has passed or failed
	comparison; and	
23	(4) programming which takes one or	·
	more actions based on the state of said	
24	indication;	TD 1 . A
25	(i) said one or more actions	Product Activation may disable the underlying
25	including at least temporarily	software from generating new files or running
26	disabling certain functions.	user applications if the test fails
20	• • •	

Exhibit B

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5	157.	Product Infringing: Any product using Microsoft Product Activation or Reader Activation feature.
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
0	(a) a first host processing environment	computer running a Microsoft product
7	comprising	containing the Product Activation feature,
•		including Windows XP, Office XP, Visio 2002
8	·	and Reader
·	(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
9.	(2) main memory operatively connected	main memory of computer
	to said central processing unit;	main memory of computer
10	(3) mass storage operatively connected	hard disk or other mass storage contained in
	to said central processing unit and said	computer
11	main memory;	
12	(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant	Microsoft Product Activation software
12	software designed to be loaded into said	
13	main memory and executed by said central	
-	processing unit, said tamper resistant	·
14	software comprising:	D. J. A.
	(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more	Product Activation software generates hash
15	aspects of said host processing	information relating to the host processing environment as part of the activation process
	environment,	environment as part of the activation process
16	(2) one or more storage locations	hardware information is stored in the
17	storing said information;	computer's storage
"	(3) integrity programming which	
18	(i) causes said machine check	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
·	programming to derive said	initial activation, Product Activation checks
19	information,	the originally derived hardware information
		against current hardware
20	(ii) compares said information	each time the Microsoft program starts up after
	to information previously stored	initial activation, Product Activation checks
21	in said one or more storage	the originally derived hardware information
. . ∦	locations, and (iii) generates an indication	against current hardware Product Activation software indicates whether
22	based on the result of said	the test has passed or failed
23	comparison; and	the test has passed of faired
∠>	(4) programming which takes one or	
24	more actions based on the state of said	
-7	indication;	
25	(i) said one or more actions	Product Activation software displays a
	including displaying a message	message to the user if the test fails
26	to the user.	
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Exhibit B 3

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5	SESSION CLAIMITANGUAGE SESSION LES	THE CHAIM OF THE RINGEMENT AND ASSESSED.
)	156.	Products infringing: Windows Media Player
6	A virtual distribution environment comprising	
. 7	a first host processing environment comprising	WMP with Individualized DRM client (referred to hereafter as the Individualized WMP) running on a client computer
8	a central processing unit	Client CPU
9	main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit	Client memory
10	mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory	Local disk drive
	said mass storage storing tamper resistant	Individualized WMP (I-WMP) stored on disk
11	software designed to be loaded into said main memory and executed by said central	and loaded into main memory upon execution. I-WMP is tamper resistant.
12	processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:	
13.		Individualization module is generated by the
	information from one or more aspects of said	MS individualization service either when the
14	host processing environment,	un-individualized WMP tries to open licensed content that requires a security upgrade (aka,
15		Individualization) or when the user requests an
1.6		upgrade un-provoked. The individualization module is unique and signed and is bound to a unique hardware ID using the MS machine
17	one or more storage locations storing said	activation process. The aforementioned unique feature are located
18	information	in multiple places or storage locations
	integrity programming which	
19	causes said machine check programming to derive said information,	The ID is regenerated by WMP/DRM client when first loading the Individualized DRM
20	,	Client to access a piece of content requiring the security upgrade.
21	compares said information to information	The program checks the new copy against the
22	previously stored in said one or more storage	one to which the Individualized DRM client is
22	locations, and generates an indication based on the result of	bound. Program stores the result of this check.
23	said comparison; and	
24	programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication	If these are not equal, the user is notified via a message stating that he/she must acquire a
· • ·	based on the state of said indication	security upgrade (that is, the current security
25		upgrade is invalid). If they are equal then
~	. •	processing of songs requiring Individualization
26		continues.
27	said one or more actions including at least	Songs targeted to this Individualization module
41	temporarily disabling certain functions.	cannot be accessed until the upgrade is correct.

Exhibit B

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4	157. A virtual distribution environment comprising	Infringing products include: Windows Media Player
-5	a first host processing environment comprising	See 156
	a central processing unit	See 156
6	main memory operatively connected to said	See 156
, U	central processing unit	
7	mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory	See 156
8	said mass storage storing tamper resistant	See 156
. •	software designed to be loaded into said main	
9	memory and executed by said central	
_	processing unit, said tamper resistant software	
10	comprising:	
- 1	machine check programming which derives	See 156
11	information from one or more aspects of said	
1	host processing environment.	
-12	one or more storage locations storing said	See 156
	information	0 156
13	integrity programming which causes said	See 156
	machine check programming to derive said	·
14	information compares said information to information previously stored in said one or	
15	more storage locations, and	
15	generates an indication based on the result of	See 156
16	said comparison; and	500 150
.~	programming which takes one or more actions	See 156
17	based on the state of said indication	·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	said one or more actions including displaying a	If these are not equal, the user is notified via a
18	message to the user.	message stating that he/she must acquire a
. 1		security upgrade (that is, the current security
19		upgrade is invalid).
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157.	Infringing Product: Microsoft's Windows File Protection and System File Checker features, embodied in Microsoft's Windows 2000, Windows XP products, and Server 2003
A virtual distribution environment comprising	
(a) a first host processing environment comprising	computer running Microsoft Windows 2000 c Windows XP.
(1) a central processing unit;	CPU of computer
(2) main memory operatively connected to said central processing unit;	
(3) mass storage operatively connected to said central processing unit and said main memory;	hard disk or other mass storage contained in computer
(b) said mass storage storing tamper resistant software designed to be loaded into said	Windows File Protection process/service ("WFP") and System File Checker (SFC.exe)
main memory and executed by said central processing unit, said tamper resistant software comprising:	features of winlogon.exe. Winlogon.exe is treated as a "critical" service by the Windows operating system. Files supporting WFP
Software comprising.	(including winlogon.exe, sfc.exe, sfc.dll (200 only), sfcfiles.dll (2000 only) and sfc os.dll
	(XP only)) are "protected" files and are signe using a signature verified by a hidden key. In
	Windows 2000, WFP uses hidden functions within the sfc.dll library. Functions are imported by "ordinal" instead of "name."
(1) machine check programming which derives information from one or more	Winlogon either directly or using another dll (XP) or using SFC.dll (2000) determines if
aspects of said host processing environment,	changed file was protected, computes the has of protected files and, if necessary, computes the hash of the file in the dll cache before using
·	it to replace a file overwritten by an incorrect version of the file.
(2) one or more storage locations storing said information;	hardware information is stored in the computer's memory
(3) integrity programming which (i) causes said machine check	Windows notifies Winlogon when there has
programming to derive said information,	been a system directory change or a change in the dll cache.
(ii) compares said information to information previously stored	Winlogon either directly or using another dll (XP) or using SFC.dll (2000) compares
(ii) compares said information to information previously stored in said one or more storage locations, and	

	(iii) generates an indication based on the result of said comparison; and	the Catalog file(s) before using it to replace an overwritten file. An event is written to the Event Viewer if hashes do not agree.
	(4) programming which takes one or more actions based on the state of said indication;	Depending on the circumstances, WFP displays several messages to the user, including prompting the user to contact the system administrator, and to insert a CD-ROM
	(i) said one or more actions including displaying a message to the user.	See above. Messages also constitute viewable Event Property pop-ups.
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_		Product Infringing: XBox
5	A process comprising the following steps:	The process constitutes assembly and use of components making up an XBox game.
6	accessing a first record containing	The first record consists of the second file
7	information directly or indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first	table on an XBox DVD. This table identifies the .xbe file which includes the
.8	component assembly,	game information.
9	at least one of said elements including at	The xbe file includes executable
10	least some executable programming,	programming.
11	at least one of said elements constituting a	The xbe file is a load module.
12	load module, said load module including executable	The xbe file includes a header.
13	programming and a header;	Most information the xbe header is not
14	at least a portion of said header is a public portion which is characterized by a	obfuscated.
15	relatively lower level of security protection; and	
16	at least a portion of said header is a private portion which is characterized, at least some of the time, by a level of security	The entry point address and the kernel image thunk address listed in the xbe header are obfuscated and therefore at a
17	protection which is relatively higher than said relatively lower level of security	higher level of security protection.
18 19	protection, using said information to identify and locate said one or more elements;	The second file table identifies the .xbe file, including where that file is located.
ł	accessing said located one or more	The .xbe file is accessed by the XBox.
20	elements;	
21	securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said	At runtime, the .xbe file is assembled with certain services of the operating system to
22	first component assembly;	form a component assembly. Security associated with this assembling process
23 24		includes verifying signatures associated with portions of the .xbe file, and replacing
25		obfuscated calls to operating system services with actual addresses.
26		The assembly may also include patch files downloaded from a remote server.
27		
28	executing at least some of said executable	Game play requires execution of the
ŀ	executing at least some of said executable	Game play requires execution of the

Exhibit B

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1	programming; and	assembled programming.
2	checking said record for validity prior to performing said executing step.	The second file table is protected by a digital signature, and is not loaded/used unless the digital signature is verified against the file.
4		
5	7. A process as in claim 6 in which:	
6 7	said relatively lower level of security protection comprises storing said public header portion in an unencrypted state; and	The header is protected by the techniques protecting the xbe such as signing and security descriptors, but it is not encrypted except as noted below.
8	said relatively higher level of security protection comprises storing said private header portion in an encrypted state.	The entry point address and the kernel image thunk address listed in the xbe header are obfuscated. The Xbox SDK's
9		(XDK) image build uses a key value shared with the retail XBox to perform two XOR
10		operations against the addresses
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5	8.	Infringing products: Microsoft CLR or CCLR and .NET Framework SDK and products that include one or both of these.
U	A process comprising the following steps:	
· 7	(a) accessing a first record containing information directly or indirectly identifying	The first record is either an assembly manifest, or a whole assembly; the elements are other
8	one or more elements of a first component assembly,	assemblies that are referenced as external in the first record; the first component assembly is a NET application domain.
10	(1) at least one of said elements including at least some executable programming.	Assembly contains executable programming.
11	(2) at least one of said elements constituting a load module,	This is an external assembly referenced in the first record.
12 13	(i) said load module including executable programming and a header;	Assemblies include executable programming, and the assembly manifest and CLS type metadata constitute a header.
14	(ii) said header including an	This feature is provided for in the .NET
15	execution space identifier identifying at least one aspect of	architecture through numerous mechanisms, for example, by demands for ZoneID
16	an execution space required for use and/or execution of the load module associated with said	permissions.
17	header;	
18	(iii) said execution space identifier provides the capability for distinguishing between	SecurityZone or other evidence provides this capability.
19 20	execution spaces providing a higher level of security and execution spaces providing a	
21	lower level of security; (b) using said information to identify and	Manifest and type metadata information
22	locate said one or more elements;	section is used to identify and locate files, code elements, resource elements, individual classes and methods.
23 24	(c) accessing said located one or more elements;	Step carried out by the CLR or CCLR loader.
25	(d) securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said first	CLR or CCLR carries out this step, including checking the integrity of the load module,
26	component assembly;	checking the load module's permissions, placing the load module contents into an
27		application domain, isolating it from malicious or badly behaved code, and from code that does not have the permission to call it.
28	(e) executing at least some of said executable programming; and	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR and the CLR/CCLR host.

Exhibit B

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•	(f) checking said record for validity prior to performing said executing step.	The CLR/CCLR checks the authenticity and the integrity of the first .NET assembly.
2	9. A process as in claim 8 in which said	The CLR/CCLR constitutes a secure
3	execution space providing a higher level of	processing environment.
	security comprises a secure processing environment.	
4 ·	13. A process as in claim 8 further comprising:	
5	(a) comparing said execution space identifier against information identifying the execution	In one example, the ZoneIdentityPermissionAttribute SecurityZone
6	space in which said executing step is to occur;	value demanded by control in the assembly
7	and	manifest is compared against the SecurityZone attribute value corresponding to the calling
		method
8	(b) taking an action if said execution space identifier requires an execution space with a	CLR/CCLR will throw an exception and transfer control to an exception handler in the
9	security level higher than that of the execution	calling routine, or it will shut down the
10	space in which said executing step is to occur.	application if there is no such exception handler, if the permissions do not include the
		permissions required by the
11		ZoneIdentityPermissionAttribute. The ZoneIdentityPermissions are hierarchical,
12		unless customized.
13	14. A process as in claim 13 in which said action includes terminating said process prior	CLR/CCLR may terminate the process or transfer control to an exception handler that
	to said executing step.	may itself terminate the process.
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8.	Products infringing include Windows Install
	SDK, and products that include the Window. Installer technology.
A process comprising the following steps:	Scenario 1: use of Windows Installer packag
A process comprising the ronowing steps.	(i.e. MSI files) to create Windows Installer-
	enabled applications, such as Office 2000 an
	used of the WI service to install them.
•	Scenario 2: software distribution technologie that use the Windows Installer OS service for
	installation, such as Internet Component
	Download and products like Office Web
	Components.
	Either scenario can be used by SMS, IntelliMirror and third party tools like
	InstallShield and WISE.
	NT or later operating systems (because they
	use the subsystem identifier)
	using cabinet files, .CAB, (because they have manifest and INF and/or OSD files), and
	have been signed with a digital signature and
	will be authenticated by Authenticode or
	WinVerifyTrust API and
	contain at least one PE (portable executables)
(a) accessing a first record containing	Scenario 1: First record is the .MSI file that
information directly or indirectly identifying	contains information on what goes in the
one or more elements of a first component	assembly and how to install the assembly.
assembly,	Scenario 2:
	A. First record is the cabinet manifest
	(indirect instructions)
	B. Or, First record can be INF and/or OSI
•	files (direct instructions)
(1) at least one of said elements	Both scenarios: The PE (portable executable)
including at least some executable	in the cabinet file is the executable
programming,	programming.
(2) at least one of said elements	Both scenarios: PE is a load module:
	•
constituting a load module,	
	Both scenarios: The PE has several headers.

Exhibit B

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1	header;	
2	(ii) said header including an	Both scenarios: SUBSYTEM is a field in the
3	execution space identifier identifying at least one aspect of an execution space required for	PE Optional Header that is an execution space
5	use and/or execution of the load module associated with said header;	
6	(iii) said execution space	Both scenarios: SUBSYSTEM distinguishes
7	identifier provides the capability for distinguishing between	between programs that can run in kernel mode and those that can run in user mode. This is a
8	execution spaces providing a higher level of security and	key security concept of process separation that was introduced with Windows NT.
9	execution spaces providing a lower level of security;	The Subsystem field in the PE header is used
10		by the system to indicate whether the executable will run within Ring 3 (user mode)
		or use Ring 0 (native or kernel mode).
11		Anything running in Ring 3 is limited to its own processing space. Executables running in
12		Ring 0 can reach out to other spaces and have security measure built around them.
13	(b) using said information to identify and	Scenario 1: the MSI file identifies and locates
14	locate said one or more elements;	the elements
15		Scenario 2: .CAB manifest is used to identify Physical
16		location OSD and/or INF is used to identify Logical
17		location
18		
19	(c) accessing said located one or more elements;	Scenario 1: Using the MSI file
20	·	Scenario 2: Using INF and/or OSD in cabinet file
21		
22	(d) securely assembling said one or more	Both scenarios: Using the Window Installer
23	elements to form at least a portion of said first component assembly;	OS service with various properties and flags on the settings for higher protection.
24		Windows Installer has numerous flags that the
25		developer can set to indicate how the assembly will be installed, in what privilege level, with
26		how much user interface, and how much ability the user has to watch or change what is
27	·	occurring. These controls have been strengthened with each release of Windows
28		Installer. Windows Installer 1.1 and later has the ability to limit the users capabilities during
		the installation. In a Windows 2000
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environment and later, using the Group Policybased Change and Configuration Management, the administrator has the most control

Fields that can be set by the developer or administrator to control what users can do

Transformssecure can be set to a value of 1 to inform the installer that transforms are to be cached locally on the user's computer in a location the user does not have write access. (Transforms create custom installations from a basic generic installation, for example to make the Finance versions different from the Marketing version or English versions different

AllowLockdownBrowse and DisableBrowse can prevent users from browsing to the

SourceList can be used to specify the only allowable source to be used for the installation

Environment can be used to specify whether the installation can be done while the user is logged on or only when no user is logged on.

Security Summary Property conveys whether a package can be opened as read-only or with

Privileged Property is used by developers of installer packages to make the installation conditional upon system policy, the user being an administrator, or assignment by an

Restricted Public Properties can be set as variables for an installation. "For managed installations, the package author may need to limit which public properties are passed to the server side and can be changed by a user that is not a system administrator. Some are commonly necessary to maintain a secure environment when the installation requires the installer use elevated privileges. " SecureCustomProperties can be created by the author of an installation package to add controls beyond the default list.

MsiSetInternalUI specifies the level of user interface from none to full.

A Sequence Table can be used to specify the required order of execution for the installation process. There are three modes, one of which is the Administrative Installation that is used by the network administrator to assign and install

InstallServicesAction registers a service for the system and it can only be used if the user is

1 2		an administrator or has elevated privileges with permission to install services or that the application is part of a managed installation.
3		DisableMedia system policy disables media sources and disables browsing to media sources. It can be used with DisableBrowse to
4		secure installations version 1.1 that doesn't have some of the other capabilities.
5		AlwaysInstallElevated can be set per user or per machine and is used to install managed
6		applications with elevated privileges. AllowLockdownBrowse,
. 7 . 8		AllowLockdownMedia and AllowLockdownPatch set these capabilities so
9		they can only be performed by an administrator during an elevated installation.
10		[See article "HowTo: Configure Windows Installer for Maximum Security (Q247528).
11		Windows XP Professional and .NET have the additional capability to set Software Restriction
12		Policies and have these used by Windows Installer.
13		In addition, most of the software distribution technologies that use Windows Installer also
14		add a layer of their own controls. For example, SMS 2.0 enables the administrators to control
15 16		the installation is optional or required and whether the user can affect the installation contents/features at all.
17	(e) executing at least some of said executable programming; and	Both scenarios: Part of executable is called during installation in order to do self-
18	F8	registration or perform custom actions. The overall executable is used at runtime.
19		·
20	(f) checking said record for validity prior to performing said executing step.	Scenario 1: Sign the overall package and the cabinet files.
21		Scenario 2: The cabinet file is signed.
22		For IE with the default security level or higher, the digital signature is verified by
23		Authenticode or a similar utility before the component is allowed to be assembled.
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5	35.	Products infringing include all products that host the Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime.
6	A process comprising the following steps:	
7 8	(a) at a first processing environment receiving a first record from a second processing environment remote from said first processing environment;	Computer running the Microsoft CLR/CCLR receives, for example, a shared assembly header or a complete shared assembly from another computer, for example a server.
9	(1) said first record being received in a secure container;	The shared assembly is cryptographically hashed and signed.
10	(2) said first record containing identification information directly or	The first record is either an assembly manifest, or a whole assembly; the elements are other
11 12	indirectly identifying one or more elements of a first component assembly;	assemblies that are referenced as external in the first record; the first component assembly is a .NET application domain.
13	(i) at least one of said elements including at least some executable programming;	Assembly contains executable programming.
14	(ii) said component assembly allowing access to or use of	The specified information can include any kind of data file, stream, log, environment variables,
15	specified information; (3) said secure container also including	The shared assembly includes at least some
16	a first of said elements; (b) accessing said first record	executable programming. CLR/CCLR accesses the assembly or assembly header.
17 18	(c) using said identification information to identify and locate said one or more elements;	Manifest and type metadata information section is used to identify and locate files, code elements, resource elements, individual classes and methods.
19	(1) said locating step including locating	Met by a multifile assembly, with files distributed across a network, or by the second
20 21	a second of said elements at a third processing environment located remotely from said first processing	element constituting another referenced assembly located elsewhere; the CLR/CCLR
22	environment and said second processing environment;	uses probing to locate and access the file.
23	(d) accessing said located one or more	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR loader.
24	elements; (1) said element accessing step	Step carried out by the CLR/CCLR loader.
25	including retrieving said second element from said third processing environment;	
26	(e) securely assembling said one or more elements to form at least a portion of said first	CLR/CCLR carries out this step, including checking the integrity of the load module,
27 28	component assembly specified by said first record; and	checking the load module's permissions, placing the load module contents into an application domain, isolating it from malicious
		or badly behaved code, and from code that

Exhibit B

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(f) executing at least some of		does not have the perr Step carried out by the	
(1) said executing st said first processing	ep taking place at environment.	CLR/CCLR is operati environment specified	ng in the first processing above.
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5	34.	Product Infringing: Microsoft Operating Systems that support device driver signature technology
7	A descriptive data structure embodied on a computer-readable medium or other logic	Signature technology
. /	device including the following elements:	m 1 PIE is a date
8	a representation of the format of data contained in a first rights management data structure	The driver package's INF is a data structure. The INF contains multiple types of sections, structured as hierarchy
10		/"branches," that the Windows operating system or its Plug and Play and/or Set-up
11		installation services "branch" through based on the operating system information and device for which a driver is to be
12		installed. The installation services use the "branching" structure (format) to determine
13		what files should be installed. The INF, further provides disk location information and file directory path information for the
14 15		files identified as necessary as a result of the "branching" process.
16		The driver package is a "rights
17	·	management" data structure based on the fact that it is governed and based on the fact that it processes governed information.
18	·	Rights Management as Governed Item
19 20		A driver manufacturer can include rules governing the driver's installation and/or use in the driver's INF file. For example:
21		Security entries specify an access control
22	•	list for the driver. Driver developers can specify rules that
23		determine behavior of the driver package based on the user's operating system
24	·	version, including product type and suite and the device for which the driver is to be installed
25		Rules specifying logging
26		Local administrators can establish policy as to what action or notification should occur
27 28		in the event that a driver being installed is not signed.

Exhibit B

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1 2 3 4 5	·.	The operating system installation services have a ranking criteria it follows when multiple drivers are available for a newly detected device. The criterion is used to determine the driver best suited for ensuring compatibility with the operating system and ensuring functionality of the device.
6 7 8		Drivers have been certified to be compatible with specified operating system versions for their respective device classes. The catalog file protects the integrity of the driver.
9		Microsoft distributes the Driver Protection List to prevent known bad deriver from being installed.
11		Processing Rights Managed Items
12		Certain drivers (SAP) have been explicitly certified to protect DRM content.
13		MSDN – DRM Overview
14		A DRM-compliant driver must prevent unauthorized copying while digital content
15	1	is being played. In addition, the driver must disable all digital outputs that can transmit
16 17	·	the content over a standard interface (such as S/PDIF) through which the decrypted content can be captured.
18	said representation including:	
19	element information contained within said first rights management data	The elements of a driver package include: A driver that is typically a dynamic-link
20	structure; and	library with the .sys filename extension. An INF file containing information that the
21		system Setup components use to install support for the device.
22		A driver catalog file containing the digital signature.
23		One or more optional co-installers which are a Win32® DLL that assists in device
24		installation NT-based operating systems. Other files, such as a device installation application, a device icon, and so forth.
25 26		XP DDK - INF Version Section
27		The LayoutFile entry specifies one or more
28	· .	additional system-supplied INF files that contain layout information on the source
۵۵		media required for installing the software

•		
2		described in this INF. All system-supplied INF files specify this entry.
. 3		The CatalogFile entry specifies a catalog (.cat) file to be included on the distribution media of a device/driver.
. 4	organization information regarding the organization of said elements	Within an INF is a hierarchy with the top being a list of manufacturers, and sub-lists
6	within said first rights management data structure; and	of models and at the bottom a list of install information by model.
7		For Windows XP and later versions of NT- based operating systems, entries in the
. 8		Manufacturer section can be decorated to specify operating system versions. The
9		specified versions indicate OS versions with which the specified INF <i>Models</i> sections will be used. If no versions are
10 11		specified, Setup uses the specified <i>Models</i> section for all versions of all operating
12		systems.
13		INF's SourceDisksNames and SourceDisksFiles sections specify
14		organization information. XP DDK Source Media for INFs The methods you should use to specify
15		source media for device files depend on whether your INFs ship separately from the
16		operating system or are included with the operating system.
17		INFs for drivers that are delivered separately from the operating system specify where the files are located using
18		SourceDisksNames and SourceDisksFiles sections.
19 20		If the files to support the device are included with the operating system, the
21		INF must specify a LayoutFile entry in the Version section of the file. Such an entry
22		specifies where the files reside on the operating system media. An INF that
23		specifies a LayoutFile entry must not include SourceDisksNames and
24		SourceDisksFiles sections. XP DDK – INF SourceDisksNames
25		Section A SourceDisksNames section identifies
26	· .	the distribution disks or CD-ROM discs that contain the source files to be
27		transferred to the target machine during installation. Relevant values of an entry in
28		the INF include: diskid Specifies a source disk.
20		disk-description - Describes the contents

1		and/or purpose of the disk identified by diskid.
2		tag-or-cab-file This optional value
3		specifies the name of a tag file or cabinet file
,		supplied on the distribution disk, either in
4		the installation root or in the subdirectory specified by path, if any.
_		path This optional value specifies the
5		path to the directory on the distribution
. 6	1	disk containing source files. The path is
		relative to the installation root and is expressed as \dirname I \dirname 2 \ and so
7		forth.
8	·	flags For Windows XP and later, setting
0		this to 0x10 forces Setup to use cab-or-tag-
. 9		file as a cabinet file name, and to use tag- file as a tag file name. Otherwise, flags is
10		for internal use only.
10		tag-file For Windows XP and later, if
11		flags is set to 0x10, this optional value specifies the name of a tag file supplied on
10		the distribution medium, either in the
12		installation root or in the subdirectory
13		specified by path. The value should specify the file name and extension without path
1.4		information.
14		XP DDK INF SourceDisksFiles Section
15		A SourceDisksFiles section names the source files used during installation,
16	·	identifies the source disks (or CD-ROM
16		discs) that contain those files, and provides
17		the path to the subdirectories, if any, on the distribution disks containing individual
	·	files. Relevant values in an entry in the
18	·	INF would include:
19		filename Specifies the name of the file on
•		the source disk. diskid Specifies the integer identifying
20		the source disk that contains the file. This
21		value and the initial path to the
		subdir(ectory), if any, containing the named file must be defined in a
22		SourceDisksNames section of the same
23	·	INF.
		subdir This optional value specifies the subdirectory (relative to the
24		SourceDisksNames path specification, if
25	·	any) on the source disk where the named
	information relating to materials gold	file resides.
26	information relating to metadata, said metadata including:	
27	metadata rules used at least in part to	The driver manufacture can specify rules in
	govern at least one aspect of use and/or	the INF that govern the installation and/or
28	display of content stored within a rights management data structure,	use of the driver. For example, security entries specify an access control list for the

driver. Driver developers can specify rules in an INF file that determines behavior of the driver package based on the user's operating system version, including product type and suite. Also, rules related to logging can be specified as mentioned in next claim element.

<u>For Example – Access Control List</u> Rules

XP DDK - Tightening File-Open
Security in a Device INF File
For Microsoft Windows 2000 and later,
Microsoft tightened file-open security in
the class installer INFs for certain device
classes, including CDROM, DiskDrive,
FDC, FloppyDisk, HDC, and
SCSIAdapter.

If you are unsure whether the class installer for your device has tightened security on file opens, you should tighten security by using the device's INF file to assign a value to the DeviceCharacteristics value name in the registry. Do this within an addregistry-section, which is specified using the INF AddReg directive.

XP-DDK -- INF AddReg Directive

An INF can also contain one or more optional add-registry-section.security sections, each specifying a security descriptor that will be applied to all registry values described within a named add-registry-section.

A Security entry specifies a security descriptor for the device. The security-descriptor-string is a string with tokens to indicate the DACL (D:) security component. A class-installer INF can specify a security descriptor for a device class. A device INF can specify a security descriptor for an individual device, overriding the security for the class. If the class and/or device INF specifies a security-descriptor-string, the PnP Manager propagates the descriptor to all the device objects for a device, including the FDO, filter DOs, and the PDO.

For Example – Operating System Versioning

Operating-System Versioning for Drivers

		•
1		under Windows XP
2		Setup selects the [Models] section to use based on the following rules:
· 4		If the INF contains [Models] sections for
5		several major or minor operating system version numbers, Setup uses the section with the highest version numbers that are
6.		not higher than the operating system version on which the installation is taking
7		place.
8		If the INF [Models] sections that match the operating system version also include
. 9		product type decorations, product suite decorations, or both, then Setup selects the
10		section that most closely matches the running operating system.
. 11	said metadata rules including at least one rule specifying that information	The AddService directive can set up event-logging services for drivers.
12	relating to at least one use or display of said content be recorded and/or	INF AddService Directive An AddService directive is used to control
13	reported.	how (and when) the services of particular Windows 2000 or later device's drivers are
14		loaded, any dependencies on other underlying legacy drivers or services, and
15		so forth. Optionally, this directive sets up event-logging services by the
16		devices/drivers as well. Relevant sections of the directive's entry
17		include: event-log-install-section -Optionally
18	·	references an INF-writer-defined section in which event-logging services for this device (or devices) are set up.
19		EventLogType Optionally specifies one
20		of System, Security, or Application. If omitted, this defaults to System, which is
21		almost always the appropriate value for the installation of device drivers. For example,
22		an INF would specify Security only if the to-be-installed driver provides its own
23	·	security support. EventName Optionally specifies a name
24		to use for the event log. If omitted, this defaults to the given ServiceName.
25		
26	35. A descriptive data structure as in claim	
27	34, in which: said first rights management data structure	The driver package is secured through a
28	comprises a first secure container.	catalog file that is signed by Microsoft's Windows Hardware Quality Lab and

	·	
1 2		contains the hash of each file of the driver's package. The INF identifies the catalog file used to sign the driver package.
3	36. A descriptive data structure as in claim 35, in which:	
;	said first secure container comprises:	The first secure container is the driver package secured by a catalog file.
	said content; and	The content is the driver and related files within the signed driver package.
	rules at least in part governing at least one use of said content.	The rules are within the INF, which is part of the signed driver package.
	37. A descriptive data structure as in claim 36, wherein the descriptive data structure is stored in said first secure container.	The INF is stored within the signed driver package.
	44. A descriptive data structure as in claim 34, further including:	
	a representation of the format of data contained in a second rights management	The manufacture and models sections in the INF Version section are provided for
	data structure,	the possibility of a single INF representing the format for multiple drivers.
	• • • '	Operating system version "decorating" relating the architecture, major and minor
		operating systems versions, product and suit information all relate to the target
		environment and is used to identify the files necessary for the target environment.
		An INF file, such as in the case of operating system targeting, can be used for
		more than one driver package since it can contain more than one catalog file.
		Further an INF can address the drives necessary for a multi-functional device.
	said second rights management data structure differing in at least one respect	The files of the second data structure would vary from the files on the first data
	from said first rights management data structure.	structure.
	45. A descriptive data structure as in claim 44, in which:	
	said information regarding elements contained within said first rights	INF specify where the driver files are located using the SourceDiskNames and
	management data structure includes information relating to the location of at	SourceDiskFiles sections.
	information relating to the rotation of at	
	least one such element.	
		Operating system version "decorating"

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1 2	environment in which the descriptive data structure may be used.	operating systems versions, product and suit information all relate to the first target environment.
3		1
4	47. A descriptive data structure as in claim 46, further including:	
5	a second target data block including information relating to a second target	Operating system version decorating will cover multiple operating systems.
6	environment in which the descriptive data structure may be used,	
7	said second target environment differing in at least one respect from said first target	This is the reason for version decorating.
8	environment.	
9	48. A descriptive data structure as in claim 46, further including:	
10	a source message field containing information at least in part identifying the	The provider entry in the version section of the INF identifies the provider of the INF
11	source for the descriptive data structure.	file. Also, the INF contains a manufacture section.
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4	THE SECULIAR SUBJECT OF THE SECULIAR SECURITY OF THE SECULIAR SECURITY OF THE SECULIAR SECURITY OF THE SECURIT	MALE CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENTS
5	58.	Product Infringing: Microsoft Reader SDK and Microsoft Digital Asset Server.
6	A method of creating a first secure container, said method including the	Method is carried out by Microsoft's Digital Asset Server and Microsoft's
•	following steps;	.Litgen tools
7	(a) accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure	opf file describing the file structure of a protected e-book including metadata,
8	including or addressing (1) organization information at least	manifest, and "spine" information Organization information regarding
9	in part describing a required or desired organization of a content	organization of the ebook and the inscription as specified in the manifest and
10	section of said first secure container, and	spine information in the .opf file
11	(2) metadata information at least in part specifying at least one step	Metadata constitutes rules specifying the degree of security to use and/or XrML rules
12	required or desired in creation of said first secure container.	
13	(b) using said descriptive data structure to organize said first secure container	e-book packaging carried out by Microsoft Litgen tool
14	contents (c) using said metadata information to at	Step performed by Digital Asset Server;
15	least in part determine specific information required to be included in	example of specific information is owner/purchaser information required in
16	said first secure container contents; and	the inscription process
17	(d) generating or identifying at least one rule designed to control at least one	Analyzing the metadata and finally packaging the e-book using a particular
18	aspect of access to or use of at least a portion of said first secure container	security level specified through the metadata
19	contents.	
20	71. A method as in claim 58, in which: (a) said specific information required to	Owner purchaser information required in
21	be included includes information at least in part identifying at least one	the inscription process; XrML rule requiring display of copyright notice
22	owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	

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5 6	58.	Product Infringing: All products that host the Microsoft Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime.
. 7	A method of creating a first secure container, said method including the	Method is practiced by a user using the Common Language Runtime (CLR) or
8	following steps;	Compact Common Language Runtime (CCLR) to create a dynamic shared
9		assembly or .NET Framework SDK to create a shared assembly
10	(a) accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure including or addressing	.NET framework Assembly class and/or AssemblyBuilder class and/or AssemblyInfo file
11	(1) organization information at least in part describing a required or	This information is specified in the classes named above and in the AssemblyInfo file.
12 13	desired organization of a content section of said first secure container, and	-
14	(2) metadata information at least in part specifying at least one step	This information is addressed in the classes and the AssemblyInfo file, e.g., for a shared assembly metadata will be specified that
15	required or desired in creation of said first secure container;	the assembly is to be signed using specified key
16 17	(b) using said descriptive data structure to organize said first secure container contents;	This step is carried out by applications and tools using the classes and assembly info file, including CLR (or CCLR) and .NET Framework SDK
18 19 20	(c) using said metadata information to at least in part determine specific information required to be included in said first secure container contents; and	This step is carried out by applications and tools using the assembly info file and classes that specify the metadata required in the target assembly
21	(d) generating or identifying at least one rule designed to control at least one	User may specify rules, as specified in the NET Framework SDK, to be placed in the
22	aspect of access to or use of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	assembly manifest including such rules requiring that all code be managed (CLR or CCLR compliant), "Code Access Security"
23	contents.	permissions be supplied for use of code supplied in the assembly, etc
24	64. A method as in claim 58, in which:	C. 1
25	(a) said creation of said first secure container occurs at a first data processing arrangement located at a	Can be a server, PC or workstation running CLR (or CCLR) to create a dynamic shared assembly or .NET Framework SDK to
26	first site;	create a shared assembly)
27	(b) said first data processing arrangement including a communications port; and	Included in virtually any computer
28	(c) said method further includes: (1) prior to said step of accessing said descriptive data structure, said	Download of the assemblyinfo file and/or a file containing a class calling the
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Exhibit B

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I	first data processing arrangement	DefineDynamicAssembly methods or
2	receiving said descriptive data structure from a second data	download of SDK containing assemblybuilder class from a second site
3	processing arrangement located at a second site,	·
4	(d) said receipt occurring through said first data processing arrangement communications port.	Communications port is normally used for downloading
5	67. A method as in claim 64, further	
6	comprising:	<u> </u>
7	at said first processing site, receiving said metadata through said communications port.	Download of the AssemblyInfo file and/or a file containing a class calling the DefineDynamicAssembly methods or
8 1.		download of SDK containing assemblybuilder class from a second site
. 9	68. A method as in claim 67, in which,	
- · .	(a) said metadata is received separately	Method practiced when metadata names are
10	from said descriptive data structure.	addressed by the assembly class and a
11		template for the AssemblyInfo file, and values corresponding to those names are received through a user interface such as
12		provided by Microsoft Visual Studio or are provided from a separate file
13	71. A method as in claim 58, in which:	
14	(a) said specific information required to be included includes information at	The Assembly class definition includes attributes for company name and trademark
•	least in part identifying at least one	information, and these may be required
15	owner or creator of at least a portion of said first secure container contents.	attributes specified in the AssemblyInfo file
16	72. A method as in claim 58, in which:	
	(a) said specific information required to	The Assembly class definition includes an
17	be included includes a copyright	attribute for copyright field that may be
,	notice.	required by the AssemblyInfo file
18		•
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Exhibit B

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II _		
170	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENTS
	58.	Product Infringing: Microsoft .NET Framework, Visual Studio .NET, and tools that include the Assembly Generator tool AL.exe.
	A method of creating a first secure container, said method including the following steps;	The Assembly Generation tool generates a portable execution file with an assembly manifest from one or more files that are either Microsoft intermediate language (MSIL) modules or resource files. When using the tool's signing option, the assembly becomes a secure container.
	(a) accessing a descriptive data structure, said descriptive data structure including or addressing	The descriptive data structure is the text file used as input by the Assembly Generation tool.
	(1) organization information at least in part describing a required or	The DDS specifies the <i>link</i> and or <i>embed</i> directives to indicate which source files should be included in the assembly, how
	desired organization of a content section of said first secure container, and	the included resource will be tagged, and i the resource will be private. Private resources are not visible to other
		assemblies. These tags are used to organize the
		assembly into named sections. Private attributes are used to organize the assembly into both public and private sections. (Public sections are the default.)
	(2) metadata information at least in part specifying at least one step required or desired in creation of said first secure container;	The text file can contain "options" relating to how the assembly should be built and additional information that should be included.
		Main – Specifies the method to use as an entry point when converting a module to an executable file.
		Algid - Specifies an algorithm to hash
		all files. Comp — Specifies string for the Company field.
		Conf – Specifies string for Configuration field
	·	Copy – Specifies string for Copyright field.
		Culture - Specifies the culture string to associate with the assembly.
		Delay - Variation of this option

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. 2	2			fully or partially signed and whether the public key is placed in the assembly. Description – Specifies the description
. 3	3	-		field.
	. I	-		Evidence – Embeds file in the assembly with the resource name
4	1	1		Security. Evidence.
5		1.		Fileversion - Specifies the file version
,		İ		of the assembly.
. 6				Flags – Specifies flags for such things
				as the assembly is side-by-side
7				compatible, assembly cannot execute
8	-		•	with other versions if either they are executing in the same application
0	. :		••	domain, process or computer.
٠ 9		ŀ	. ·	Keyf - Specifies a file that contains a
		}	•	key or key pair to sign an assembly.
10			•	Keyn – Specifies the container that holds
				a key pair. Product - Specifies string for Product
11	1	1	,	field.
12		1		Producty - Specifies string for Product
				Version.
13.		1		Template - Specifies the assembly fro
1.4				which to inherit all assembly metadata. Title - Specifies string for Title field.
14				Trade - Specifics string for Trademark
15			•	field.
		ļ	·	V - Specifies version information.
16		(b)	using said descriptive data structure to	The following directives are used to specify
177			organize said first secure container	which files are to be compiled into the assembly, how they will be tagged, and
17	1		contents	whether or not they will be visible to other
18		1	•	assemblies, AKA private:
19				Embed[name, private] - copies the
20.			,	content of the file into the assembly and applies an optional name tag, and
20			·	optional private attribute.
21		1	·	Link[name, private] - file becomes part
		1		of the assembly via a link and applies an
22	.			optional name tag, and optional private
22				The following are some of the "options"
23		(c)		address what information should be
24			least in part determine specific information required to be included in	included in the secure container:
- ·			said first secure container contents;	
25	.		and	Main – Specifies the method to use as
~		l		an entry point when converting a
26				module to an executable file. Comp - Specifies string for the
27				Company field.
-			·	Conf – Specifies string for
28				Configuration field
				Copy - Specifies string for Copyright
- 11				_ 1#

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		field. Culture – Specifies the culture string to
		associate with the assembly.
		Description - Specifies the description
1		field.
ŀ		Evidence – Embeds file in the assembly with the resource name
		Security. Evidence.
		Fileversion - Specifies the file version
	•	of the assembly.
		Flags - Specifies flags for such things
		as the assembly is side-by-side compatible, assembly cannot execute
		with other versions if either they are
		executing in the same application
·		domain, process or computer.
		Keyf - Specifies a file that contains a
.		key or key pair to sign an assembly. Keyn - Specifies the container that holds
	•	a key pair.
		Product - Specifies string for Product
		field.
		Producty - Specifies string for Product Version.
		Template – Specifies the assembly fro
		which to inherit all assembly metadata.
		Title - Specifies string for Title field.
		Trade – Specifics string for Trademark field.
		V – Specifies version information.
1/4) generating or identifying at least one	User may specify rules, as specified in the
10	rule designed to control at least one	.NET Framework SDK, to be placed in the
	aspect of access to or use of at least a	assembly manifest including such rules requiring that all code be managed (CLR
	portion of said first secure container	compliant), "Code Access Security"
	contents.	permissions be supplied for use of code
\vdash		supplied in the assembly, etc.
71	1. A method as in claim 58, in which:	
12) said specific information required to	The following "options" specifies owner
10	be included includes information at	and creator information:
	least in part identifying at least one	Comp – Specifies string for the
	owner or creator of at least a portion of	Company field.
	said first secure container contents.	Copy – Specifies string for Copyright
		field.
-	·	Trade – Specifics string for Trademark field.
	2. A method as in claim 58, in which:	
72	. A method as in claim 30, in which.	
-		The copy "option" specifies the string for
(a		The copy "option" specifies the string for the for the Copyright field.

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)	SAN THE STATE OF THE SAN THE S	GLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4 5	1.	Products infringing: All products that include the Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime or Common
6	A method for using at least one resource	Language Infrastructure. Resource may constitute a Microsoft Windows
7	processed in a secure operating environment at a first appliance, said method comprising:	process or hardware element; secure operating environment is Microsoft Common Language
.8		Runtime ("CLR") environment, Common Language Infrastructure ("CLI") or Compact CLR ("CCLR"); first appliance is computer
9		running CLR, CLI or Compact CLR. Two infringing scenarios are set forth herein: (1)
10		For CLR, an administrator, using the NET
11		framework caspol.exe tool remotely configures security policy in a .NET configuration file for
12		a machine, enterprise, user, or application and that security policy interacts with rules or
13		evidence declared in a shared assembly provided by another entity ("1st scenario"); and
14		(2) for CLR, CLI and CCLR two assemblies are delivered to an appliance; the first
15		assembly has a rule that demands permissions from a caller in the second assembly, and the
16		second assembly includes a control that asserts such permissions or provides evidence that
17		convinces the runtime that it has such permissions. ("2 nd scenario"). In each scenario
18		Microsoft .NÈT "Code Access Security" framework or "Role Based Security"
19		framework is used.
20	(a) securely receiving a first entity's control at said first appliance, said first entity being	1 st scenario: first entity is the administrator, and the policy that constitutes this entity's
21	located remotely from said operating environment and said first appliance;	control is securely received at the first appliance through a session established
22		between the administrator's computer and the first appliance, requiring security credentials
23		such as the administrator's login and password or other secure session means.
l		2 nd scenario: first entity is creator or distributor of the first assembly, assembly manifest
24		includes a control demanding or refusing or
25		otherwise asserting a security action on permissions from a caller; first assembly is
26	(b) securely receiving a second entity's control	integrity-checked. Second entity's control is contained in shared
27	at said first appliance, said second entity being located remotely from said operating	assembly manifest (and therefore integrity protected) that provides evidence for obtaining
28	environment and said first appliance, said second entity being different from said first	permissions, or asserts permissions; assembly creator/distributor is located remotely and is
	Descrit with your direction and and and	

1 2	entity; and	not the administrator (1 st scenario) or creator/distributor of the first container (2 nd scenario);
3	(c) securely processing a data item at said first appliance, using at least one resource,	Secure processing is carried out by CLR, CLI or CCLR, Data item constitutes an executable
4	including securely applying, at said first appliance through use of said at least one	code element, an interface controlled by such an executable, a data collection or stream (such
5	resource said first entity's control and said second entity's control to govern use of said	as media file or stream or text file) or an environment variable. CLR, CLI or CCLR
6	data item.	securely processes the rules, which will in both scenarios govern access to methods and data from the first assembly. The resource named in
7		the claim is, e.g., a Windows process that is established by the runtime or hardware element
8	51. A method as in claim 1 wherein at least	on the computer. Consumer computer or appliance running
9 10	said secure processing step is performed at an end user electronic appliance.	Microsoft CLR, CLI or CCLR).
11	58. A method as in claim 1 wherein the step of securely receiving a first entity's control	1 st scenario 1: link is LAN or WAN; 2 nd scenario: link is any telecommunications link,
12	comprises securely receiving said first entity's control from a remote location over a	including the internet.
13	telecommunications link, and the step of securely receiving said second entity's control	
14	comprises securely receiving said second entity's control from the same or different	
15	remote location over the same or different telecommunications link.	
16 17	65. A method as in claim 1 wherein the processing step includes processing said first and second controls within the same secure	Secure processing environment is CLR, CLI or CCLR running on user's computer or appliance.
18	processing environment.	
19	71. A method as in claim 1 further including the step of securely combining said first	In scenario 2, arrangement consists of the stack frame, and the corresponding array of permission grants for assemblies on the stack,
20 21	entity's control and said second entity's control to provide a combined control arrangement.	and the permission demanded by the first assembly. Secure combining performed by the CLR, CLI or CCLR.
22	76. A method as in claim 1 wherein said two securely receiving steps are independently	Steps are performed at different times in both scenarios.
23	performed at different times. 84. A method as in claim 1 wherein at least one	In both scenarios the second entity supplies an
24	of the first entity's control and the second entity's control comprises at least one	assembly with a demand procedure executed by the CLR, CLI or CCLR. The data
25	executable component and at least one data component.	component is a specific attribute value referenced by the assembly.
26 27	89. A method as in claim 1 wherein said first appliance includes a protected processing environment, and wherein:	Microsoft Common Language Runtime (CLR), Common Language Infrastructure (CLI), or Compact Common Language Runtime (CCLR)
		environment.
28	(a) said method further comprises a step of receiving, at said first appliance, said data item	Typically occurs in both scenarios.
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(l a e	b) said t least nviron	secuin par ment	rely proc rt in said	fferent time tity's contro essing step protected p	is perf process	ormed ing	Prote CLI o	cted prod r CCLR.	cessing e	nvironi	nent i	s the C	LI
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INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.

1	<u>INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIE</u>	S CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.
2		INGEMENT CHART
	FOR U.S. PATE	NT NO. 5,982,891
3		
4	22.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
5		Passport
6	A method of securely controlling use by a third party of at least one protected operation with	A user (third party) accesses an IRM-protected data item governed by IRM controls under two
7	respect to a data item comprising:	or more RMS servers. For example, the data item may be a IRM-protected document.
8		The IRM controls may be associated with the
9	•	data item directly or via a IRM-protected container holding the IRM-protected data item,
10		such as an IRM-protected email with the IRM- protected document attached.
11	(a) supplying at least a first control from a first party to said third party;	The user acquires a first use license from a first RMS server (first party) enabling access to, the
12		IRM-protected data item under the IRM rules associated with the first RMS server. For
13 14		example: (1) the first use license from the first RMS server permits the user to access a IRM-protected document contained within or
15		attached to an IRM-protected email; or (2) the first use license from the first RMS server
16		applies a first set of IRM rules to an IRM- protected document.
17	(b) supplying, to said third party, at least a second control from a second party different	The user acquires a second use license from a second RMS server (second party) enabling
18	from said first party;	access to the IRM-protected data item under the IRM rules associated with the second RMS server. For example: (1) in addition to the
19		user being given access to an IRM-protected email based on a first use license, a second
20		RMS server provides a second use license enabling access to the IRM-protected
21		document attached thereto; or (2) the second use license from the second RMS server
22		applies a second set of IRM rules to the IRM- protected document.
23	(c) securely combining at said third party's location, said first and second controls to form	The first and second use licenses are combined to form a control arrangement that governs
24	a control arrangement;	access to the IRM-protected data item.
25	(d) securely requiring use of said control	The combined first and second use licenses govern access to the IRM-protected data item.
26	arrangement in order to perform at least one protected operation using said data item; and	
27	(e) securely performing said at least one protected operation on behalf of said third	The user performs a protected operation (e.g., read, print, edit) on the IRM-protected data
28	party with respect to said data item by at least in part employing said control arrangement	item. The combined first and second use licenses are employed to permit the protected operation.

1	23. A method as in claim 22 wherein said data	The data item is encrypted and protected by IRM.
2	item is protected. 39. A method as in claim 22 further including	The first and/or second use license are securely
,3	securely and persistently associating at least one of: (a) said first control, (b) said second control, and (c) said control arrangement, with	and persistently associated with the IRM- protected data item.
4	said data item.	
5	53. A method as in claim 22 wherein at least two of the recited steps are performed at an end user electronic appliance.	Steps performed at a user's computer or appliance.
6	60. A method as in claim 22 wherein step (a)	The first and second use licenses are received
7	comprises supplying said first control from at least one remote location over a	over a telecommunications link such as a networking or modem/serial interface.
8.	telecommunications link, and step (b) comprises supplying said second control from	
9	the same or different remote location over the same or different telecommunications link	
10	67. A method as in claim 22 wherein at least step (c) is performed within the same secure	Steps are performed at user's computer or appliance.
11	processing environment at said third party's location.	
12	91. A method as in claim 22 wherein: (a) said method further comprises supplying	The first use license (first control) is received
13.	said data item to said third party separately and	at the time that the user accesses the data item,
14	at a different time from supplying of said first control to said third party; and	which occurs separately and at a different time from receipt of the IRM-protected data item itself.
15	(b) said securely performing step comprises	The protected operations require decryption of
16	performing said protected operation at least in part in a protected processing environment.	the protected content, which is done inside the RM lockbox. The RM lockbox is protected by mechanisms such as obfuscation, anti-
17		debugging, and tamper resistance.
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. 2.	INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,982,891		
3 4 5	26.	Products infringing: Visual Studio.NET, .NET Framework SDK, and all products that include the Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime or Common Language Infrastructure.	
6 7	A secure method for combining data items into a composite data item comprising:		
8	(a) securely providing, from a first location to a second location, a first data item	A first signed and licensed .NET component, .NET assembly, managed	
9	having at least a first control associated therewith;	control and/or Web control (component) is the first data item. The first .NET	
10		component developer (first location) provides the application assembly developer (second location) the first	
11 12		component. The first control is the set of declarative statements comprising the	
13		LicenseProviderAttribute (alternately referred to as license controls). A second signed and licensed component is	
14	(b) securely providing, from a third location to said second location, a second data item having at least a second control	the second data item. The second component developer (third location)	
15	associated therewith;	provides the application assembly developer (second location) the second	
16		component. The second control is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.	
17 18	(c) forming, at said second location, a composite of said first and second data items;	The application assembly developer will include at least the two components into its assembly.	
19 20	(d) securely combining. at said second location, said first and second controls to form a control arrangement; and	At the second location, the application assembly developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager.	
21		Whenever a component is instantiated	
22		(here, an instance of the first licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the	
23		component. The license controls (first control) for the runtime license (derived	
24		from the design time license) are bound into the header of the .NET application	
25 26		assembly, along with the second control for the second component.	
26	·	Visual Studio.NET securely handles the creation of runtime license controls.	
28		Runtime licenses are embedded into (and bound to) the executing application assembly. The license control attribute	

		•
2 3 4 5 6		included in the first component is customized in the second location to express and require the runtime license. In a more advanced scenario, the License Complier tool can be used to create a ".licenses file" containing licenses for multiple components, including runtime licenses for components and classes created by the license provider. This .licenses file is embedded into the assembly.
7		The third control set comprises the runtime license controls for the first and second components (that had been bound to the assembly), the declarative controls
. 9		provided by the application assembly developer, and any runtime licenses for
10		other components included by the developer in application assembly. The
11		controls are typically integrated into the header of the .NET application assembly
12	(e) performing at least one operation on	The proper execution of the application
13	said composite of said first and second data items based at least in part on said control	will require that the assembly have run time licenses for the two components.
14	аrrangement.	
15 16	27. A method as in claim 26 wherein said combining step includes preserving each of said first and second controls in said composite set.	The set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of both the first and second components are included in the application assembly.
17	28. A method as in claim 26 wherein said	The application will require the first and
18 19	performing step comprises governing the operation on said composite of said first and second data items in accordance with said first control and said second control.	second controls to operate properly when it calls the first and second data items, respectively.
20		
21	29. A method as in claim 26 wherein said providing step includes ensuring the integrity of said association between said	Signing the component that has embedded within it the license control ensures the integrity of the association of the control
22	first controls and said first data item is maintained during at least one of	and data item.
23	transmission, storage and processing of said first data item.	
24	31. A method as in claim 26 wherein said	The component includes the license control
25	providing step comprises codelivering said first data item and said first control.	and therefore they are codelivered.
26	40. A method as in claim 26 further	Each component includes the license
27	including the step of securely ensuring that at least one of (a) said first control, (b) said	control. Signing the component that has embedded within it the license control
28	second control, and (c) said control arrangement, is persistently associated with	ensures the persistence of the association of the control and data item.

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1	at least one of said first and second data	
2	items.	
3	54. A method as in claim 26 wherein at least one of steps (c), (d) and (e) is performed at an end user electronic	At least step (e) is typically performed at an end-user electronic appliance.
, .4	appliance.	
5	61. A method as in claim 26 wherein step	Microsoft maintains Web sites where a
6	(a) comprises providing said first data item from at least one remote location over a	developer can get components over the Web. These sites include references
7	telecommunications link, and step (b) comprises providing said second data item	whereby a developer may obtain components through their Web connection.
8	from the same or different remote location	One such site is Internet Explorer Web
•	over the same or different telecommunications link.	Control Gallery at ie.components.microsoft.com/webcontrols
9	telecommunications mik.	
10	68. A method as in claim 26 wherein step (d) is performed within the same secure processing environment at said second	Typically, step (d) will be performed within the same secure processing environment.
11	location.	CHYHOMENCH.
12	79. A method as in claim 26 wherein steps	The application assembly developer will
13	(a) and (b) are performed at different times.	typically acquire components at different times.
14		The component must include an executable
15	86. A method as in claim 26 wherein at least one of the first and second controls	and can include a data items as a EULA, readme file or help file.
16	comprises at least one executable component and at least one data component.	readine the or neip the.
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4	35	Infringing products include: Windows
		Media Player, Individualized DRM Clients
5		and the Secure Audio Path (SAP)
6		technology.
	A method for using at least one resource	
7	processed by a secure operating	
	environment, said method comprising:	
0	securely receiving a first load module	The Individualized DRM Client (first load
.8	provided by a first entity external to said	module) is a signed security upgrade DLL.
_	operating environment	It is also bound to the hardware ID of the
9	operating environment	machine on which it runs. It is therefore
10		securely delivered and integrity protected:
	securely receiving a second load module	A SAP certified driver is also signed and
11	provided by a second entity external to said	carries with it a certificate that indicates its
	operating environment, said second entity	compliance with SAP criteria. If it is
12	being different from said first entity; and	delivered to a PC it is secure in the sense
12	being different from said first entry, and	that it is integrity protected. This driver
13		would not come from the same entity as the
13		Individualization DLL.
	securely processing, using at least one	If a WM audio file targeted to the
14	securely processing, using at reast one	Individualized DRM client carries with it a
	resource, a data item associated with said	
15	first and second load modules, including	requirement that SAP be supported to
	securely applying said first and second load	render the WMF contents, the content is
16	modules to manage use of said data item.	processed for playing through a soundcard
		using the WMP and by applying the DRM
17	·	client - which decrypts the content and
- '		negotiates with the DRM kernel processing
18		of the content through a Secure Audio Path
10		that includes the SAP-certified audio
10		driver.
19		
	56. A method as in claim 35 wherein at	All steps occur at the user's PC that
20		supports the WMP and DRM client and
	least two of the recited steps are performed	l 11 .
21	at an end user electronic appliance.	SAP.
22	63. A method as in claim 35 wherein said	The Driver and DRM client are received
	first load module receiving step comprises	from distinct locations and may be
23	securely receiving said first load module	delivered securely over the Internet. They
ا دی	from at least one remote location over at	are delivered securely in that each is
اير	least one telecommunications link, and said	integrity protected.
24		micelial protected.
	second load module receiving step	
25	comprises securely receiving said second	
- 1	load module from the same or different	
26	remote location over the same or different	
	telecommunications link.	
27		
-	70. A method as in claim 35 wherein said	Both load modules are executed on the PC
28		within the WMP/DRM Client/SAP
40	securely processing step comprises	environment.
1	securely executing said first and second	CHAILOIMIICHT.

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2	load modules within the same secure processing environment.		
3	74. A method as in claim 35 further	Since both the DRM client and the driver:	
.4	including securely combining said first and	are DLLs in the same audio rendering	
• • •	second load modules to provide a	chain, they exist as an execution	
5	combined executable.	environment.	
6	81. A method as in claim 35 wherein said	The driver and Individualization DLL need	
. 7	securely receiving steps are performed	not be received at the same time.	
•	independently at different times.		
8	94. A method as in claim 35 wherein said secure operating environment includes a	The Windows Media Player together with the Individualized DRM Client and Secure	
9	protected processing environment, and	Audio Path comprise a protected	
10	wherein:	environment for processing protected media. The protected Windows Media	
11	said method further comprises receiving a	Files are received after the load modules	
	data item within said secure operating environment;	have been received and installed (licenses cannot be acquired until load modules are	
. 12	in place). The processing of the Window		
13	said first load module receiving step is performed separately and at a time different	environment.	
14	from receiving said data item; and		
15	said securely processing step is performed		
	at least in part in said protected processing environment.		
16			
17	Examples of SAP-certified drivers include -	as indicated at	
18	http://www.microsoft.com/Windows/window	vsmedia/WM//DRM/FAQ.asp#Security/	
19	 All VIA controllers with AC-97 codecs 		
20	 All ALI controllers with AC-97 codec 		
	Intel ICH controllers with AC-97 codecs		
21	Creative Labs SoundBlaster16/AWE32/AWE64/Vibra		
22	Yamaha OPL3		
23	Yamaha DS-I		
24			
	Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4280		
25	Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4614 / CS4624		
26	ESS Maestro 2E		
27	USB Audio		
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Cirrus Logic (Crystal) CS4281

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- Ensoniq ES1370
- NeoMagic NM6
- Ensoniq ES1371/73 and CT5880
- SoundBlaster Live!
- Aureal 8810
- Aureal 8820
- Aureal 8830
- Conexant Riptide
- ESS Maestro
- ESS ISA parts
- NeoMagic NM5

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4	36.	Product Infringing: Any product using
5		Common Language Runtime (CLR), Common
)	1	Language Infrastructure (CLI), or Compact
_		Common Language Runtime (CCLR)
6	A secure operating environment system for	Microsoft CLR, CLI or CCLR (operating
_	managing at least one resource comprising:	environment system), managing any of the
7	managing at least one resource comprising.	resources on a typical computer, including
		memory, files system, communications ports,
8		storage devices, and higher level resources that
9		may use any of these or combinations of them.
	(a) a communications arrangement	Communications port and Microsoft Internet
0		Protocol stack that may optionally use Secure
	1	Socket Layer protocol or IPSEC packet
1		security protocol, supplied with Microsoft
		Windows.
2	(1) that securely receives a first control	Rule or evidence contained in the manifest of a
	of a first entity external to said	shared assembly, distributed by a first entity
3	operating environment, and	that can be used by the CLR, CLI or CCLR to
_		determine permissions that may be needed to
4		cause operations on a data item or resource
Ì		controlled by another entity; shared assembly
5		is tamper-protected and may be received using
٠.		secure SSL or IPSEC protocol.
6	(2) securely receives a second control	Rule specified in the manifest of a second
	of a second entity external to said	shared (Tamper protected) assembly, that
7	operating environment, said second	demands permissions of callers of its methods.
	entity being different from said first	
8	entity; and	
`	(b) a protected processing environment,	CLR, CLI or CCLR, connected to (e.g.)
9	operatively connected to said	communications port
^	communications arrangement, that:	
0	(1) [] securely processes, using at least	CLR, CLI or CCLR uses type safety
۲I	one resource, a data item logically	mechanisms, access controls, integrity
1	associated with said first and second	detection, and separation of domains. Data
٠ ا	controls, and	item may be any data item that is managed by
2	,	the second assembly, which may be a member
-	· ·	of such assembly, and whose state or value
3		may be accessible through an interface to other
ا د	i ·	assemblies, and which is referenced by the first
ا ؍		assembly.
4	(2) ∏ securely applies said first and	CLR, CLI or CCLR processes the demand for
ا ہ		permissions from the second assembly, collects
5	second controls to manage said	the evidence or processes the rule from the first
_	resource for controlling use of said data	
6	item.	assembly, and determines whether the first
		assembly has the permissions to use the
7		resource to operate on the data item controlled
		by the second assembly.
8	57. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	Computer or electronic appliance running
	protected processing environment is part of an	CLR CLI or CCLR
ı I		
- 11	1	**

Exhibit B

1	end user electronic appliance.	
2	64. A system as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement receives said	Shared assemblies are designed to be received remotely, e.g., over the internet.
3	first and second controls from at least one remote location over at least one telecommunications link.	
4	75. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	Arrangement consists of the stack frame and
5	protected processing environment combines said first and second controls to provide a combined control arrangement.	and the corresponding array of permission grants for assemblies on the stack, and the permission demanded by the second assembly.
6	82. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	Assemblies, including controls, are designed
7	communications arrangement independently receives said first and second controls at	for independent delivery.
8	different times	771
9	88. A system as in claim 36 wherein at least one of the first control and second controls comprises at least one executable component	The second entity supplies an assembly with a demand procedure (executed by the CLR, CLI or CCLR) that includes reference to a specific
10	and at least one data component.	attribute value (the data component), and the protected processing environment executes the
		executable component (demand) in a manner that is at least in part responsive to the data
12	•	component (execution is in response to the security action supplied in the data item).
13		1 Security action supplied in the data from).
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5	36.	Infringing Product: My Services
	A secure operating environment system	Secure operating environment is the secure
6	for managing at least one resource	server for any .NET My Services service
7	a communications arrangement that	(e.g. My Calendar, My Inbox) Secure server receives communications
8	securely receives	formatted using the SOAP-SEC, the
9		security extension to SOAP that is used by My Service servers to receive controls.
10		
.11	a first control	The first control is a roleTemplate
12		associated with the service. The roleTemplate identifies specific actions
13		(e.g. read, replace) that can be performed
14		against a certain scope (resource or set of resources).
15		
16	of a first entity external to said operating environment,	The first entity is the administrator of the server database, or other entity with
	Chynolinent,	authority over its content that sets up the
17		roleTemplates and scopes. That entity is independent from and located remotely
18	and securely receives a second control	A role element specified by a specific end
19	and securety receives a second control	user, which is securely received by the
20	·	secure server using the SOAP-SEC protocol.
21		:
22	of a second entity external to said operating environment, said second entity	The end user is located remotely from the secure server.
23	being different from said first entity;	
24	and a protected processing environment, operatively connected to said	The protected processing environment is the .NET security service (authorization
25	communications arrangement, that:	system) operating within the server. The server uses the SOAP-SEC
1	·	communication protocol to receive
26	(a) securely processes, using at least one	"Securely processes" is performing the
27	resource, a data item logically associated	requested operation on secure server
28	with said first and second controls, and	running .NET. The system will perform the requested operation ensuring that the user
		has no access to information outside the
1	1	· at

Exhibit B 45

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1		scope computed.
2		The resource is the server software and/or hardware used to process the two controls and user data.
· · 4		The first control is the roleTemplate for the service. The second control is the role element for an individual user.
. 6		The data item is the end user's stored
7		content (e.g. calendar, email inbox, etc.).
8.	(b) securely applies said first and second	The secure server determines the result
9	controls to manage said resource for controlling use of said data item.	scope (visible node set) for the operation that is computed from the role element and
10		the roleTemplate. That result scope is used to manage the data item.
11		·
12	64. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	The remote location is the site where the
13	communications arrangement receives said first and second controls from at least one	user's or administrator's application is running.
14	remote location over at least one telecommunications link.	The telecommunication link can be the Internet, intranet, VPN or other similar
15		channels.
16	75. A system as in claim 36 wherein said	The role scope incorporating the role
17	protected processing environment combines said first and second controls to	element and the role Template.
18	provide a combined control arrangement.	
19	82. A system as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement	Administrator and user controls will ordinarily be received at different times.
20	independently receives said first and second controls at different times.	
21	95. A secure operating environment system	This is the normal case for .NET My
22	as in claim 36 wherein said communications arrangement also receives	Services. The user's content is normally stored and updated independently of the
23	a data item separately and at a different time from at least one of said first control	setting of scope elements, role elements and roleTemplates.
24	and said second control.	
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4.	 	EN LES CLAIMOF DERINGEMENTS SEE
5	0772-110-20-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-110-20-20-110-20-20-110-20-20-110-20-20-110-20-20-110-20-20-110-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20-20	Product Infringing: Windows CE for Automotive
6	1. A security method comprising:	WCEfA is Microsoft Windows CE for Automotive, sometimes also known by its former name, AutoPC 2.0.
7		With WCEfA an OEM can assign their device to a class that only accepts certain kinds of software. The device can be set to accept 1) any software with the correct
8		processor/version 2) only certified software or 3) only software from the OEM or Microsoft. These Security (or Trust) levels also control to which kernel APIs and
0		middlewere APIs the software has access.
1		Background: "Microsoft Software Install Manager (SIM), a component of WCEfA, allows you to control what can
3		be installed on your device platform. You can define your platform as being <u>open</u> , <u>closed</u> or <u>restricted</u> to new installations, and SIM will enforce these designations."
4		(D,pg.1)
5		"Anything can be installed on an open platform, as long as the applications are compiled for the appropriate processor. At the other extreme, no third-party software
5		can be installed on a closed platform. Only certified applications can be installed on a restricted platform." (D, pg.1)
3		"By restricting installations to compliant applications, the risk of installing and using incompatible or harmful software is greatly reduced, while still keeping the device open for robust, quality applications that enhance the user experience." (F, pg.1)
		WCEfA also has a Security Layer whose purpose is to
2		"Create an abstraction layer of security surrounding ISV applications to limit and/or deny access to key Window
		CE kernel API calls and WCEfA middleware APIs." I, pg. 1)
	(a) digitally signing a first load module with a first digital signature designating the first load	A first load module is a WCEfA software component is a signed .PE file. The first device class is a device that
	module for use by a first device class;	only allows software designated as "restricted" (or higher) to be installed. "Restricted" software is software
,		that has been certified. With restricted software, the device also implements a Security Layer functionality that limits the kernel and WCEfA API calls that the software can make.
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Exhibit B 47

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1 2 3 4		"SIM Level: 1 = Restricted Description: Only properly certified CEI (WCEfA device installation) files can be installed on the device. Remote execution is restricted to executables with master key. Key: Logo certified CEI file required. CEI files or EXEs with master keys permitted." (F, pg.1)
5 6 7	t t	"The kernel loader calls it each time a module is loaded by Windows CE. It returns one of the following values that determine the module's access to kernel resources:
8	N 1	Value Meaning
9 10	1	OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST (2) The module is trusted by the OEM to perform any operation.
11 12]	OEM_CERTIFY_RUN (1) The module is trusted by the OEM to run but is restricted from making certain function calls.
13		DEM_CERTIFY_FALSE (0) The module is not allowed to run.
14		'(H, pg. 1)
15 16	11	Digitally signing: "Before the kernel loads a file, it uses he OEMCertifyModule function to verify that the file contains the proper signature." (N, pg.1)
17 18 19	s c c s s	Signfile exe: This tool signs an executable with a supplied private key. You can use the following command parameters with this tools AttribString, pecifies an optional attribute string to be included in the signature. For example, you could add a string to
20		ndicate the trust level of the application." (O. Pg. 1) n the MSDN article Verifying the Signature, the sample
21	c "	ode segment states //the file has a valid signature
23	d	/ we expect the trust level to be returned as signed lata /case 'R': dwTrustLevel = OEM_CERTIFY_RUN" (N,
24	34	reser - devinisheder - dem_certifi_Ron (n, pg.2)
25		The WCEfA Security Layer isolates installed
26 27	v t	pplications from making unrestricted kernel and WCEfA API calls. This allows the OEM to assign one of three levels of security to applications and drivers
28	T _.	nstalled in RAM when they are loaded into the system. The three levels are Trusted, Restricted, and BlockedOn the systems level, the WCEfA Security

1 2		layer fits between ISV applications and isolates these software modules from having free access to all WinCE kernel calls and WCEfA middleware APIs." (I, pg. 1)
3		The developer submits their application for certification.
4		If it passes, then the .cei file (a form of cab file) receives a certification key from the certifier. The signed PE is within this .cei file.
5	(b) digitally signing a second load module with	A second load module is a WCEfA software component
6	a second digital signature different from the	is a signed PE file. The second device class with a different tamper resistance or security level is a device
7	first digital signature, the second digital signature designating the second load module	that is "Closed", that is, it will not allow third party to
8	for use by a second device class having at least one of tamper resistance and security level	software to be installed. A closed device only allows trusted software to run. The Security Layer setting of
9	different from the at least one of tamper resistance and security level of the first device	"Trusted" allows the Microsoft and OEM software full access to kernel and middleware APIs.
10	class;	In the MSDN article Verifying the Signature, the sample code segment states
11	·	"//the file has a valid signature
12		// we expect the trust level to be returned as signed data
13		//case 'T': dwTrustLevel = OEM_CERTIFY_TRUST" (N, pg.2)
14	·	"Signfile exe: This tool signs an executable with a supplied private key. You can use the following
15		command parameters with this tools AttribString,
16		specifies an optional attribute string to be included in the signature. For example, you could add a string to
17		indicate the trust level of the application. (O. Pg. 1)
18		"SIM Level: 2 = Closed Description: Platform is limited to software supplied
19		directly by OEM or Microsoft. Third-party applications cannot be installed
20		Key: Master key required for any install or remote execution." (F, pg.1)
21.		Related to the Security Layer, the Trusted level "is most
22		likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers." (I, pg. 1)
23	• •	Whereas the .cei files for certified software have a
24		certification key (sometimes call MS Logo key), the cei files from Microsoft or the OEM have a master key
25		attached. ""Master key required for any install or remote execution." (F, p.gl)
26	(c) distributing the first load module for use by	First load module is the certified software from a third
27	at least one device in the first device class; and	party that will be run as part of the "Restricted" first device class.
28		"Once your application is complete, send the .cei file to

certification for the OEM. They would validate it, t either reject or return a .cei that has been stamped v certification key. You would then reproduce this .cc on CD-ROM or a compact flash card and distribute p.g. 5) "APCLoad compares the device SIM level against t.cei file certification key, and either allows the installation to proceed or prohibits it based on the outcome of this comparison." (D, pg. 2) "Security: To achieve a high level of reliability, WCEA is carefully designed to: "Control the installation of certified and less software and drivers. Limit the access of system services by inst module. Monitor the proper execution of software (G, pg. 1) The second load module is the certified software for the OEM or Microsoft that will be run as part of the "Closed" second device class. "You may need to change ROM components after y device ships, either to fix a problem, or to provide enhanced functionality. For this purpose, the OEM given a CEIBuild that adds a master key to a .cei file CEI files stamped with this master key can be instal on an open, closed or a restricted platform." (D, pg. "Trusted: The application is registered as a complete trusted module and allowed full access to the kernel APIs and WCEIA APIs. This mode is mostly likely			
cei file certification key, and either allows the installation to proceed or prohibits it based on the outcome of this comparison." (D, pg. 2) "Security:. To achieve a high level of reliability, WCEfA is carefully designed to: Control the installation of certified and iest software and drivers. Limit the access of system services by inst module. Monitor the proper execution of software. (G, pg. 1) (d) distributing the second load module for use by at least one device in the second device class. The second load module is the certified software fit the OEM or Microsoft that will be run as part of the "Closed" second device class. "You may need to change ROM components aftery device ships, either to fix a problem, or to provide enhanced functionality. For this purpose, the OEM of given a CEIBuild that adds a master key to a . cei fill CEI files stamped with this master key	3		certification for the OEM. They would validate it, then either reject or return a .cei that has been stamped with a certification key. You would then reproduce this .cei file on CD-ROM or a compact flash card and distribute." (D,
WCEfA is carefully designed to:			installation to proceed or prohibits it based on the
Comparison of the second load module for use by at least one device in the second device class. The second load module is the certified software for the OEM or Microsoft that will be run as part of the "Closed" second device class. The second load module is the certified software for the OEM or Microsoft that will be run as part of the "Closed" second device class. "You may need to change ROM components after y device ships, either to fix a problem, or to provide enhanced functionality. For this purpose, the OEM igiven a CEIBuild that adds a master key can be install CEI files stamped with this master key can be install on an open, closed or a restricted platform." (D, pg. "Trusted: The application is registered as a complet trusted module and allowed full access to the kernel APIs and WCEfA APIs. This mode is mostly likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers. Note that applications and drivers included in ROM automatically given trusted status." (I, pg. I)	8		WCEfA is carefully designed to: -: Control the installation of certified and tested software and drivers.
Company Comp	10		- Monitor the proper execution of software"
device ships, either to fix a problem, or to provide enhanced functionality. For this purpose, the OEM is given a CEIBuild that adds a master key to a .cei fill cell files stamped with this master key can be instal on an open, closed or a restricted platform." (D, pg. "Trusted: The application is registered as a complete trusted module and allowed full access to the kernel APIs and WCEfA APIs. This mode is mostly likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers. Note that applications and drivers included in ROM automatically given trusted status." (I, pg.1) References: [D] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/ceibuildrev_8.asp [G] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev.asp [H] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_7.asp [I] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_3.asp [N] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library	12	by at least one device in the second device	The second load module is the certified software from the OEM or Microsoft that will be run as part of the "Closed" second device class.
"Trusted: The application is registered as a complete trusted module and allowed full access to the kernel APIs and WCEfA APIs. This mode is mostly likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers. Note that applications and drivers included in ROM automatically given trusted status." (I, pg.1) References: [D] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dnceauto/html/WinCAuto_SIM.asp [F] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_asp [H] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_7.asp [I] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_3.asp [N] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/cgconVerifyingSignature.asp. [O] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/wcedsn40/htm/cgconVerifyingSignature.asp. [O] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/sccurityrev_apcguide/htm/scc	15		enhanced functionality. For this purpose, the OEM is given a CElBuild that adds a master key to a .cei file. CEl files stamped with this master key can be installed
automatically given trusted status." (I, pg.1) References: [D] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dnceauto/html/WinCAuto_SIM.asp [F] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/ceibuildrev_8.asp [G] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev.asp [H] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_7.asp [I] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/cgconVerifyingSignature.asp. [N] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/wcedsn40/htm/cgconVerifyingSignature.asp. [O] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/wceoem/htm/os_secur_6.asp 24 25 26 27	17 18		"Trusted: The application is registered as a completely trusted module and allowed full access to the kernel APIs and WCEfA APIs. This mode is mostly likely reserved for MS and OEM applications and drivers.
[D] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/decauto/html/WinCAuto_SIM.asp [F] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/ceibuildrev_8.asp [G] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_7.asp [H] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/reliabilityrev_3.asp [N] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/wcedsn40/htm/cgconVerifyingSignature.asp [O] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/wceoem/htm/os_secur_6.asp 25 26 27			
[G] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_7.asp [H] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/securityrev_7.asp [I] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/apcguide/htm/reliabilityrev_3.asp [N] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/wcedsn40/htm/cgconVerifyingSignature.asp [O] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/wceoem/htm/os_secur_6.asp 25 26 27		[D] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/libr	rary/en-us/dnceauto/html/WinCAuto_SIM.asp
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5.		Product infringing: Windows Hardware Quality Lab certification services, and operating system products that support driver signature technology.
A software verifying	g method comprising:	Microsoft encourages manufacturers to have their device drivers tested and signed. For example, only signed drivers will ship
8		"in-the-box." Also, Microsoft's driver ranking prefers signed drivers to unsigned drivers.
0		Microsoft Web Page - Can't Find a Test Category for Your Driver?
1		WHQL's long-term objective is to be able to digitally sign all drivers. Although we do
2		not currently have test programs for certain driver types, such as specialized device
3		drivers and software filter drivers, WHQL is investigating a long term solution to
4		expand the categories of drivers tested under Windows 2000 and ultimately all Windows operating systems. We are
5		already formulating a test program for anti- virus file system filters, and plan to address
6		other file system filter drivers as soon as the initial program is in place.
(a) testing a load mo	odule	The driver will be tested for each version of the operating system it supports and against the device class specification that apply to the device's class.
		The driver package is a load module. A
1		driver package contains one or more of the following files: A device setup information file (INF file)
2		A driver catalog (.cat) file One or more optional co-installers
		Microsoft operates the Window Hardware Quality Lab, which tests drivers submitted
		by driver manufactures.
5		The manufacturer can test their own driver using the Microsoft testing kit and submit
7		the test results to WHQL when requesting a signature. Additionally, Microsoft or a testing facility working with Microsoft can
2	····	perform the testing. The manufacturer-written INF file, which
having at least one s	pecification associated	1 The manufacturer-written five file, which

1 2	therewith,	is part of the driver package, is a specification. Microsoft Windows drivers
•		must have an INF file in order to be installed.
3	the specification describing one or more functions performed by the load module;	The INF Version section specifies its device class. One use of the device class is to identify the specific Windows
5		compatibility specification that relate to the device class. These specifications will vary by device class in part because the function
6		of each device can vary among class. The INF incorporates by reference the
8		Microsoft supplied device class-specific specification by identifying its class in the INF.
9.		The INF can include operating system
10		"decorating" to specify the operating system architecture, major and minor
11		version, product and suite the driver is intended for and can further use this
12		decorating to specify what operating systems for which it is not intended.
13		Because the functionality of each of the operating systems may vary the driver must
14		be tested for each applicable operating system.
15		Qualification Service Policy Guide – Hardware Category Policies
16		You must select the correct hardware
17		category for your device. If you select the
18		wrong hardware category for your device, your submission will fail. For example, if
19	·	you have a storage/hard drive device, but you select storage/tape drive as your
20	<i>;</i>	hardware category, your submission will fail.
21		Windows XP HCT 10.0 Q & A – Windows
22		XP Logos
23		Q: Which "Designed for Windows XP" logos are available for my product?
24	en en en en ekkelige som en	A: Devices and systems qualify for a "Designed for Windows" logo after passing
25		testing with the appropriate WHQL test kit on all operating systems specified by the
26		logo. "Designed for Windows" Logos for Device and System Programs lists which logos are
27		available for each type of product.
28	(b) verifying that the load module satisfies the specification; and	The Microsoft WindowsXP Hardware Compatibility Test (HCT) kit version 10.0
20		includes the tests, test documentation, and
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1 2 3 4 5		submission processes that are required to participate in the Microsoft Windows Logo Program for Hardware for the Windows XP Professional operating system. To qualify to use the "Designed for Windows" logo for hardware, products must pass testing with the Microsoft Windows HCT kit. The HCT kits are organized by hardware type.
• 6		As mentioned above, the manufacturer can
7		test their own driver using the Microsoft testing kit and submit the test results to
8		WHQL when requesting a signature. Additionally, Microsoft or a testing facility
9		working with Microsoft can perform the testing.
10	(c) issuing at least one digital certificate attesting to the results of the verifying step.	When a driver package passes WHQL testing, WHQL generates a separate CAT
11	arreading to me receive of the construction	file containing a hash of the driver binaries and other relevant information. WHQL
12		then digitally signs the CAT file using Digital Signature cryptographic technology
13		and sends it to the vendor. Driver signing does not change the driver binaries or the
14		INF file submitted for testing.
15		Microsoft uses digital signatures for device drivers to let users know that drivers are
16	·	compatible with Microsoft Windows XP, Windows 2000, and Windows Me. A
17		driver's digital signature indicates that the driver was tested with Windows for
18		compatibility and has not been altered since testing.
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3	CLAIMLANGUAGE	GLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4	14.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
5		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A first protected processing environment comprising:	A personal computer running Windows XP, Windows 2000, or Windows 2003
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level, and	The tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the
9		signed digital certificate identifying the user.
10		If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are debugged or tampered with, the system will
11		cease to operate.
12 13		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office Application, e.g., Word.
14	at least one arrangement within the first	The arrangement that prevents a load module
15	tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first protected processing environment from	from running in one PPE and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular Load Module (VBA program within a document or
16	executing the same load module accessed by a second protected processing environment	add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level"
17	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.	settings.
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	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 0,137,721	
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4	18.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and
5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6		Passport
7	A method for protecting a first computing arrangement surrounded by a first tamper	The first computing arrangement with a tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client
8	resistant barrier having a first security level, the method including:	environment and includes the signed digital certificate identifying the user.
9		If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are
10		debugged or tampered with, the system will cease to operate.
11		The computing arrangement is being protected
12		from; for example, viruses and malicious code.
13 14		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office
	preventing the first computing arrangement	Application, e.g., Word.
15	from using the same software module accessible by a second computing arrangement	The arrangement that prevents a load module from running in one computing arrangement
16	having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first	and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software module
17	security level.	(VBA program within a document or add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code capabilities,
18		etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
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Exhibit B

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	FOR U.S. 1 A 1 E 1 1 1 1 0 . 0,137,721	
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4 5	34.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6		Passport
7	A protected processing environment comprising:	A personal computer running Windows XP, Windows 2000, or Windows 2003
8	a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	The first tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the
9		signed digital certificate identifying the user. If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain, sensitive IRM processes or modules are
10		debugged or tampered with, the system will. cease to operate.
11 12		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office
13		Application, e.g., Word.
14 15	a first secure execution space, and	The secure execution space is process space allocated by the operating system for the Microsoft Office host application to run. This host application (e.g., Word) executes the VBA
16		code within this process space. This execution space (application) is secure
17		because the IRM environment takes steps to insure that it is "trusted", the application is
18		signed, and the document which includes the VBA code is protected by IRM policy and then encrypted and signed.
19	at least one arrangement within the first	
20	tamper resistant barrier that prevents the first secure execution space from executing the	The arrangement that prevents a load module from running in one computing arrangement
21	same executable accessed by a second secure execution space having a second tamper	and not in another is the type and characteristics of a particular software module
22	resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security level.	(VBA program within a document or add-in); i.e., signed, script author, code capabilities,
23		etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
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Exhibit B

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3	FOR 0.5. I ATENT NO. 0,137,721	
4	WWW. SECURIOR TO A GENERAL SECURIOR OF THE SEC	
5	34.	Product Infringing: Microsoft Common Language Runtime and ASP.NET
6	A protected processing environment comprising:	Microsoft Common Language Runtime and ASP.NET
_	a first tamper resistant barrier having a	TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER
7	first security level,	The first tamper resistant barrier is the application domain in the CLR. The runtime hashes the
8		contents of each file loaded into the application domain and compares it with the hash value in the
.9		manifest. If two hashes don't match, the assembly fails to load.[1]
10		
11		Also "Code running in one application cannot directly access code or resources from another
12		application. The common language runtime enforces this isolation by preventing direct calls
		between objects in different application domains.
13.		Objects that pass between domains are either copied or accessed by proxy."[2]
14		SECURITY LEVELS
15		The security levels of the application domain if
16	·	different by setting the trust level assigned to an
17		outside application using the "trust" element in the web.config for the ASP.NET application.
18		Syntax- <trust <="" level="Full/High/Low/None" th=""></trust>
10		originUrl="url"/>
19		Example-
20		Example- <trust <="" level="High" th=""></trust>
21		originUrl=http://www.SomeOtherCompany.com/defaul t.aspx/>
22		[7]
23	a first secure execution space, and	The application domain is the execution space for a particular application.
24 -	at least one arrangement within the first tamper resistant barrier that prevents the	The second secure execution space is another application domain that has a different trust level for
25	first secure execution space from executing the same executable accessed	an outside application.
26	by a second secure execution space having a second tamper resistant barrier	If second app domain gives Full trust to the outside application; whereas the first one doesn't, the first
27	with a second security level different from	app domain won't be able to execute the application
	the first security level.	that requires full trust permission.
28		References:

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THE REPORT OF THE PARTY OF THE	W MARKET REPORT OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT
34.	Product Infringing: Products containing Microsoft Common Language Runtime or Compact Common Language Runtime and products implementing the Common Language Infrastructure specification.
A protected processing environment	Microsoft Common Language Runtime and
comprising:	.NET Framework SDK:
a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	TAMPER RESISTANT BARRIER The first tamper resistant barrier is the application domain in the CLR. The runtime hashes the contents of each file loaded into the
	application domain and compares it with the hash value in the manifest. If two hashes don
,	match, the assembly fails to load. [1]
	Also "Code running in one application canno directly access code or resources from another
	application. The common language runtime enforces this isolation by preventing direct
	calls between objects in different application domains. Objects that pass between domains
	are either copied or accessed by proxy."[2]
	SECURITY LEVELS
	Application domains have different security levels by setting security policy of the application domain programmatically. [3]
	"It has different security based on code-based security model of .NET. Administrators and hosts use code-access security to decide what
•	code can do, based on characteristics of the code itself, regardless of what user is executing
. •	the code. The code characteristics are called evidence and can include the Web site or zone
	from which the code was downloaded, or the digital signature of the vendor who published the code."
	the code."
	"When the security manager needs to determine the set of permissions that an
	assembly is granted by security policy, it start with the enterprise policy level. Supplying the
	assembly evidence to this policy level will result in the set of permissions granted from
	that policy level. The security manager typically continues to collect the permission
	sets of the policy levels below the enterprise

Exhibit B

1

allow a specific permission before it can make it into the granted permission set for the assembly." Example of granted permission sets from a policy — Condition: All code, Permission Set: Nothing Condition: Zone: Internet, Permission Set: Internet Condition: URL: www.monash.edu.au, Permission Set: MonashPSet Condition: Strong Name: m-Commerce, Permission Set: m- CommercePSet [4] Another difference in security levels can be	=		
Example of granted permission sets from a policy— Condition. All code, Permission Set. Nothing Condition. All code, Permission Set. Nothing Condition. Some Name: m-Commerce, Permission Set. Internet. Condition: URL: www.monash.edu.ou. Permission Set. MonashPSet Condition: Strong Name: m-Commerce, Permission Set. m- CommercePSet [4] Another difference in security levels can be whether the verification process selected in a verification process selected in the run (unless the administrator has granted permission to skip the verification). The verification process determines whether the code can attempt to access in which it is running to fall to operate properly. Code that passes the verification test is said to be type-safe. The ability to verify code as type-safe enables the common language runtime to provide as great a level of isolation as the process boundary, at a much lower performance cost." [5] The application domain is the execution space is another actually a permission to code from internet zone, but first app domain does, then the code would run in first app domain and not in second. [6] References: [1] Www.microsoft.com/library/enus/cpcjuide/himi/ cpconapilicationdomainsoverview.asp?fra*	2		intersected to generate the policy system permission set for the assembly. All levels must allow a specific permission before it can make it into the granted permission set for the
policy — Condition: All code, Permission Set: Monthing Condition: Zone: Internet, Permission Set: Internet Condition: URL: www.monash.edu.au, Permission Set: MonashPSet Condition: Strong Name: m-Commerce, Permission Set: m- CommercePSet [4] Another difference in security levels can be whether the verification process is turned off or on, "Managed code must be passed through a verification process before it can be run (unless the administrator has granted permission to skip the verification). The verification process the etermines whether the code can attempt to access invalid memory addresses or perform some other action that could cause the process in which it is running to fail to operate properly. Code that passes the verification test is said to be type-safe. The ability to verify code as type-safe enables the common language runtime to provide as great a level of isolation as the process boundary, at a much lower performance cost." [5] The application domain is the execution space for a particular application. The application domain that has a different security policy than the first cone, but first app domain and not in second. [6] References: [1] www.microsoft.com/germany/ms/ms/msdnbiblio/dotnettk/doc/assembly.doc [2] msdn.Microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbiblio/dotnettk/doc/assembly.doc [2] msdn.Microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbiblio/dotnettk/doc/assembly.doc [2] msdn.Microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbiblio/dotnettk/doc/assembly.doc [2] msdn.Microsoft.com/germany/ms/msdnbiblio/dotnettk/doc/assembly.doc	7		Evernle of granted namigains and from
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3	CLAIMLANGUAGE :	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
4	38.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
5		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
6.	A method for protecting a first computing	Passport The first computing arrangement surrounded by
7	arrangement surrounded by a first tamper resistant barrier having a first security level,	a tamper resistant barrier is the Office 2003 IRM client environment and includes the
8	the method including:	signed digital certificate identifying the user. If the certificate is tampered with, or if certain,
9		sensitive IRM processes or modules are debugged or tampered with, the system will
10		cease to operate.
-11		The first security level is the "Security Level" which has been selected for a particular Office
12		Application, e.g., Word.
13	preventing the first computing arrangement from using the same software module accessed	The computing arrangement that prevents a software module from running in one
14	by a second computing arrangement having a second tamper resistant barrier with a second security level different from the first security	computing arrangement and not in another is the type and characteristics of the particular
15	level.	software module (VBA program within a document or add-in); i.e., signed, script author,
16		code capabilities, etc., and the "Security Level" settings.
17		settings.
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4	**************************************	EN CHAIM OF INFRINGEMENT AND
5	2.	Product Infringing: Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows Media Player
5	A system including:	
6	(a) a first apparatus including,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
· 7 ·	(1) user controls,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
8	(2) a communications port,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
9	(3) a processor,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
10	(4) a memory storing:	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
11	(i) a first secure container containing	Secure container (packaged Windows Media
12	a governed item, the first secure container governed item being at	file), received by consumer's computer from "Content provider" (WMRM SDK, Step 3),
	least in part encrypted; the first	which contains encrypted governed item ("Encrypted content")
13	secure container having been received from a second apparatus;	(Encrypted content)
14	(ii) a first secure container rule at least	Rights portion of signed license, received by
	in part governing an aspect of	consumer's computer from "License issuer"
15	access to or use of said first secure	(WMRM SDK, Step 9)
16	container governed item, the first	•
16	secure container rule [sic], the first secure container rule having been	
17	received from a third apparatus	
	different from said second	
18	apparatus; and	
	(5) hardware or software used for	Windows Media Player and Windows Media
19	receiving and opening secure	Rights Manager
20	containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a	
۲۷	governed item, a secure container rule	
21	being associated with each of said	
	secure containers;	
22	(6) a protected processing environment at	1st and 2nd rules consist of any two valid rules
,, l	least in part protecting information	as specified in the Window Media Rights
23	contained in said protected processing	Manager SDK; protected processing environment includes Windows Media Rights
24	environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus, said protected	Manager and Windows processes for
-	processing environment including	protecting operation of Windows Media Rights
25	hardware or software used for	Manager. Licenses can be used to convey
_	applying said first secure container	multiple rules.
26	rule and a second secure container rule	
,, l	in combination to at least in part	
27	govern at least one aspect of access to	·
28	or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and	
Ì	(7) hardware or software used for	Any hardware or software employed in
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Exhibit B

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trans other secur appar	transmitting Windows Media files, including for example consumer's computer's communication port and Windows Media files, including for example consumer's communication port and Windows Media Player (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
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_	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 0,103,003				
3	+ CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT			
5	2.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport			
6	Ain aludina	r assport			
7	A system including: a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications			
8	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC			
9	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive			
10	a processor,	or RAM.			
11	a memory storing:				
12	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	An encrypted IRM-governed email received from a remote computer. The encrypted IRM-governed email contains an encrypted IRM-			
13	being at least in part encrypted; the first secure container having been received from a second	governed email message.			
14	apparatus;				
15	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said	The first secure container rule is received from the RMS server in the form of a use license.			
16	first secure container governed item, the first secure container rule, the first secure container rule having been received from a third	This use license contains rules generated by the RMS server specifically for the user (or user's			
17	apparatus different from said second apparatus; and	group)			
18	hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or software for receiving and opening secure			
19	opening secure containers,	emails.			
20	said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The secure email has the capacity to contain an			
21	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	IRM-governed email message, with a rule being associated with each email.			
22		The rules associated with the secure emails are			
23	. •	rules that come as part of the original email as well as rules that come back from the RMS.			
24	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled device is protected by the use of at least			
25	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.			
26		The rule governing the email works together			
27	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a	with an additional rule to determine what access to or use (if any) are allowed with			
28	second secure container rule in combination to	respect to the IRM-governed email message. For example, the additional rule may be			
1	at least in part govern at least one aspect of	F TO ECABITITION THE BOOK THE			
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in a s	access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and			received together with the rule in the use license.		
secur	e containe	rs to other and	or transmission of paratuses or for ers from other	for transmitting example, RM-	The device includes hardware or software used for transmitting or receiving secure emails. For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive encrypted IRM-governed emails to/from other devices.	
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4	GLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	2.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6	·	including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor, and memory. For example,
9	user controls,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive or RAM.
11	a processor,	of RAM.
12	a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed	The first secure container is an encrypted IRM-
.13	item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted; the first secure	protected document. This encrypted IRM-governed document is, for
14	container having been received from a second apparatus;	example, received from a remote computer, as an attachment to an IRM-governed email or
15 16		downloaded from a document server or web site.
16		The first secure container rule is received from
17	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said	the RMS server in the form of a use license.
18	first secure container governed item, the first secure container rule, the first secure container	This use license contains rules generated by the RMS server specifically for the user (or user's
19	rule having been received from a third apparatus different from said second	group).
20	apparatus; and hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or software for receiving and opening secure
21	opening secure containers,	documents.
22	said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The secure documents have the capacity to contain IRM-governed content, with a rule
23	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	being associated with each secure document.
24		The rules associated with said secure documents are the rules that come as part of the
25	·	originally received document as well as rules that come back from the RMS server.
26	a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled device is protected by the use of at least
27	protected processing environment from	cryptographic technique.
28	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	The rule governing the document works
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1 2 3 4 5	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and	together with an additional rule to determine what access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed document. For example, the additional rule may be associated with an email to which the document was attached, or received together with the rule in the use license. The device includes hardware or software used for transmitting or receiving secure documents. For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive to/from other devices emails with IRM-governed documents		
6	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses.			
. 8		attached thereto.		
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CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT				
3.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service usin Passport				
A system including:					
a first apparatus including, user controls, a communications port, a processor,	A device with user controls, a communication port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-driv or RAM.				
a memory storing:					
a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item	The first secure container containing a governed item is an IRM protected email.				
being at least in part encrypted;	Both the email and attachment are IRM protected, each having their own rules, each being encrypted.				
a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	The rule governing the email (a first secure container rule) governs said first secure container governed item.				
a second secure container containing a digital certificate;	The second secure container is the IRM protected attachment's derived license request object. The license request object contains the Publishing license and a signed digital certificate.				
	T DIAGRAM II I				
hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.				
said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	The IRM secure containers have capacity to contain a governed item, with a secure				
container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.				
a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least				
protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.				
said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	The rules governing the email itself (first				

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se at ac	applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses.						secure container rule) and the rules governing the attachment work together to determine whaccess to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item. IRM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.				
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4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT:					
	3.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and					
. 5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using					
6		Passport					
7	A system including:						
1	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications					
8	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and					
. 9		mouse, the communications port may be a NIC					
•	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive					
.10	a processor,	or RAM.					
11	a memory storing:						
12	a first secure container containing a governed	The first secure container containing a					
	item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	governed item is an IRM protected document, which is an attachment within an IRM					
. 13	companies in part enerypted,	protected email message. The governed item is					
14	·	the document's content.					
15		Both the email message and attachment are					
16	·.	encrypted and have associated usage rules due to IRM protection.					
16	a first secure container rule at least in part	A use license for the IRM protected document					
17	governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	specifies rules governing access to or use of said first secure container governed item.					
18	a second secure container containing a digital	The second secure container is the IRM					
19	certificate;	protected email message.					
13	·	The IRM protected attachment includes a					
20		publishing license and an owner certificate, both of which are signed XrML digital					
21		certificates.					
22		The attachment (including embedded					
		certificates) is contained within the IRM					
23		protected email message (said second secure container).					
24	hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software					
25	opening secure containers,	for receiving and opening secure containers.					
25	said secure containers each including the	The IRM secure containers have capacity to					
26	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure	contain a governed item, with a secure					
27	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers:	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.					
	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled					
28	part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	computer is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.					
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1	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,					
2	said protected processing environment					
3	including hardware or software used for	The rules governing the attachment (first secure container rule) and the rules governing the				
. 4	applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to	email message (second secure container rule)				
. 5	at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained	work together to determine what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the				
6	in a secure container; and hardware or software used for transmission of	governed item. RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are				
7	secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.				
•	apparatuses.					
8	4. A system as in claim 3.	All confidence Goduling				
. 9	said memory storing a rule associated with said second secure container, said rule	All parts of the attachment (including embedded signed XrML licenses/certificates)				
10	associated with said second secure container at least in part governing at least one aspect of	are protected by the enclosing email message and governed by the associated email rules				
11	access to or use of said digital certificate.	(second secure container rule).				
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3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
	A system including:	
7	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications
8	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and
9	discretifications,	mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10 ·	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
10	a processor,	or RAM.
11		
	a memory storing:	first secure container containing a governed
12	a first secure container containing a governed item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	item is an IRM protected email.
-13	being at least in part encrypted,	Both the email and attachment are IRM
14		protected, each having their own rules, each being encrypted.
15	a first secure container rule at least in part	The rule governing the email (a first secure
16	governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	container rule) governs said first secure container governed item.
17		
18	a second secure container containing a digital signature, the second secure container being	The second secure container is the IRM protected attachment's derived license request
19	different from said first secure container;	object. The license request object contains the
20		Publishing license and a signed digital certificate.
21	hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
22	opening secure containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
23	contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure	contain a governed item, with a secure
24	containers;	container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.
25	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled
25	part protecting information contained in said	computer is protected by the use of at least
26	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.
27	and analogical are consists any incomment	
28	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for applying said first secure container rule and a	The rules governing the email itself (first secure container rule) and the rules governing
	anniving said that accord companies rule and a	ii

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1	second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and	the attachment will work together to determine what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.
1	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
ľ	apparatuses.	
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.4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	GLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using
7	A system including:	Passport
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications
9	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed	first secure container containing a governed
13	item, the first secure container governed item being at least in part encrypted;	item is an IRM protected email.
14		Both the email and attachment are IRM protected, each having their own rules, each being encrypted.
15	a first secure container rule at least in part	The rule governing the email (a first secure container rule) governs said first secure
16	governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	container governed item.
17		
18	a second secure container containing a digital signature, the second secure container being	The second secure container is the IRM email attachment.
19	different from said first secure container;	This attachment and its publishing license are
20		signed.
21	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
22	containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
23	rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of
24	•	said secure containers. Protected information on the RM-enabled
25	a protected processing environment at least in- part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	computer is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
26	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	
27	said protected processing environment	The rules governing the email itself (first
28	including hardware or software used for anniving said first secure container rule and a	secure container rule) and the rules governing
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2	second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and	the attachment work together to determine what access to or use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.
3 4.	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
5	apparatuses.	
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4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	5.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
·. 7	A system including:	1 assport
8	a first apparatus including,	A device with user controls, a communications
9	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory storing: a first secure container containing a governed	The first secure container containing a
13	item, the first secure containing a governed item being at least in part encrypted;	governed item is an IRM protected document, which is an attachment within an IRM
14		protected email message. The governed item is the document's content.
15		Both the email message and attachment are
16		encrypted and have associated usage rules due to IRM protection.
17 18	a first secure container rule at least in part governing an aspect of access to or use of said first secure container governed item; and	A use license for the IRM protected document specifies rules governing access to or use of said first secure container governed item.
	a second secure container containing a digital	The second secure container is the IRM
19	signature, the second secure container being different from said first secure container;	protected email message.
20		The IRM protected attachment includes a
21		publishing license and an owner certificate, both of which are signed XrML digital certificates.
22		The attachment (including embedded
23		certificates) is contained within the IRM protected email message (said second secure
24		container).
25	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to	The RM (IRM) enabled computer has software for receiving and opening secure containers.
26	contain a governed item, a secure container	The IRM secure containers have capacity to
27	rule being associated with each of said secure containers:	contain a governed item, with a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers.
28	a protected processing environment at least in nart protecting information contained in said	Protected information on the RM-enabled computer is protected by the use of at least
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1 2	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	cryptographic techniques.
3	said protected processing environment including hardware or software used for	The rules governing the attachment (first secure
. 4	applying said first secure container rule and a second secure container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of	container rule) and the rules governing the email message (second secure container rule) work together to determine what access to or
5 6	access to or use of a governed item contained in a secure container; and	use (if any) will be allowed with respect to the governed item.
7	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	RM-enabled applications, e.g., OUTLOOK, are designed to transmit and receive RM secured containers to/from other computers.
8	apparatuses.	
9	6. A system as in claim 5, said memory storing a rule at least in part	All parts of the attachment (including
10	governing an aspect of access to or use of said digital signature.	embedded signed XrML licenses/certificates) are protected by the enclosing email message and governed by the associated email rules
11		(second secure container rule).
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. 4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	28.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003,
6		including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport
7	A system including:	
8	a first apparatus including;	A device with user controls, a communications
9	user controls,	port, a processor and memory. For example, the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
- 10	a communications port,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
11	a processor,	or RAM.
12	a memory containing a first rule,	The first rule governs use of an IRM protected document (e.g., an IRM rule permitting a
13		document to be read by specified users or barring access to IRM-governed information
14		from specified users, applications, or other principals).
15	hardware or software used for receiving and opening secure containers,	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or software for receiving and opening secure
16	said secure containers each including the	containers.
17	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of	The secure email has the capacity to contain an IRM-governed email message, with a rule
18	said secure containers; a protected processing environment at least in	being associated with each email. Protected information on the RM-enabled
19	part protected processing environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	device is protected by the use of at least cryptographic techniques.
20	tampering by a user of said first apparatus,	The secure container rule is an IRM rule
21	said protected processing environment	governing access to the IRM protected
22	including hardware or software used for applying said first rule and a secure container	document (e.g., a rule permitting editing by specified users).
23	rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a	The rule governing the email works together
24	governed item; and	with an additional rule to determine what access to or use (if any) are allowed with
25		respect to the IRM-governed email message (the document's content). For example, the
26		additional rule may be received together with the rule in the use license, may be associated
27		with a publishing license, may be associated with user certification, revocation lists, or exclusion policies, or may be received from
28		any other source.
	hardware or software used for transmission of	The device includes hardware or software used
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1	secure containers to other apparatuses or for	for transmitting or receiving secure containers.
2	the receipt of secure containers from other	For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive encrypted
. 3	apparatuses; and	IRM-governed emails to/from other devices.
,	a second apparatus including:	
4	user controls,	A device with user controls, a communications port, a processor and memory. For example,
5	a communications port,	the user controls may be a keyboard and mouse, the communications port may be a NIC
6	a processor,	card with an Ethernet port, the processor may be a CPU, and the memory may be a hard-drive
7	a memory containing a second rule,	or RAM.
8	•	The second rule governs use of an IRM protected document (e.g., an IRM rule
9		permitting a document to be read by specified users or barring access to IRM-governed
10		information from specified users, applications, or other principals).
11	hardware or software used for receiving and	The RM-enabled device contains hardware or
12	opening secure containers,	software for receiving and opening secure containers.
	said secure containers each including the	The second small booth a constitute contain an
13	capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of	The secure email has the capacity to contain an IRM-governed email item, with a rule being
14	said secure containers;	associated with each secure containers.
15	a protected processing environment at least in	Protected information on the RM-enabled device is protected by the use of at least
	part protecting information contained in said protected processing environment from	cryptographic technique.
16	tampering by a user of said apparatus,	The secure container rule is an IRM rule
17	said protected processing environment	governing access to the IRM protected
18	including hardware or software used for applying said second rule and a secure	document (e.g., a rule permitting editing by specified users).
19	container rule in combination to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use	The rule governing the email works together
20	of a governed item;	with an additional rule to determine what access to or use (if any) are allowed with respect to the IRM-governed item (the
21-		document's content). For example, the additional rule may be received together with
22		the rule in the use license, may be associated with a publishing license, may be associated
23	·	with user certification, revocation lists, or exclusion policies, or may be received from
24		any other source.
25	hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for	The device includes hardware or software used for transmitting or receiving secure containers.
26	the receipt of secure containers from other apparatuses; and	For example, RM-enabled OUTLOOK is designed to transmit and receive encrypted
		IRM-governed emails to/from other devices.
27	an electronic intermediary, said intermediary including a user rights authority clearinghouse.	The RMS Server (Microsoft hosted or otherwise) constructs a 'use license' specific to
28		a piece content and targets it to a specific user.

29. A autho to ma	A system as in claim 28, said user rights prity clearinghouse operatively connected ake rights available to users.	The RMS server sends use licenses to users through a communications port, e.g., Ethernet, serial, satellite, "the internet" These use licenses include rights.
		The clearing functionality of the RMS is operatively connected to the RMS server.
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4	28.	Product Infringing: Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows Media Player
5	A system including:	
6	(a) a first apparatus including;	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
7	(1) user controls,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
8	(2) a communications port,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
9	(3) a processor,	Consumer's computer, as shown in WMRM SDK
10 11	(4) a memory containing a first rule,	Memory is in the consumer's computer, first rule is a right received as part of a signed license (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
	(5) hardware or software used for	Consumer's computer receives Windows
12	receiving and opening secure	Media file (secure container) via communications port (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
13	containers, said secure containers each including the capacity to contain a governed item, a secure container	and applies secure container rule or rules via Windows Media Player and Windows Media
14	rule being associated with each of	Rights Manager.
	said secure containers;	
15	(6) a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information	Processing environment includes Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows
16	contained in said protected processing	processes for protecting operation of Windows
	environment from tampering by a	Media Rights Manager
17	user of said first apparatus, said protected processing environment	
18	including hardware or software used	
	for applying said first rule and a	
19	secure container rule in combination	
20	to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a	
20	governed item; and	
21	(7) hardware or software used for	Hardware or software employed in transmitting
,,	transmission of secure containers to	Windows Media files, including for example
22	other apparatuses or for the receipt of secure containers from other	consumer's computer's communication port and Windows Media Player (WMRM SDK,
23	apparatuses; and	Step 3)
	(b) a second apparatus including:	2nd consumer's computer
24	(1) user controls,	2nd consumer's computer
٠.	(2) a communications port,	2nd consumer's computer
25	(3) a processor,	2nd consumer's computer
26	(4) a memory containing a second rule,	Memory is in the 2nd consumer's computer, first rule is a Right received as part of a signed
		license (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
27	(5) hardware or software used for	2nd consumer's computer receives Windows
_	receiving and opening secure	Media file (secure container) via
28	containers, said secure containers	communications port (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
.	each including the capacity to contain	and applies secure container rule or rules via
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1 2	a governed item, a secure container rule being associated with each of said secure containers;	Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager.
3	(6) a protected processing environment at least in part protecting information	Processing environment includes Windows Media Rights Manager and Windows processes for protecting operation of Windows
4	contained in said protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said apparatus; said protected	Media Rights Manager; processing environment applies multiple rules in
5	processing environment including hardware or software used for	combination
6	applying said second rule and a secure container rule in combination	
8	to at least in part govern at least one aspect of access to or use of a governed item;	
9	(7) hardware or software used for transmission of secure containers to other apparatuses or for the receipt of	Hardware or software employed in transmitting Windows Media files, including for example 2 nd consumer's computer's communication
10	secure containers from other apparatuses; and	port and Windows Media Piayer (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
11 12	(c) an electronic intermediary, said intermediary including a user rights	License Issuer
13	authority clearinghouse. 29. A system as in claim 28,	
	said user rights authority clearinghouse	License Issuer, operatively connected to consumer's computer (WMRM SDK, Step 9)
14	operatively connected to make rights available to users.	consumer's computer (withday 3DIC, step 2)
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Exhibit B

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3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT	
4 5 6	56.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using Passport	
7	A method of securely delivering an item, including the following steps:		
8	performing an authentication step;	The RM-enabled application, e.g., Word, OUTLOOK, PowerPoint, etc., must be	
9		authenticated before it is allowed access to or use of the content.	
10	associating a digital signature with said item;	The RM protected content is signed.	
11	incorporating said item into a first secure electronic container, said item being at least in part encrypted while in said container,	RM-protected content is packaged with rules and encrypted.	
12	said incorporation occurring in an apparatus		
13	containing a first protected processing environment, said protected processing	Protected information on the RM enabled computer is protected by the use of at least	
14	environment at least in part protecting information contained in said protected	cryptographic techniques.	
15	processing environment from tampering by a user of said apparatus;		
16	in said protected processing environment, associating a first rule with said first secure	The IRM-protected document (said item) has an associated rule or rules.	
17 18	electronic container, said first rule at least in part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;		
19	authenticating an intended recipient of said item;	A recipient of IRM-protected content must be authenticated before being allowed access to or use of the content.	
20	transmitting said first secure electronic container and said first rule to said intended	The document is sent via IRM-protected email as an attachment.	
21	recipient; and	The email is received at another IRM-enabled	
22	using a second protected processing environment, providing said intended recipient access to at least a portion of said item,	computer.	
23			
24	said access being governed at least in part by said first rule and by a second rule present at	The first said rule is the rule(s) associated with	
25	said intended recipient's site.	the attached document, and the second rule is the rule(s) received that govern the email itself.	
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5	126.	Product Infringing: Windows Hardware Quality Labs Authentication services, Windows operating Systems (such as Windows XP) that support the driver
6		signing features, and any product using Driver Signing feature
7	A method of providing trusted intermediary	Driver Signing reature
8	services including the following steps: at a first apparatus, receiving an item from	Microsoft's Window Hardware Quality
9	a second apparatus;	Labs (WHQL) (first apparatus) receiving driver package (item) from independent
· 10		hardware vendor (IHV) or any driver developer (second apparatus).
11	associating authentication information with said item;	The signature information of a security catalog file (see next element of claim) names Microsoft as the publisher.
12 13		WHQL's signature is intended to signify that a driver has complied with Microsoft's
14		Windows compatibility and/or Secure Audio Path (SAP) specifications.
15	incorporating said item into a secure digital container;	The hashes of the files making up the driver package are included in the signed security catalog file for the driver package.
16		The catalog file makes the driver package a secure digital container.
17	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in	Driver developers specify rules in an INF file that govern the installation and/or use
18	part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;	of the driver. For example, as specified in the INF, the installation events will vary
19		based on the user's operating system version, which includes architecture,
20		product type and suite. The INF logging rules and can further specify security rules
21	·	that are evaluated when the driver is used.
22	•	White Paper – Operating-System Versioning for Drivers under Windows XP
23		Setup selects the [Models] section to use
24		based on the following rules:
25		If the INF contains [Models] sections for several major or minor operating system version numbers, Setup uses the section
26 27		with the highest version numbers that are not higher than the operating system
28		version on which the installation is taking place.

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2 3		If the INF [Models] sections that match the operating system version also include product type decorations, product suite decorations, or both, then Setup selects the section that most closely matches the
4		running operating system.
5		Suppose, for example, Setup is running on Windows XP Professional (which is operating system version 5.1), and it finds the following entry in a [Manufacturer]
7		section:
8		%FooCorp%=FooMfg, NT, NT.5, NT.5.5, NT0x80
9		In this case, Setup will look for a [Models] section named [FooMfg.NT.5]. Setup will look for a [Models]
11		also use the [FooMfg.NT.5] section if it is running on a Datacenter version of
12		Windows .NET Server, because a specific major/minor version takes precedence over
		the product type and suite mask.
13		For example, to create an INF that is
14		intended for use only on Windows XP, the INF file could contain the following:
15		[Manufacturer]
16		"Foo Corp." = FooMfg, NT.5.1, NT.5.2 [FooMfg.NT.5.1]
17		"Foo Device" = FooDev, *FOO1234
18		Note the omission of the undecorated [FooMfg] section, as well as the omission
19		of the [FooMfg.NT.5.2] section. This INF
20		file would appear to be "empty" on any operating system other than Windows XP.
		Access Control List Rules
21		XP DDK - Tightening File-Open
22		Security in a Device INF File
23		For Microsoft Windows 2000 and later, Microsoft tightened file-open security in
24		the class installer INFs for certain device classes, including CDROM, DiskDrive,
25		FDC, FloppyDisk, HDC, and SCSIAdapter.
26		If you are unsure whether the class installer for your device has tightened security on
27		file opens, you should tighten security by
		using the device's INF file to assign a value to the DeviceCharacteristics value name
28		in the registry. Do this within an add-
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1		registry-section, which is specified using
2	transmitting said secure digital container	the INF AddReg directive. Microsoft, IHV, driver developer or any
3	and said first rule to a third apparatus, said	other party distributing signed driver
J	third apparatus including a protected	packages transmitting the driver package to
4	processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said	user (third apparatus). Since the driver package includes the INF file, it will
5	protecting information stored in said protected processing environment from	include the first rule. The protected
	tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	processing environment (PPE) is Windows
6		operating system with its pertinent services such as Windows File Protection, signature
	1	and cryptographic functions, Plug and Play
7		and Set-up and their related default and
8		modifiable policies. The PPE checks for
•		signatures on driver packages and detects situations when the driver package's
. 9		signature does not match the driver
10		package.
11		Additionally, the Digital Rights Manager
		(DRM) components (kernel and client) will contribute to making the third apparatus a
12	-	PPE when the SAP functionality is
13		invoked. [That is, when SAP is required, an
	·	additional signature is checked to verify that the driver is SAP compliant and that it
14		hasn't been tampered with.]
15	said third apparatus receiving said secure	The end-user receiving the driver package.
	digital container and said first rule; said third apparatus checking said	A step in the Plug and Play/Setup driver
16	authentication information; and	installation process checks signature at
17		installation. Additionally, the DRM
10		component will check the DRM signature when invoking DRM functionality.
18		
19	_	White Paper – Driver Signing for Windows
20		During driver installation, Windows
		compares the hashes contained in the driver's CAT file with the computed hash
21		of the driver binaries to determine whether
22		the binaries have changed since the CAT
		file was created. If a driver fails the signature check or there is no CAT file,
23		what happens next depends on the driver
-24		signing policy in effect on the user's
		system:
25		If the policy is set to Ignore, the driver
26		installs silently, with no message to the
.		user.
27		If the policy is set to Warn, a message
28		warns the user the driver is unsigned,
		which means that it has not passed WHQL
1	•	` !!

1 testing and might cause problems. The Warn dialog box gives an administrative 2 user the option to override the warning and install an unsigned driver anyway. If the policy is set to Block, the system displays a message that informs the user that the driver cannot be installed because it is not digitally signed. The action would be installing and/or using said third apparatus performing at least one the driver. For example, installation action on said item, said at least one action policies govern the actions (ignore, warn or being governed, at least in part, by said 7 block) taken based on whether a driver is first rule and by a second rule resident at signed or not and these policies (rule) are said third apparatus prior to said receipt of 8 resident on the third apparatus. Another said secure digital container and said first rule is the "ranking" of available drivers rule, said action governance occurring at when selecting a driver to install. This least in part in said protected processing ranking process includes whether a driver environment. 10 is signed or not. Another rule is the security access rules that the class installer 11 that will be used to install the device has. 12 In the case of DRM, the content will have associated rules governing its use in a SAP-13 complaint environment. These rules (the content license) can be resident at the third 14 apparatus particularly in the case when a user is installing a new (SAP-compliant) 15 device that will render previously acquired content or in the case that acquired content 16 cannot be rendered until the user installs required drivers. 17 For example, when installing: 18 The XP driver ranking process and the 19 modifiable default related to signature state of the driver act as the second rule. 20 The driver will be installed only if the first 21 and second rules validate. 22 Operating-System Versioning for Drivers under Windows XP 23 Default System Policy for Unsigned 24 Drivers 25 If the user installs an unsigned driver for a designated device class from disk or from 26 another web site, Windows XP/Windows 2000 displays a warning that the driver is 27 unsigned, thus helping to preserve the integrity of the released system. However, 28 by default, Windows XP/Windows 2000

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	2 3	does not block installation of unsigned drivers, so vendors can get urgent hot-fixes to customers while waiting for WHQL to test the fix.
	4 5 6	In Windows XP, the default driver signing policy can be changed through the Hardware tab of the System applet on the Control Panel. A user can change the policy to be more restrictive, but not less
. 7	7	restrictive on a per-user basis (that is, a user can change Warn to Block, but not to Ignore). An administrator can change the policy to be either more restrictive or less
9		restrictive for all users on the system by checking "Apply the setting as system default."
10		Driver Ranking
11		Under Windows XP, the driver ranking strategy has been modified as follows:
13		If an INF file is unsigned, and if neither the [Models] section nor the [DDInstall]
14	·	section is decorated with an NT-specific extension, the INF file is considered
15 16		"suspect" and its rank is shifted into a higher range (that is, worse) than all hardware and compatible rank matches of
17		INF files for which one (or both) of those criteria are met.
18		The new ranking ranges will now be:
19	·	0 – 0xFFF (DRIVER_HARDWAREID_RANK):
20 -		"trusted" hardware-ID match 0x1000 - 0x3FFF: "trusted" compatible-ID match
22		0x8000 - 0x8FFF: "untrusted" hardware- ID match
23		0x9000 - 0xBFFF: "untrusted" compatible-ID match
24		0xC000 - 0xCFFF: "untrusted" undecorated hardware-ID match (possibly a
25		Windows 9x-only driver) 0xD000 - 0xFFFF: "untrusted"
26		undecorated compatible-ID match (possibly a Windows 9x-only driver)
27		
28	127. A method as in claim 126, in which said authentication information at least in part identifies said first apparatus and/or a	The authentication information will identify Microsoft, operator of the first apparatus.
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	FOR U.S. PA	TENT NO. 6,185,683
3	126.	Products Infringing: Microsoft Software
4.		that includes the Authenticode feature, .NET Framework SDK, Visual Studio,
		Microsoft technology that supports a digital
5		signature function (such as ActiveX),
. 6		Windows Installer technology.
	A method of providing trusted intermediary	Infringement is based on use Microsoft ActiveX control, Cabinet file, Microsoft
7	services including the following steps:	Windows Installer, Authenticode and
8		Software Restriction Policy technologies.
O		For example, a software publisher
9		distributing a signed application that has licensed ActiveX controls embedded
10		within it would practice this method.
10	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from	The item is unsigned software such as an
11	a second apparatus;	ActiveX control or any software packaged in a cabinet file or Microsoft Installer
10		(.msi) file. Within the development
12	·	environment, multiple software developers
. 13		(working on a second apparatus) will send their unsigned software to a secure location
		(first apparatus) containing the entity's
14	·	private signing key. An example entity
15		would be a software publisher.
		Source: Deploying ActiveX Controls on
16	,	the Web with the Internet Component
17	:	Download
		The holder of the digital certificate
18		
19		Keeping your digital certificate safe is very
		important. Some firms (including Microsoft) do not keep their signature file
20		on site. The signature is kept with the
21		Certificate Authority and files are sent
		there for signing.
22	associating authentication information with	Signing the software associates the
23	said item;	software publisher's identify with the
		software.
24	:	Source: Packaging ActiveX Controls
25		Signing Cabinet Files
		A .cab file can be digitally signed like an
26		ActiveX control. A digital signature provides accountability for software
27		developers: The signature associates a
21		software vendor's name with a given file. A
28		signature is applied to a .cab file (or
		control) using the Microsoft Authenticode®
		41

Exhibit B

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1		technology. The .cab tool set assists software
2		developers in applying digital signatures to
. 3	·	.cab files by allowing a developer to
3		allocate space in the .cab file for the
. 4	idiagnoid item into a convendicital	signature. Signing software either directly or within a
_	incorporating said item into a secure digital container;	package (cabinet or .msi file) secures it in a
5	·	digital container.
6		Alternately, the signed ActiveX control
	associating a first rule with said secure	could be placed into a signed cabinet file. The first rule would be the licensing
7	digital container, said first rule at least in	support code within the ActiveX control
	part governing at least one aspect of access	and/or conditional syntax statements when
-	to or use of said item;	the software is within a signed .msi file. When the software is within a signed
9		cabinet file, the first rule can be a rule
10		contained in the software, as is the case
	·	when an ActiveX control is packaged in a signed cabinet file.
11		
12		First rule, in the case of ActiveX:
13		When an application with a licensed
		ActiveX control is started, an instance of the control usually needs to be created.
14	_	The application accomplishes this by
15		making a call to CreateInstanceLic and
	,	passing the license key embedded in the application as a parameter in the call. The
16		ActiveX control performs a string
17		comparison between the embedded license
	,	key and its own copy of the license key. If the keys match, an instance of the control is
18	·	created and the application can execute
19		normally.
		Source: Using ActiveX Controls to
20		Automate Your Web Pages
21	·	Run-time licensing Most ActiveX Controls should support
22		design-time licensing and run-time
22		licensing. (The exception is the control that
23		is distributed free of charge.) Design-time
		licensing ensures that a developer is building his or her application or Web page
24	·	with a legally purchased control; run-time
25		licensing ensures that a user is running an
		application or displaying a Web page that contains a legally purchased control.
26	·	Design-time licensing is verified by control
27		containers such as Visual Basic, Microsoft
l		Access, or Microsoft Visual InterDev®. Before these containers allow a developer
28		to place a control on a form or Web page,

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1		they first verify that the control is licensed
2		by the developer or content creator. These containers verify that a control is licensed
3		by calling certain functions in the control: If the license is verified, the developer can add it.
4		Run-time licensing is also an issue for
5	· '-	these containers (which are sometimes bundled as part of the final application); the
6		containers again call functions in the control to validate the license that was
7	transmitting said secure digital container	embedded at design time. The third apparatus is a user computer or
8	and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected	an application server. The protected processing environment (PPE) is Windows
9	processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said	operating system, Internet Explorer (IE) and pertinent operating IE services such as Windows File Protection and security,
10	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	signature and cryptographic functions related to code signing and related policies.
11	•	The PPE checks for signatures on software
12	:	or the software packages and detects situations when the signature does not
13		validate as an indication that tampering may have occurred with the item.
14	said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule;	Having the third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule is
15	,	typical of networked computing environments.
16	said third apparatus checking said	Examine the signature information includes verifying that signature was creating using
17	authentication information; and	the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher.
18	said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action	The action would be installation and/or use of the distributed software. The second
19	being governed, at least in part, by said	rule can be software restriction policies resident on the machine, which can be
20	first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of	invoked at installation and/or runtime.
21	said secure digital container and said first rule, said action governance occurring at	NET Framework Security - pg 259
22	least in part in said protected processing environment.	and
23		White Paper – Using Software Restriction Policies in Windows XP and Windows
24		NET Server to Protect Against Unauthorized Software
25		Software Restriction Polices is a policy-
26		driven technology that allows administrators to set code-identity-based
27 28		rules that determine whether an application is allowed to execute. (.NET Framework Security - pg 259)
20		

1	For example, administrators can set rules for all Windows Installer packages coming from the Internet or Intranet zone.
4 5	As part of the DLL load mechanisms, Software Restriction Policies is invoked and starts to check its most specific rules. Software Restriction Policies get invoked
6	prior to an .exe being able to run.
7	The four types of rules are – hash, certificate, path, and zone.
8	Note: The hash and certificate rules relate directing to the signature information
9	whereas, the path and zone rules do not.
10	127. A method as in claim 126, in which said authentication information at least in part identifies said first apparatus and/or a information. The software publisher, user of first device, is identified in the authentication information.
11	user of said first apparatus.
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5	126.	Product infringing: Visual Studio .NET, .NET Framework SDK, Authenticode, Products that contain the .NET CLR, Compact CLR or CLI.
6	A method of providing trusted intermediary services including the following steps:	
7	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from	First apparatus is a software build or
8	a second apparatus;	deployment services computer that has access to signing key. The item may be a
. 9		program, graphic, media object or other resource, from a developer computer, or
10	associating authentication information with	Associating a cryptographic hash with the
. 11	said item;	file that will contain this item for the purpose of ensuring the authenticity of the
12		item, along with names and attributes that are desired to be associated with the item
13	incorporating said item into a secure digital	for identification purposes. Producing signed, strongly named
14	container;	assembly that contains this assembly and associated attributes.
15	associating a first rule with said secure digital container, said first rule at least in	Including any security demands (such as members of the Microsoft .NET
16	part governing at least one aspect of access to or use of said item;	Framework SDK Public Class CodeAccessSecurityAttribute) as part of the assembly.
1.7 18	transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said third apparatus including a protected	The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The third apparatus's protected processing
19	processing environment at least in part protecting information stored in said	environment is Windows NT and the .NET CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR.
20	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	Information is protected from tampering because user is not administrator, user runs
21	tampering by a user of said time apparatus,	code on server, a share on another
22		computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of
23		with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI
24	said third apparatus receiving said secure	and/or compact CLR distributions. Having the third apparatus receiving said
25	digital container and said first rule;	secure digital container and said first rule is typical of networked computing
26	said third apparatus checking said	The .NET Framework, when the assembly
27	authentication information; and	is installed into the global assembly cache (GAC), verifies the strong name of
28		assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using the private key that corresponds to the
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1		public key of the publisher.
2	said third apparatus performing at least one action on said item, said at least one action	The action is executing code that is the item or using code that renders the item.
. 3	being governed, at least in part, by said	Action is governed by security demands on
4	first rule and by a second rule resident at said third apparatus prior to said receipt of	code that calls the item or on code that calls code included in the .NET assembly that
•	said secure digital container and said first	manages said item. The second rule is the
. 5	rule, said action governance occurring at least in part in said protected processing	machine, enterprise, user, and application configuration file resident rules. Typically
6	environment.	these configuration files will be populated before the arrival of most new assemblies
7		in a virtual distribution environment. This
8	'	action governance occurs in the protected processing environment of the CLR, CLI
		and/or compact CLR.
9	127. A method as in claim 126, in which	The authentication information will
10	said authentication information at least in part identifies said first apparatus and/or a	identify the .NET Assembly Class company name and trademark attributes
11	user of said first apparatus.	that identify the apparatus or user of the first apparatus as being a member of an
12		entity or a branded source (brand name).
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· 4 5 6	126.	Product infringing: Visual Studio .NET, .NET Framework SDK, Authenticode, Products that contain the .NET CLR, Compact CLR or CLI.
	A method of providing trusted intermediary services including the following steps:	
7 8 9 10 11	at a first apparatus, receiving an item from a second apparatus;	The item is an unsigned .NET assembly, which can include, but not be limited to, a Web control, multi-file assembly or component. Within the development environment, multiple assembly builders (working on a second apparatus) will send their unsigned assembly to a secure location (first apparatus) containing the entity's private signing key. An example entity would be a software publisher.
13		.NET Security Framework - pg 130-1
14		Describes this exact practice and further explains the "Delay Signing Assemblies" feature of .NET that accommodates the fact
15 16	· ·	that "many publishers will keep the private key in a secure location, possibly
17		embedded in specially designed cryptographic hardware."
18		"Delay signing is a technique used by developers whereby the public key is added
19		to the assembly name as before, granting the assembly its unique identity, but no
20		signature is computed. Thus, no private key access is necessary."
21	associating authentication information with said item;	Strong naming the assembly binds the entity's/publisher's name into the
22		assembly. The public portion of the key used to strongly name the assembly is
23	·	placed in the assembly manifest. Other assemblies or applications can contain
24		references to the strong names of strongly named assemblies such as in the case of
25		applications that contain references to a set of compliant .NET core libraries. Strong
26		naming compliant .NET core libraries with the European Computers Manufactures
27		Association's (ECMA) key is a way to allow any publisher to develop compliant
28		NET core libraries that can be authenticated by other applications.
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Exhibit B

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1		NET Convity Franciscale 124
2		NET Security Framework – pg 124 "Strong naming is a process whereby an
. 3		assembly name can be further qualified by
3		the identity of the publisher."
4		NET Security Framework – pg 133 The publisher must educative its public key
_		The publisher must advertise its public key or keys in an out-of-band fashion (such as
5	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	documentation shipped with the product or
6		on the company Web site)
Ŭ		NET Security Framework – pg 130
7		The goal of the ECMA key is to allow a slightly more generalized strong name
8		binding than usual, namely allowing
0		binding to the publisher of the runtime in
9	1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1: 1	use, rather than to a fixed publisher.
	incorporating said item into a secure digital container;	Signing the assembly places it in a secure container.
10	conumer,	NET Framework Security - pg 527
11		Strong named assemblies cannot be
		modified in any manner without destroying the strong name signature.
12	·	Applied Microsoft .NET Framework
13		Programming – pg 89
	·	Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-
14		Resistant When the assembly is installed into the
15		GAC, the system hashes the contents of the
15		file containing the manifest and compares
16		the hash value with the RSA digital signature value embedded within the PE
17	·	file (after unsigning it with the public key).
17		If the values are identical, the file's
18		contents haven't been tampered with and
		you know that you have the public key that corresponds to the publisher's private key.
19		In addition, the system hashes the contents
20		of the assembly's other files and compares
		the hash values with the hash values stored in the manifest file's FileDef table. If any
21		of the hash values don't match, at least one
22		of the assembly's files has been tampered
İ		with and the assembly will fail to install
23	associating a first rule with said secure	into the GAC. A .NET assembly includes imperative and
24	digital container, said first rule at least in	declarative statements/rules that will
27	part governing at least one aspect of access	govern its access or use. For example,
25	to or use of said item;	role-based security or strong name demands in the assembly can be the first
		rule.
26		
27		MSDN on Role-Based Security
ĺ		Applications that implement role-based
28	·	security grant rights based on the role

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2 3		associated with a principal object. The principal object represents the security context under which code is running. The PrincipalPermission object represents the identity and role that a particular principal
4		identity and role that a particular principal class must have to run. To implement the
5		PrincipalPermission class imperatively, create a new instance of the class and
6		initialize it with the name and role that you want users to have to access your code.
7		MSDN on StrongNameIdentityPermission
•		StrongNameIdentityPermission class
8		defines the identity permission for strong
9		names. StrongNameIdentityPermission uses this class to confirm that calling code
10		is in a particular strong-named assembly.
11	transmitting said secure digital container and said first rule to a third apparatus, said	The third apparatus is a user computer or an application server. The software
12	third apparatus including a protected processing environment at least in part	publisher transmitting the .NET assembly to an end-user with a CLR. The third
13	protecting information stored in said	apparatus's protected processing
14	protected processing environment from tampering by a user of said third apparatus;	environment is Windows NT and the .NET CLR, CLI and/or compact CLR.
	,	Information is protected from tampering
15	,	because user is not administrator, user runs code on server, a share on another
16		computer, or over a network. Further this information is protected by a number of
17		protection mechanisms that are included with the Windows NT and CLR, CLI
18		and/or compact CLR distributions.
19	said third apparatus receiving said secure digital container and said first rule;	The end-user receiving the signed assembly.
	said third apparatus checking said authentication information; and	The .NET Framework, when the assembly is installed into the global assembly cash
20	authentication information, and	(GAC), verifies the strong name of
21	·	assemblies. This process includes verifying that signature was creating using
22		the private key that corresponds to the public key of the publisher.
23		Applied Microsoft .NET Framework
24	·	Programming - pg 89 Strongly Named Assemblies Are Tamper-
		Resistant As above.
25		·
26		NET Framework Security – pg 128
27		The verification of any strong name assemblies is performed automatically
28		when needed by the .NET Framework.
		Any assembly claiming a strong name but
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failing verification will fail to install into the global assembly or download cache or 2 will fail to load at runtime. said third apparatus performing at least one Within the CLR (protected processing action on said item, said at least one action environment), the execution of the program being governed, at least in part, by said will depend upon whether the user is of the first rule and by a second rule resident at "role" required of the assembly or whether said third apparatus prior to said receipt of 5 the calling assembly is from a strongsaid secure digital container and said first named assembly specified in the "item" rule, said action governance occurring at assembly (alternate first rules) and only if least in part in said protected processing assembly complies with the local code environment. access security policy (second rule), as an example of one of the types of rules that .NET Framework allows to be resident on 8 the third apparatus.. 9 127. A method as in claim 126, in which The user of the first apparatus is the developer said authentication information at least in at the assembly developer. Strong naming 10 part identifies said first apparatus and/or a binds the publisher's name to assembly. user of said first apparatus. 11 LaMacchia, Brian, etc, NET Framework Security, Addison-Wesley, 2002 12 Richter, Jeffrey, Applied Microsoft NET Framework Programming, Microsoft Press, 2002 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

	3		
CLAIM-LANGUAGE		* SEE SECLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT SELECTION	
٠	4 1 5	Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager SDK	
·	A method comprising:		
((a) receiving a digital file including music;	Reference is made to the Windows Media Rights Manager SDK Programming Reference ("WMPM SDK") attached beauty as Full 11:	
8		("WMRM SDK"), attached hereto as Exhibit A. Media Player infringement analysis is set forth herein using the example of a music file	
9		downloaded and transferred to a portable audio player.	
10		Consumer receives a Windows Media file (WMRM SDK, Step 3)	
11 12	(b) storing said digital file in a first secure memory of a first device;	Windows Media file is stored in consumer's computer and all use of it is securely managed by the Secure Content Manager in Windows	
13	(c) storing information associated with said digital file in a secure database stored on said	Media Player. License is stored in the License Store (WMRM	
14	first device, said information including at least one budget control and at least one copy	SDK, Step 5); license includes Rights which may include AllowTransfertoNonSDMI, AllowTransfertoSDMI, (or Allow Transfer to	
15	control, said at least one budget control including a budget specifying the number of copies which can be made of said digital file;	WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices), and TransferCount- the	
16	and said at least one copy control controlling the copies made of said digital file:	number of times a piece of content may be transferred to the device (a transfer budget).	
17 18	(d) determining whether said digital file may be copied and stored on a second device based	Windows Media Rights Manager enforces the license restrictions	
10	on at least said copy control;	777	
19	(e) if said copy control allows at least a portion of said digital file to be copied and stored on a second device,	Windows Media Rights Manager determines whether the AllowTransferToNonSDMI or	
20	second device,	AllowTransferToSDMI rights are present.(Or, Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices.)	
21	(1)copying at least a portion of said digital file;	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI portable device (Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-	
22		Compliant devices or other types of devices), if allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager	
23	(2)transferring at least a portion of said digital file to a second device	Portable device necessarily includes at least a memory and audio output	
24	including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	and addit output	
25	(3)storing said digital file in said memory of said second device; and	Music file is transferred to the portable device	
26	(4)including playing said music through said audio output.	Portable device plays the music	
27	2. A method as in claim 1, further comprising:		
28	(a) at a time substantially contemporaneous with said transferring step, recording in said	Counter reflecting TransferCount is decremented by Windows Media Rights	
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...Exhibit B

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1	first device information indicating that said Manager
2	transfer has occurred. 3. A method as in claim 2, in which:
.3	(a) said information indicating that said Counter decrement reduces the allowable number of budgeted transfers
4	on said budget. 4. A method as in claim 3, in which:
5	(a) said encumbrance operates to reduce the number of copies of said digital file authorized number of budgeted transfers
6	by said budget.
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	Infringing products include Windows Media
	Player and Windows Media Rights Manager SDK
11. A method comprising:	
(a) receiving a digital file;	Consumer receives a Windows Media file (WMRM SDK, Step 3)
(b) storing said digital file in a first secure memory of a first device;	Windows Media file is stored in consumer's computer and all use of it is securely managed by the Secure Content Manager in Windows Media Player.
(c) storing information associated with said digital file in a secure database stored on sai	License information is stored in the License Store (WMRM SDK, Step 10), license
first device, said information including a first control;	
control,	AllowTransferToSDMI (Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices), TransferCount
(d) determining whether said digital file may be copied and stored on a second device bas	WMRM determines whether transfer rights a
on said first control, (1) said determining step including	Portable Device Service Provider Module
identifying said second device and determining whether said first contr	identifies the portable device as either SDMI-
allows transfer of said copied file to	DRM Compliant or other types of supported
said second device, said determinati based at least in part on the features present at the device to which said	Windows Media Device Manager, which allows the transfer based on whether the device
copied file is to be transferred; (e) if said first control allows at least a portion	identification matches the License Right.
of said digital file to be copied and stored on second device,	
second device,	Allow Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant devices or other types of devices), the
	following steps are performed: Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (Allow
(1) copying at least a portion of said digital file;	Transfer to WM-D-DRM-Compliant or other portable device, if allowed by Windows Med
(2) transferring at least a portion of said	Rights Manager Portable device necessarily includes at least a
digital file to a second device including a memory and an audio	memory and audio output
and/or video output; (3) storing said digital file in said memory of said second device; and	ory Music file is stored in the portable device
(4) rendering said digital file through sa output.	Portable device plays the music

Exhibit B

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2 INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 6,253,193 Product infringing: Windows Media Player, Windows Media Player, Windows Media 5 Rights Manager SDK A method comprising: Consumer receives a Windows Media file (a) receiving a digital file; ((WMRM SDK, Step 3) 7 (b) an authentication step comprising: License includes identity of user's Windows (1) accessing at least one identifier 8 Media Player. WM Players capable of playing associated with a first device or with a protected content must be individualized. user of said first device; and They contain a unique (Individualized) DRM client component to which protected WMA 10 content licenses are bound. Content licenses are bound to this DRM individualization 11 module as the result of a challenge sent from the Client to the WMLM service. The 12 challenge contains information about Individualized DRM Client (in the form of an 13 encrypted Client ID) and capabilities of the machine (e.g. support for Secure Audio Path 14 (SAP), version of the WMRM SDK supported in the player. 15 Music file cannot be used unless identifier (2) determining whether said identifier is associated with a device and/or user indicated in License matches user's Windows 16 Media Player identifier (that is, the authorized to store said digital file; Individualized DRM Client to which the 17 license is bound must be the same one supported by the device). 18 Music file will not be processed through (c) storing said digital file in a first secure Windows Media Player, including protected memory of said first device, but only if said 19 rendering buffers, unless the identifiers match. device and/or user is so authorized, but not Protected WMA file can be stored on client proceeding with said storing if said device 20 even if unauthorized but it cannot be decrypted and/or user is not authorized; and enter into the secure boundary (first secure 21 memory) of the player unless appropriately licensed. 22 License includes Rights and is stored in the (d) storing information associated with said License Store, Rights may include digital file in a secure database stored on said 23 AllowTransferToNonSDMI, first device, said information including at least AllowTransferToSDMI, (or Allow Transfer To one control; 24 WM-D-DRM-CompliantDevice or other device) TransferCount 25 Windows Media Rights Manager enforces the (e) determining whether said digital file may license restrictions be copied and stored on a second device based 26 on said at least one control; (f) if said at least one control allows at least a If appropriate rights are present, the following 27 steps are performed: portion of said digital file to be copied and stored on a second device, 28 Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (or WM-(1) copying at least a portion of said

Exhibit B

1	/	
2	digital file;	D-DRM Compliant or other) portable device, if allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager
3	(2) transferring at least a portion of said digital file to a second device	Portable device necessarily includes at least a memory and audio output
	including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	
4 _. 5	(3) storing said digital file in said memory of said second device; and	Music file is stored in the portable device
	(4) rendering said digital file through said output.	Portable device plays the music
6	16. A method as in claim 15, in which:	
7	said digital file is received in an encrypted form;	Protected Windows Media File is encrypted. WMP will not decrypt file until license is
8	and further comprising:	processed. Licenses are bound to Individualization DLLs, which are bound to
9		Hardware ID. Ind. DLL and Hardware ID must be verified as the Ids to which the license
10	decrypting said digital file after said authentication step and before said step of	is bound – this is the authentication process. :
11	storing said digital file in said memory of said first device.	(Recall that this module was created based in part on receipt of the Client Hardware ID or
12		fingerprint and the license was create based in part on receipt of a challenge from the client
13		indicating the security properties (SAP-ready, SDK support, etc.) of the client).
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	FOR U.S. TATENT NO. 0,233,173		
3	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT	
. 4	19.	Infringing products include Office 2003 and	
5		included applications, and Server 2003, including Microsoft hosted RMS Service using	
6		Passport	
7	A method comprising:		
, 8	receiving a digital file at a first device;	Receiving a digital file such as a Word Document, email, Excel spreadsheet, PowerPoint presentation, or other content at a	
9		recipient's device. Such content may be received via email, received on removable	
10		media, such as floppy disk, downloaded and viewable by Internet Explorer, e.g., a web page	
11		possibly containing graphics and/or audio data, etc.	
12	establishing communication between said first device and a clearinghouse located at a	If the digital file is subject to rights management, and the recipient tries to open the	
13	location remote from said first device;	digital file in an IRM-enabled application, the IRM-enabled application contacts a remote RMS, i.e., cleaninghouse for a use license.	
14	said first device obtaining authorization	If the recipient is authorized to access or use	
15	information including a key from said clearinghouse;	the digital file, the RMS creates a license for the digital file. The RMS then seals a key	
16		inside the license so that only the recipient canaccess or use the digital file. Finally, the RMS sends the license back to the recipient.	
17	said first device using said authorization	The recipient's device then uses the key in the	
18	information to gain access to or make at least one use of said first digital file, including	license to gain access or decrypt a portion of the digital file.	
19	using said key to decrypt at least a portion of said first digital file; and		
20	receiving a first control from said clearinghouse at said first device;	The license received from the RMS at the recipient's device contains at least one control,	
21	clearinghouse at said first device,	such as restricting the ability to print, forward, or edit.	
22	storing said first digital file in a memory of said first device;	The digital file is stored in the memory of the said recipient's device, such as in RAM, on a	
23		hard drive, etc. The at least one control in the license limits	
24	using said first control to determine whether said first digital file may be copied and stored on a second device;	copying the digital file.	
25		Such controls are set when the digital file was authored. For example, when the digital file is	
26	·	authored, the IRM-enabled application	
27		presented the author with a list of policy templates with different rights levels. The	
28		author selected an appropriate rights level which may for instance, allow other users in the system to open and read the document, but not	
	*:	System to oben and read the document, but his	
	**		

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,			
2		to modify it, copy text from it, or forward it. These rights or controls are then associated with the digital file.	
3 4 5		When an attempt is made to access the digital file, the RMS determines the recipient's rights based on the recipient's identity and the policies or controls associated with the digital	
6		file.	
7	if said first control allows at least a portion of said first digital file to be copied and stored on a second device,	If the control in the license allows copying the digital file to a second device, then at least a portion of the digital file is copied,	
8	copying at least a portion of said first digital file;	such as by transferring or forwarding the digital file in an email message;	
9 . 10	transferring at least a portion of said first digital file to a second device including a memory and an audio and/or video output;	A portion of the digital file is then transferred to a second device, such as a personal computer or portable device. The second device includes	
11		a memory and an audio and/or video output. The memory may be a hard-drive, RAM, CD,	
12		DVD, or other storage. The audio and/or video output may be speakers and/or a video monitor.	
13	storing said first digital file portion in said memory of said second device; and	The digital file is stored in the second device's memory.	
14 15	rendering said first digital file portion through said output.	The digital file is rendered through the output, such as played through the speakers and/or displayed on the video monitor. For example, a	
16		Word document is displayed on the screen of the video monitor.	
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. 4	11			
. 4			Infringing products include Windows Media Player, Windows Media Rights Manager SDK	
	19	. A method comprising:		
6	(a)	receiving a digital file at a first device;	WMRM SDK, Step 3.	
O	(b)		WMRM SDK, Step 6.	
7		first device and a clearinghouse located at		
. /	H	a location remote from said first device;		
8	(c)	said first device obtaining authorization	WMRM SDK, Step 9. [License contains the	
_	1	information including a key from said	key]	
9	(1)	clearinghouse;	What A CDV Can 11	
	(d)	said first device using said authorization	WMRM SDK, Step 11.	
10		information to gain access to or make at least one use of said first digital file,		
11		including using said key to decrypt at least a portion of said first digital file; and		
12	(e)	receiving a first control from said	WMRM SDK, Steps 8-9.	
12		clearinghouse at said first device;		
13	(f)	storing said first digital file in a memory of said first device;	WMRM SDK, Step 3.	
14	(g)	using said first control to determine	At least the following WMRMRights Object	
	(8)	whether said first digital file may be	properties meet this limitation:	
15	·	copied and stored on a second device;	AllowTransferToNonSDMI,	
			AllowTransferToSDMI (or AllowTransfer To	
16			WM-D-DRM-Compliant Device or other) and	
	i		TransferCount	
17	(h)	if said first control allows at least a portion	This and all subsequent claim steps occur when	
	` ´	of said first digital file to be copied and	the condition specified in the WMRMRights	
18		stored on a second device,	Object property is met	
	(i)	copying at least a portion of said first	Transfer to the SDMI or non-SDMI (or WM-	
19) `	digital file;	D-DRM Compliant) portable device, if	
.	l		allowed by Windows Media Rights Manager	
20	(j)	transferring at least a portion of said first	Portable device necessarily includes at least a	
	"	digital file to a second device including a	memory and audio output	
21		memory and an audio and/or video output;		
ĺ	(k)	storing said first digital file portion in said	Music file is stored in the portable device	
22		memory of said second device; and		
I	(1)	rendering said first digital file portion	Portable device plays the music	
23		through said output.		
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Exhibit B

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4		Infringing products include Windows Media Player, Windows Media Player, Windows Media Rights Manager SDK
5	51. A method comprising:	
6	(a) receiving a digital file at a first device;	WMRM SDK, Step 3.
7	(b) establishing communication between said first device and a	WMRM SDK, Step 6.
8	clearinghouse located at a location remote from said first device;	
9	(c) said first device obtaining authorization information from said	WMRM SDK, Step 9.
10	clearinghouse; and (d) said first device using said	WMRM SDK, Step 11.
11	authorization information to gain access to or make at least one use of said first	·
12	digital file; (e) storing said first digital file in a	WMA file stored on client
13	memory of said first device; (f) using at least a first control to	If device is based on WM D-DRM, it has a
14	determine whether said first digital file may be copied and stored on a second	certificate that is used to identify the device as compliant as well as the device's security
15	device, said determination based at least in part on (1) identification information	level. The security level indicates support on the device for such attributes as an internal
16	regarding said second device, and (2) the functional attributes of said second	clock.
17	device; (g) if, based at least in part on said	If License specifies that transfer of protected
18	identification information, said first control allows at least a portion of said	WMA file to WM-D-DRM-Compliant device is allowed, transfer may occur.
19	first digital file to be copied and stored on a second device,	
20	(h) copying at least a portion of said first digital file;	If transfer is a licensed right as indicated in the license, the song is copied to the device via Windows Media Device Manager.
21	(i) transferring at least a portion of said	Windows Media Device Manager transfers the
.22	first digital file to a second device including a memory and an audio	content to the device:
23	and/or video output; (j) storing said first digital file portion	WMA file is stored on device
24	in said memory of said second device; and	
25	(k) rendering said first digital file portion through said output.	WMA file is rendered.
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3	FOR U.S. 17	(1EXT NO. 3,713,017	
,	CLAIM LANGUAGE 35	CEAIM OF INFRINGEMENT	经被
4 5 6	33.	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.	
7 8	A data processing arrangement comprising at least one storing arrangement that at least temporarily stores a first secure	The first protected data is an ActiveX control.	
9	container comprising first protected data and a first set of rules governing use of said	The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed .msi in which the	
10	first protected data,	ActiveX developer packaged the ActiveX control. The first set of rules is the conditional syntax statements of the signed	
11		.msi file.	
12		The second alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed	
13 14		ActiveX control. The first set of rules is the license support code in the ActiveX control.	
15	·	A third alternative for the first container is	
16		a signed cabinet file containing a (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support code. The first set of rules is the	
17		license support code in the ActiveX control.	
18	·		
19	and at least temporarily stores a second secure container comprising second	The second protected data is the application developer's application that includes/uses	
20	protected data different from said first protected data and a second set of rules	the ActiveX control. The application developer's signed msi file (second secure	.
21	governing use of said second protected data; and	container) contains the application (second protected data). The second set of rules is the signed .msi file's conditional syntax	
23		statements that will be governed the offer/installation of the application.	
24	a data transfer arrangement, coupled to at least one storing arrangement, for	Placing the licensed ActiveX control (first protected information) in a signed cabinet	
25	transferring at least a portion of said first protected data and a third set of rules	file (third secure container) that itself is included in the application's signed .msi	
26	governing use of said portion of said first protected data to said second secure container.	file (second secure container). The third set of rules is the license support code in the ActiveX control.	
27	further comprising		
28	means for creating and storing, in said at least one storing arrangement, a third secure container;	The ability of the application developer to package files in signed cabinet files.	
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Exhibit B

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The third secure container is a cabinet file said data transfer arrangement further signed by the application developer and comprising means for transferring said 2 including at least the licensed ActiveX portion of said first protected data and control (first protected information. The said third set of rules to said third secure 3 container, and means for incorporating licensing support code in the ActiveX said third secure container within said control when its developer added licensing support to the ActiveX control is the third second secure container. set of rules. 5 Before an ActiveX control will create a 34. A data processing arrangement as in copy of itself, the calling application has to claim 33 further comprising means for pass a license key to the ActiveX control. applying said third set of rules to govern at 7 The license support code in the ActiveX least one aspect of use of said portion of control (third rule set) evaluates the said first protected data. authenticity of the calling application's request. 10 Windows Installer operating system service 35. A data processing arrangement as in enforces the conditional syntax statements claim 34 further comprising means for 11 of the application's signed .msi file. These applying said second set of rules to govern statements govern the offer/installation of at least one aspect of use of said portion of 12 the ActiveX control. said first protected data. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

2		TENT NO. 5,915,019
. 3	41	Infringing products include all Microsoft
4 5		tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft
6	A method comprising performing the	Installer technology. The signed .msi file created by the ActiveX
7	following steps within a virtual distribution environment comprising one or more	control developer is the first secure container. The conditional syntax
. 8	electronic appliances and a first secure container, said first secure container	statement(s) of the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file is/are the first
. 9	comprising (a) a first control set, and	control set.
10	(b) a second secure container comprising a second control set and first protected information:	The first protected information is the ActiveX control.
11 12	momation.	The first alternative for the second secure container is the signed and licensed
13		ActiveX control. The second control set is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
14		The second alternative for the second
15		secure container is a signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned)
16		ActiveX control. The second control set is the license support code in the ActiveX
17	using at least one control from said first	Control. The ActiveX control developer's
18	control set or said second control set to govern at least one aspect of use of said	conditional syntax statements (first control set) in the ActiveX developer's signed .msi
19	first protected information while said first protected information is contained within	file govern the offer/installation of the ActiveX control while it is in its signed
20	said first secure container;	.msi file.
.21		Alternately, the license support code (second control set) in the ActiveX control
22		governs use of the licensed ActiveX control.
23	creating a third secure container comprising a third control set for governing	The third secure container is a signed .msi file. The application developer packages
24	at least one aspect of use of protected information contained within said third	its application in a signed .msi file (third secure container) and includes conditional
25	secure container;	syntax statements (third control set) in the signed .msi
26	incorporating a first portion of said first protected information in said third secure	Placing the ActiveX control into the application developer's signed .msi file
27	container, said first portion made up of some or all of said first protected	(third secure container).
28	using at least one control to govern at least	The application developer's conditional
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2	one aspect of use of said first portion of said first protected information while said first portion is contained within said third	syntax statement(s) in its signed .msi file govern the offer/installation ActiveX control while it is in the signed .msi file
3	secure container.	(third secure container).
4	42. A method as in claim 41, in which said first secure container further includes a	The second protected information is a second ActiveX control.
5	fourth secure container comprising a fourth control set and second protected	The first alternative for the fourth secure
6	information and further comprising the following step:	container is the signed and licensed second ActiveX control. The fourth control set is
7		the license support code in the ActiveX control.
8		The second alternative for the fourth secure
9		container is a signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned) second ActiveX
10 ⁻		control. The fourth control set is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
12	using at least one control from said first control set or said fourth control set to	The ActiveX control developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
	govern at least one aspect of use of said second protected information while said	set) in the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file govern the offer/installation of the
13	second protected information is contained within said first secure container.	second ActiveX control while it is in its signed .msi file.
14	within said first secure container.	signed inisi me.
15	·	Alternately, the license support code
16 17	N. Committee of the com	(second control set) in the ActiveX control governs use of the licensed ActiveX control.
18 19	47. A method as in claim 41, in which said step of creating a third secure container includes:	
19	creating said third control set by	The application developer's conditional
20	incorporating at least one control not found in said first control set or said second	syntax statements are not found in either the first control set or the second control
21	control set.	set.
22	52. A method as in claim 41 in which said step of creating a third secure container	
23	occurs at a first site, and further comprising:	
24	copying or transferring said third secure container from said first site to a second	The application developer at first site distributes its application to other sites.
25	site located remotely from said first site.	distributes its application to other sites.
26	53. A method as in claim 52 in which said	The application developer at the first site is
27	first site is associated with a content distributor.	the content distributor.
28	54. A method as in claim 53 in which said second site is associated with a user of	The application developer distributes the application to end-users.
	T.	vhihit B

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1	content.	
2	55. A method as in claim 54 further	
3	comprising the following step:	
. 4	said user directly or indirectly initiating communication with said first site.	For Internet downloads, the user initiates the communication with the first site.
5	64. A method as in claim 54 in which said	The application developer's conditional
6	third control set includes one or more controls at least in part governing the use	syntax statements (third control set) govern the installation of the ActiveX control (first
7	by said user of at least a portion of said first portion of said first protected	protected information).
8	information.	
	76. A method as in claim 41 in which said	The third secure container is the application
.9 10	creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which specifies one or more of the controls	developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional syntax statements in that file.
11	contained in said third control set.	Microsoft supplies several template .msi
12	·	databases for use in authoring installation packages. The UISample.msi is the template recommended in the "An
13		Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default
14		of these conditional syntax statements in the second tional syntax statements
15		directly govern the installation by blocking progress until the EULA is accepted.
16	78. A method as in claim 52 in which said	The third secure container is the application
17	creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which	developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional syntax statements in that file.
18	specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.	
19		Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation packages. The UISample.msi is the
20 21	·	template recommended in the "An Installation Example" on MSDN. This
22	,	template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two
23		of these conditional syntax statements directly govern the installation by blocking
24		progress until the EULA is accepted.
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25		
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28	· ·	

INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART

FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019

_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	TENT NO. 5,915,019
3	81.	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the
5 6		Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology.
U	A data processing arrangement comprising:	
· 7	a first secure container comprising first protected information and a first rule set governing use of said first protected	The first alternative for the first secure container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing a
9	information;	licensed ActiveX control (the first protected information). The conditional
10	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the first rule set.
11		The second alternative for the first secure container is the signed cabinet file
12		containing the ActiveX control. The license support code in the ActiveX control
13		is the first rule set.
14		The third alternative for the first secure container is the licensed and signed
15		ActiveX control governed by license support code in the ActiveX control.
16 17	a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the signed .msi file which the application developer package its application. The second rule
18		set is the conditional syntax statements of the application developer's signed .msi file.
••	means for creating and storing a third	The third container is a signed cabinet file
19	secure container; and means for copying or transferring at least a	containing at least the ActiveX control. Putting the licensed ActiveX control (first
20	portion of said first protected information and a third rule set governing use of said	protected information) in a signed cabinet file (third secure container). The licensing
21	portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said means	support code in the ActiveX control is third rule set.
22	for copying or transferring comprising: means for incorporating said third	Packaging the signed cabinet file in the
23	secure container within said second secure container.	signed .msi file.
24		
25	82. A data processing arrangement as in claim 81 further comprising:	
26	means for applying at least one rule from said third rule set to at least in part govern	The third rule set ensures the user is licensed.
27	at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected information.	
28	02 4 4	····
20	83. A data processing arrangement as in claim 82 further comprising:	
4	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	

means for applying at least one rule from said second rule set to at least in part govern at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected information.

The second rule offer/installation information.

The second rule set governs the offer/installation of first protected information.

Exhibit B

comprising a third rule set; control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. copying said first portion of said first protected information; transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	3		
Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft Installer technology. A method comprising the following steps: creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected information; The first protected information is the ActiveX control. The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX control with license support container as an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container as the first memory; The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container as assigned cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's location. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is at signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's location. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is at secure container is the ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed Act	. 4 .	85.	tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX
A method comprising the following steps: creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected information; The first protected information is the ActiveX control. The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed ActiveX control. The first alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container in a first memory: The first alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support code. The first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container within a signed cabinet file. The first ule set is the ActiveX license support code. The second secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the signed mass file. The conditional syntax statements of the signed mass file are the second rule set. The second secure container is the secure container is stored at the application developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control with license support container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX stored at the application developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control with license support container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX stored at the activeX control developer's signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed and is the price of the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control developer's signed and is the signed and licensed ActiveX control developer's signed a	5		Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating
a first rule set and first protected information; The first protected information is the ActiveX control. The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support codainer is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX license support code. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support code undia event on the first rule set is the ActiveX license support code. The first protected information at the first rule set is the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The first protected information is apport to developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The ActiveX control developer packages the control in a signed mis file for distribution to the application developer's location. The ActiveX control developer's location. The ActiveX control developer's location. The ActiveX control developer's location. The Active	6	·	
a first rule set and first protected information; The first protected information is the ActiveX control. The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support codainer within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX icense support codainer within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX icense support codae. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support codainer within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX icense support code. The first protected information activeX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX control developer's signed mis file. The conditional syntax statements of the signed mis file are the second rule set. The second secure container is the ActiveX control developer's location. The first protected information is a signed and licensed ActiveX control with license support coda in the ActiveX control developer's signed mis file. The first protected information is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control developer's location. The first protected information is a signed activeX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is the ActiveX control developer's location. The ActiveX control developer packages the control in a signed mis file for distribution to the application developer's signed mis file are the third rule set. The third secure container is the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using mis authoring tool to import the control into the signed mis file. The third secure container is the ActiveX control to a package staging area.	7	A method comprising the following steps:	
The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support container within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX license support code. Storing said first secure container in a first memory: Coreating a second secure container comprising a second secure container in a second memory: Storing said second secure container in a second memory: Storing said second secure container in a second memory: Copying or transferring at least a first portion of said first protected information to said second secure container; said copying or transferring step comprising: Creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set; Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container to said second secure container. Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container. Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first portion of said first portion of	. 8	creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected	The first protected information is the ActiveX control.
ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control. The second alternative for the first secure container is an (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support contained within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set is the ActiveX license support code. Storing said first secure container in a first memory; creating a second secure container comprising a second rule set; The first secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's signed mis file. The conditional syntax statements of the signed mis file are the second rule set. The second secure container is the application developer's signed mis file. The second secure container is the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location. The second secure container is stored at the application developer packages the control in a signed .msi file for distribution to the application developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The application developer installs the ActiveX control developer installs the Active	9	mormation,	
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second memory; copying or transferring at least a first portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said copying or transferring step comprising: creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set; Copying said first portion of said first portion of said first protected information; copying said first portion of said first protected information; copying said first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring step comprising: The ActiveX control developer packages the control in a signed .msi file for distribution to the application developer's site. The third secure container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control on the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control on the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control on the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control on the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control on the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control on the sig	17		signed .msi file are the second rule set.
copying or transferring at least a first portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said copying or transferring step comprising: creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set; copying said first portion of said first protected information; copying said first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring step comprising: treating a third secure container comprising a third rule set; comprising a third rule set; The ActiveX control developer packages the control in a signed .msi file for distribution to the application developer's site. The third secure container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The ActiveX control developer's site. The third secure container is the ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The ActiveX control developer's site. The third secure container is the ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file and installis the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	18		
to said second secure container, said copying or transferring step comprising: creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set; Creating a third rule set; Creating a third rule set; Comprising a third rule set; Copying said first portion of said first protected information; Copying said first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container. Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to the application developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The third secure container is the ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file and into the signed .msi file and into the signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool t	19	copying or transferring at least a first	the control in a signed .msi file for
creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set; The third secure container is the ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. Copying said first portion of said first protected information; transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. The third secure container is the ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	20	to said second secure container, said	site.
containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed msi file are the third rule set. Copying said first portion of said first protected information; In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed msi file. Copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. Containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed msi file are the third rule set. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed msi file. The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	21	creating a third secure container	
copying said first portion of said first protected information; transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	-		containing a licensed ActiveX control. The conditional syntax statements of the signed
first protected information; transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the ActiveX control to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	23	conving said first portion of said	
transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to said third secure container; and copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. Using msi authoring tool to import the control into the signed .msi file. The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed .msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	24	first protected information;	tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the
copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. The application developer installs the ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the		of said first protected information to	Using msi authoring tool to import the
first portion of said first protected information from said third secure container to said second secure container. ActiveX control, which involves removing it from the ActiveX developer's signed msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	20		The application developer installs the
information from said third secure container to said second secure container. it from the ActiveX developer's signed msi file and installing it into its environment. Subsequently, the	27		
container. environment. Subsequently, the			it from the ActiveX developer's signed
	28	•	.msi file and installing it into its
		container.	environment. Subsequently, the

Exhibit B

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	· ·	
1 2		application developer places the ActiveX control into its signed .msi file when it is packaging its application.
3		
4	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected information consists of the entirety of said	The entire ActiveX control is copied.
5	first protected information.	
6	89. A method as in claim 85 in which	
7	said first memory is located at a first site,	The first memory is located at the ActiveX control developer's site.
8.	said second memory is located at a second site remote from said first site, and	The second memory is located at the application developer's site.
9	said step of copying or transferring said first portion of said first protected information to said second secure container	The ActiveX control developer's signed .msi file is transferred from its site to the site of the application developer.
10	further comprises copying or transferring said third secure container from said first	site of the application developer.
11	site to said second site.	
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. 4	85. (alternate infringing scenario)	Infringing products include all Microsoft tools that support the Microsoft ActiveX licensing model, Visual Studio .NET, the
5		Microsoft Installer SDK, and Operating System products that include the Microsoft
	4 1 1 C. H	Installer technology.
7	A method comprising the following steps: creating a first secure container comprising	The first protected information is the
8	a first rule set and first protected information;	ActiveX control.
9		The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed
10		ActiveX control. The first rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
11		
12 13		The second alternative for the first secure container is a (signed or unsigned) ActiveX control with license support contained
14		within a signed cabinet file. The first rule set would remain the ActiveX license support code.
15		
16		The third alternative for the first secure container is a signed msi file in which the ActiveX control developer packaged its
17		ActiveX control. The first rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) of the
18		signed msi file.
19	storing said first secure container in a first memory;	The first secure container is stored at the ActiveX control developer's location.
20	creating a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the application developer's signed .msi file.
21		The conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file are the second rule set.
22	storing said second secure container in a second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the application developer's location.
	copying or transferring at least a first	The ActiveX control is placed in a cabinet
23	portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said	file signed by the application developer and the signed cabinet file is placed in a .msi
24	copying or transferring step comprising:	file signed by the application developer. The third secure container is signed cabinet
25	creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set;	file in which the application developer
26	•	placed licensed ActiveX. The third rule set is the license support code in the ActiveX control.
27	copying said first portion of said first protected information;	Copying ActiveX control.
28	transferring said copied first portion of said first protected information to	Transferring ActiveX control to signed cabinet file.
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Exhibit B

1	said third secure container; and
2	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected cabinet file into its signed .msi file when it
3	information from said third secure is packaging its application. container to said second secure
4	container.
5	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected The entire ActiveX control is copied.
. 6	information consists of the entirety of said first protected information.
7	93. A method as in claim 85 in which
8	said step of copying transferring said copied first portion of said first protected The ActiveX control is placed in a cabinet file signed by the application developer and
9	information from said third secure the signed cabinet file is placed in a .msi file signed by the application developer.
10	further comprises storing said third secure container in said second secure container.
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. 4	1.	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
6		products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
7	A method of operating on a first secure	The first protected content is a signed and
8	container arrangement having a first set of controls associated therewith, said first secure container arrangement at least in	licensed .NET component used by the .NET assembly. The .NET assembly is distributed with a signed and governed .msi
9	part comprising a first protected content file, said method comprising the following	file. The second protected content is another signed and licensed .NET
10	steps performed within a virtual distribution environment including at least	component that is used by the .NET assembly.
11	one electronic appliance: using at least one control associated with	The first protected content is signed and
12	said first secure container arrangement for governing, at least in part, at least one	licensed .NET component (first secure container) contained within the .NET
13	aspect of use of said first protected content file while said first protected content file is	assembly. The one control is a declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header.
14	contained in said first secure container arrangement;	
15	creating a second secure container	The protected content is the same as the
16	arrangement having a second set of controls associated therewith, said second set of controls governing, at least in part, at	first protected content plus the additional implementation information included in the signed msi file. The second secure
-17	least one aspect of use of any protected content file contained within said second	container is the signed .msi file created for the .NET assembly. The signed .msi file's
18	secure container arrangement;	conditional syntax statements are the second set of controls that control the
19	4 for inc at least a portion of said first	offer/installation of the .NET assembly. The entire .NET assembly is included in
20	transferring at least a portion of said first protected content file to said second secure container arrangement, said portion made	the signed .msi file.
21	up of at least some of said first protected content file; and	Packaging the .NET assembly in the signed .msi file involves the following process
22		steps. In preparation for using a msi authoring tool, such as Microsoft's Orca,
23		copying the .NET component to a package staging area. Using msi authoring tool to
24		import the .NET component into the signed .msi file.
25	using at least one rule to govern at least one aspect of use of said first protected content	The conditional syntax statement(s) of the signed .msi file (second secure container)
26	file portion while said portion is contained	control(s) the offer/installation of the .NET
27	within said second secure container arrangement:	assembly.
Ĭ	in which	
28	said first secure container arrangement comprises a third secure container	The first alternative for the third secure container is a licensed and signed .NET
	comprises a time secure container	Contained to a received data signed if 12.1

Exhibit B

1	arrangement comprising a third set of	component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the
2	controls and said first protected content file, and	LicenseProviderAttribute (third set of
. 3		controls).
. 4		The second alternative for the third secure container is a .NET component whose hash
5		is included in the header of the .NET assembly. The set of declarative
6		statements comprising the
7		LicenseProviderAttribute is the third set of controls.
8	said first secure container arrangement further comprises a fourth secure container	The first alternative for the fourth secure container is another licensed and signed
•	arrangement comprising a fourth set of controls and a second protected content	.NET component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the
9	file.	LicenseProviderAttribute (fourth set of controls).
10	-	
11	*	The second alternative for the fourth secure container is the container created when the
12		hash of the .NET component is included in the header information of the .NET
13		assembly. The set of declarative statements comprising the
14		LicenseProviderAttribute is the fourth set
4-1		of controls.
15		of controls.
		of controls.
15		of controls.
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24		of controls.

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4	33.	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5		products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6		technology.
7	A data processing arrangement comprising at least one storing arrangement that at least temporarily stores a first secure	The first protected information is the .NET component.
8	container comprising first protected data and a first set of rules governing use of said	The first alternate for the first secure container is the signed .msi file in which
9	first protected data,	the .NET component developer packaged its .NET component. The first set of rules
10		is the conditional syntax statements of the signed .msi file.
11		The second alternative for the first secure
12		container is a licensed and signed .NET component governed by the set of
13		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of the :NET
14		component (first set of controls).
15		The third alternative for the first container is a signed cabinet file containing a (signed
16 17		or unsigned) .NET component with license support. The first set of controls is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of the .NET component.
18		•
19 20	and at least temporarily stores a second secure container comprising second protected data different from said first	The second protected data is the .NET assembly developer's assembly that includes/uses the .NET component.
	protected data and a second set of rules	
21	governing use of said second protected data; and	The first alternative for the second secure container is a signed .msi file in which the
22		.NET assembly developer packaged its multi-file assembly (second protected
23		data). The second set of rules is the conditional syntax statements of the signed
24		msi file that governs the offer/installation of the .NET assembly.
25		The second alternative for the second
26 27	· .	secure container is a signed .NET assembly. The second set of rules is the declarative rules within the assembly's
		header.
28	a data transfer arrangement, coupled to at least one storing arrangement, for	The third secure container is a signed .NET assembly governed by declarative rules in

	1	
2	transferring at least a portion of said first protected data and a third set of rules governing use of said portion of said first	its header (third set of rules). An alternative third rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
3	protected data to said second secure container,	LicenseProviderAttribute. The .NET assembly includes the .NET component.
. 4		The secure .NET assembly is included in a signed .msi file (second secure container).
5		An alternative third secure container is the container created by hashing the .NET
6 7		component and including the hash in the header information of a .NET assembly.
8		The .NET component is included in the signed and governed .NET assembly (second secure container). The third set of
9		rules is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
10		An alternative third secure container is a
11		signed cabinet file containing the .NET component and which is destined for a
12		signed .msi file (second secure container). The third set of rules is the set of
13		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
14	further comprising means for creating and storing, in said at	The first alternative for the third secure
15	least one storing arrangement, a third secure container;	container is a signed .NET assembly. In this case, the second secure container is the
16		signed .msi file.
17		The second alternative for the third container is the container created by
18		including a hash of the .NET component in the header information of a .NET assembly.
19	·	In this case, the second secure container is either the signed .msi file or the signed .NET assembly.
20		
21		The third alternative for the third container is a cabinet file signed by the .NET
22		assembly developer containing the .NET assembly and/or the .NET component. In
23		this case the signed .msi file is the second secure container.
24	said data transfer arrangement further comprising means for transferring said	The first alternative for the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly,
25	portion of said first protected data and	which includes and/or uses the licensed
26	said third set of rules to said third secure container, and means for incorporating	.NET component (first protected information). The third set of rules is a
27	said third secure container within said second secure container.	declarative rule within the .NET assembly's header. The .NET assembly is
28		placed in a signed .msi file (second secure container).
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1		The second alternative for the third secure
2		container is the container that results when the hash of the .NET component is added
3		to the .NET assembly header information. The third set of rules is the set of
4		declarative statements comprising the
. 4		LicenseProviderAttribute added to the
5		assembly.
6		The third alternative for the third secure container is a cabinet file signed by the
7		.NET assembly developer containing the .NET assembly and/or the .NET
8 .		component. The third set of rules is a declarative rule(s) within the .NET
9		assembly's header and/or the set of
- 10		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute added to the assembly
11		assembly
	34. A data processing arrangement as in	When the third rule set is the declarative
12	claim 33 further comprising means for applying said third set of rules to govern at	statement(s) of the assembly header, the runtime CLR enforces the statements.
13	least one aspect of use of said portion of said first protected data.	When the third set of rules is the set of
14	·	declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute added to the
15		assembly, the license support code in the .NET component evaluates the authenticity
16		of the calling assembly's request.
17	35. A data processing arrangement as in claim 34 further comprising means for	When the second set of rules is the conditional syntax statements of the signed
- 18	applying said second set of rules to govern	.msi file, the Windows Installer operating system service enforces the conditional
19	at least one aspect of use of said portion of said first protected data.	syntax statements of .NET assembly's signed .msi file, which govern the
20		offer/installation of the .NET component.
21		When the second set of rules is the declarative statement(s) within the
22		assembly's header, the runtime CLR enforces the statements.
23	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	i emorees the statements.
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2	FOR U.S. PA	TENT NO. 5,915,019
. 3	41.	Infringing products include the .NET
4		Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5		products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6		technology.
7	A method comprising performing the following steps within a virtual distribution	The signed .msi file created by the .NET component developer is the first secure
8	environment comprising one or more electronic appliances and a first secure	container. The first conditional syntax statement(s) of the .NET component
	container, said first secure container comprising (a) a first control set, and	developer's signed .msi file is/are the first control set.
9		The first protected information is the .NET
10	(b) a second secure container comprising a second control set and first protected information:	component.
11	information.	The first alternative for the second secure
12		container is the signed and licensed .NET component. The second control set is the
13		set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
14		The second alternative for the second
15		secure container is a signed cabinet file. The second control set remains the set of
16		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
17	using at least one control from said first control set or said second control set to	The .NET component developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
18	govern at least one aspect of use of said first protected information while said first	set) in its signed .msi file governs the offer/installation of the .NET component
19	protected information is contained within	while it is in the signed .msi file.
20	said first secure container;	Alternately, the set of declarative
21		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (second control
.		set) of the licensed .NET component governs use of the .NET component.
22	creating a third secure container	The first alternative for the third secure container is a signed .NET assembly, the
23	comprising a third control set for governing at least one aspect of use of protected	protected information is the .NET
24	information contained within said third secure container;	component and the third control set is the declarative statement(s) within the .NET
25	, in the second	assembly's header.
26		The second alternative for the third secure container is a signed .msi file in which the
27		.NET assembly developer packages its
28		.NET assembly and the third control set is the conditional syntax statement(s) in the
ĺ		signed .msi file.

Exhibit B

1	incorporating a first portion of said first protected information in said third secure	In the first alternative, placing the .NET component into the signed .NET assembly.
2	container, said first portion made up of	
3	some or all of said first protected information; and	In the second alternative, placing the .NET component into the. Net assembly
4	using at least one control to govern at least	developer's signed msi file. In the first alternative, the .NET assembly
5	one aspect of use of said first portion of said first protected information while said	developer's declarative statement(s) within the .NET assembly's header govern(s) the
6	first portion is contained within said third secure container.	use of the .NET component while it is in the signed .NET assembly.
· 7		In the second alternative, the conditional
. 8		syntax statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file govern the
.9.		offer/installation of the .NET component while it is in the signed .msi file.
10	42. A mathed as in claim 41 in which said	The second protected information is a
11	42. A method as in claim 41, in which said first secure container further includes a fourth secure container comprising a fourth	second .NET component.
12	control set and second protected information and further comprising the	The first alternative for the fourth secure container is the signed and licensed second
13	following step:	.NET component. The fourth control set is the set of declarative statements comprising
14		the LicenseProviderAttribute of the second .NET component.
15 16		The second alternative for the fourth secure container is a second signed cabinet file.
17		The fourth control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
18	using at least one control from said first control set or said fourth control set to	The .NET component developer's conditional syntax statements (first control
19	govern at least one aspect of use of said second protected information while said	set) in its signed .msi file governs the offer/installation of the second .NET
20	second protected information is contained within said first secure container.	component while it is in the signed .msi file.
21	·	Alternately, the set of declarative
22		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (fourth control
23	,	set) of the licensed second .NET component governs use of the second .NET
24		component.
· 25	47. A method as in claim 41, in which said step of creating a third secure container	
26	includes: creating said third control set by	The .NET assembly developer's declarative
27	incorporating at least one control not found in said first control set or said second	statements (first alternative for third control set) and/or the developer's conditional
28	control set.	syntax statements (second alternative for the third control set) are not found in either
·		1

1		the first control set or the second control set.
2		
3	52. A method as in claim 41 in which said step of creating a third secure container occurs at a first site, and further	
5	comprising: copying or transferring said third secure container from said first site to a second	The .NET assembly developer at first site distributes its assembly to other sites.
6	site located remotely from said first site.	
7.	53. A method as in claim 52 in which said first site is associated with a content	The .NET assembly developer's business module is used to create and distribute its
8	distributor.	assembly.
9	54. A method as in claim 53 in which said second site is associated with a user of content.	The .NET assembly developer distributes the assembly to end-users.
11	55. A method as in claim 54 further	
12	comprising the following step: said user directly or indirectly initiating communication with said first site.	For Internet downloads, the user initiates the communication with the first site.
13		Laws 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14	64. A method as in claim 54 in which said third control set includes one or more controls at least in part governing the use	When the third control set is the .NET assembly developer's declarative statement(s) within the .NET assembly's
15 16	by said user of at least a portion of said first portion of said first protected information.	header, it governs the user's use of the .NET component (first protected information).
17		When the third control set is the .NET assembly developer's conditional syntax
18.		statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file, it governs the
19 20		user's offer acceptance/installation of the .NET component (first protected information).
20		
21 22	76. A method as in claim 41 in which said creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which	When the third secure container is the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional
1	specifies one or more of the controls	syntax statements in that file.
23 24	contained in said third control set.	Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation
		packages. The UISample.msi is the
25 26		template recommended in the "An Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default
27		conditional syntax statements. At least two of these conditional syntax statements
28		directly govern the installation by blocking progress until the EULA is accepted.

78. A method as in claim 52 in which said creation of said third secure container further comprises using a template which specifies one or more of the controls contained in said third control set.

When the third secure container is the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file and the third control set is the conditional syntax statements in that file.

Microsoft supplies several template .msi databases for use in authoring installation packages. The UISample.msi is the template recommended in the "An Installation Example" on MSDN. This template msi files contains several default conditional syntax statements. At least two of these conditional syntax statements directly govern the installation by blocking progress until the EULA is accepted.

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3 4	81.	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5		products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6	A data processing arrangement comprising:	technology.
7	a first secure container comprising first protected information and a first rule set	The first protected information is the .NET component.
8	governing use of said first protected information;	The first alternative for the first secure
9		container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET component developer packaged
10		its assembly. The first rule set is the conditional syntax statements written by
11		the .NET component developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
12		The second alternative for the first secure
13		container is the signed cabinet file containing the (signed or unsigned) .NET
14		component. The set of declarative statements comprising the
15		LicenseProviderAttribute when its developer added licensing support to the
16		assembly is the first rule set.
17		The third alternative for the first secure container is the licensed and signed .NET
1.8		component governed by the set of declarative statements comprising the
19		LicenseProviderAttribute (first rule set) added by the .NET component developer.
20	a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The first alternative for the second secure container is the signed .msi file in which
21		the .NET assembly developer packaged its .NET assembly. The second rule set is the
22		conditional syntax statements written by the .NET assembly developer and placed
23	·	into the signed .msi file.
24		The second alternative for the second secure container is the signed .NET
25		assembly. The second rule set is the declarative statements in the .NET
26		assembly's header.
27	means for creating and storing a third secure container; and	When the second secure container is the signed msi file, the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly.
28		When the second secure container is the
1		H

Exhibit B

1		signed .NET assembly, the third secure
2		container a .NET component secured by placing it in a signed cabinet file or by
. 3		including its hash in the header of the assembly.
. 4	means for copying or transferring at least a	When the second secure container is the signed msi file and the third secure
5	portion of said first protected information and a third rule set governing use of said portion of said first protected information	container is the signed .NET assembly, the third rule set is the set of declarative
6	to said second secure container, said means for copying or transferring comprising:	statements within the assembly's header.
7	for copying or transforming comprising.	When the second secure container is the
8		signed .NET assembly, the third rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute (third rule
9		set) added to the .NET component by its developer.
10	means for incorporating said third secure container within said second	When the second secure container is the signed msi file and the third secure
11	secure container.	container is the signed .NET assembly, the assembly is placed in the signed .msi file.
12		When the second secure container is the
13		signed .NET assembly and the third secure container is a .NET component contained
14		in a signed cabinet file or a .NET component whose hash is included in the
15		header of the assembly, the third secure container is incorporated within the .NET
16		assembly.
17	82. A data processing arrangement as in claim 81 further comprising:	
18	means for applying at least one rule from said third rule set to at least in part govern	When the third rule set is declarative statements within the assembly's header, it
19	at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected information.	governs the use of the .NET assembly which includes the first protected
2Ò	portion of said mist protected information	information.
21		When the third rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
22	· .	LicenseProviderAttribute added by the .NET component by its developer, it
23		ensures the user is licensed.
24	83. A data processing arrangement as in claim 82 further comprising:	
25	means for applying at least one rule from said second rule set to at least in part	When the second rule set is the conditional syntax statements written by the .NET
26	govern at least one factor related to use of said portion of said first protected	assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file, it governs the
27	information.	offer/installation of the .NET component.
28		When the second rule set is the declarative statements in the .NET assembly's header,
1		<u>!</u> !

Exhibit F

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INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP.

INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019

•	FOR 0.5. FA	1 EN1 140. 5,715,017
3	85. A method comprising the following	Infringing products include the .NET
. 4	steps:	Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio
• •		NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and
5	1	products that include the Microsoft .NET
,		CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6		technology.
·	creating a first secure container comprising	The first protected information is the .NET
7	a first rule set and first protected	component.
	information;	m is
8		The first secure container is a signed .NET
	·	component (first protected information) governed by the set of declarative
9		statements comprising the
10		LicenseProviderAttribute (first rule set).
10		Diction 10 (1001) 11110 and (11111 and 1001).
11		The second alternative for the first secure
11	·	container is a cabinet file signed by the
12		.NET component developer containing a
		(signed or unsigned) .NET component with
13		license support. The first rule set is the set
		of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute.
14	storing said first secure container in a first	The first secure container is stored at the
16	memory;	.NET component developer's location.
15	creating a second secure container	The first alternative for the second secure
16	comprising a second rule set;	container is a signed .NET assembly and
10	,	the second rule set is declarative
17		statement(s) within the assembly's header.
		m 1 1 Confirma
18		The second alternative for the second
		secure container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly developer
19		packages its (signed or unsigned)
20		assembly. The second rule set is the
20		conditional syntax statement(s) written by
21		the .NET assembly developer and placed
~ .		into the signed .msi file.
22	storing said second secure container in a	The second secure container is stored at the
	second memory;	.NET assembly developer's location.
23	copying or transferring at least a first	The .NET component developer packages
·	portion of said first protected information	its module in a signed .msi file for
24	to said second secure container, said	distribution to the .NET assembly developer's site.
25	copying or transferring step comprising: creating a third secure container	The third secure container is the signed
23	comprising a third rule set;	.msi file in which the .NET component
26	comprising a unitariate sec,	developer packaged its .NET component.
20		The third control set is the conditional
27		syntax statements written by the .NET
[component developer and placed into the
28		signed .msi file.
	copying said first portion of said	In preparation for using a msi authoring
	•	::

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1	first protected information;	tool, such as Microsoft's Orca, copying the .NET component to a package staging area.
2	transferring said copied first portion	Using the msi authoring tool to import the
3	of said first protected information to said third secure container; and	NET component into the signed .msi file.
4	copying or transferring said copied	The .NET assembly developer installs the
	first portion of said first protected	.NET component, which involves removing it from the .NET component
5	information from said third secure container to said second secure	developer's signed msi file and installing it
6	container.	into its environment. Subsequently, the .NET assembly developer places the .NET
7	·	component into its .NET assembly and/or
		signed .msi file when it is packaging its
8		
9	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected	The entire .NET component is copied.
10	information consists of the entirety of said	
	first protected information.	<u> </u>
11	89. A method as in claim 85 in which	
12	said first memory is located at a first site,	The first memory is located at the .NET component developer's site.
13	said second memory is located at a second	The second memory is located at the .NET
14	site remote from said first site, and said step of copying or transferring said	assembly developer's site. The .NET component developer's signed
	first portion of said first protected	.msi file is transferred from its site to the
15	information to said second secure container further comprises copying or transferring	site of the .NET assembly developer.
16	said third secure container from said first	
17	site to said second site.	
	94. A method as in claim 85 further	
18	comprising: creating a fourth rule set.	When the second secure container is not a
19		signed .NET assembly, the fourth rule set is declarative statements within the
20	·	assembly's header.
21		When the second secure container is not
1	·	the signed .msi file in which the .NET
22		assembly developer packages its (signed or unsigned) assembly, the fourth rule set is
23		the conditional syntax statements written
24		by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
25		•
26	-	• •
27		•
28		

. 3	85 (alternate infringing scenario)	
4	A method comprising the following steps:	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio
5		.NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer
6		technology.
7	creating a first secure container comprising a first rule set and first protected	The first protected information is the .NET component.
.8	information;	The first alternative for the first secure
9		container is the signed and licensed .NET component. The first rule set is the set of
10 - 11		declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
11		•
12		The second alternative for the first secure container is a (signed or unsigned) .NET component with license support contained
13 14		within a cabinet file signed by the .NET component developer. The first rule set is
15		the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
16		-
17		The third alternative for the first secure container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET component developer packaged
18		its assembly. The first rule set is the conditional syntax statements written by
19		the .NET component developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
20	storing said first secure container in a first memory;	The first secure container is stored at the NET component developer's location.
21	creating a second secure container comprising a second rule set;	The first alternative for the second secure container is a signed .NET assembly and
22	-	the second rule set is declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header.
23	:	The second alternative for the second
24.		secure container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly developer
25		packages its (signed or unsigned) assembly. The second rule set is the
26		conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
27	storing said second secure container in a	The second secure container is stored at the
28	second memory;	.NET assembly developer's location.
	copying or transferring at least a first	The .NET assembly developer places the
		4 .

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. 1	portion of said first protected information	.NET component into the third secure
2	to said second secure container, said	container, which is either a signed cabinet
	copying or transferring step comprising:	file or a signed NET assembly.
3	creating a third secure container	When the second secure container is the
,	comprising a third rule set;	signed .msi file, the third secure container
4		is the signed .NET assembly. The third
7		rule set is the declarative statement(s) in
5		the .NET assembly's header.
•		
6		When the second secure container is either
		a .NET assembly or the signed .msi file, the
7		third secure container is a signed cabinet file in which the .NET assembly developer
		placed licensed .NET component. The
8	·	third rule set is the set of declarative
		statements comprising the
9	·	LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
10		component.
10	copying said first portion of said	Copying the .NET component to either the
11	first protected information;	.NET assembly or to the signed cabinet
		file.
12	transferring said copied first portion	Transferring the .NET component to either
_	of said first protected information to said third secure container; and	the .NET assembly or the signed cabinet file.
13	copying or transferring said copied	When the second secure container is the
14	first portion of said first protected	signed .msi file and the third secure
14	information from said third secure	container is the signed .NET assembly, the
15	container to said second secure	.NET assembly is placed into the signed
	container.	.msi file.
1.6		3371 41
I		When the second secure container is either the .NET assembly or the signed .msi file
17	_	and the third secure container is the signed
10		cabinet file, the signed cabinet file is placed
18		into either the .NET assembly or the signed
19		.msi file.
. [
20	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said	The entire .NET component is copied.
	copied first portion of said first protected	
21	information consists of the entirety of said	
	first protected information.	
22	93. A method as in claim 85 in which	
23	said step of copying transferring said	When the third secure container is the
ر د د	copied first portion of said first protected	signed .NET assembly, it is placed in the
24	information from said third secure	signed .msi file.
	container to said second secure container	_
25	further comprises storing said third secure	When the third secure container is a signed
	container in said second secure container.	cabinet file, it can be placed in either the
26		.NET assembly and/or the signed .msi file.
<u></u> ∦	04 4 1 1 1 1 06 6 1	
27	94. A method as in claim 85 further	
28	comprising: creating a fourth rule set.	When the second rule set is declarative
20	creating a fourth full set.	statement(s) within the assembly's header,
H		

2 3		the fourth rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
4		When the second rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET
5	. ·	assembly developer and placed into the signed msi file, the fourth rule set is
6		declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header or the set of declarative
7		statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
8		component.
9	95. A method as in claim 94 further comprising:	
10	using said fourth rule set to govern at least one aspect of use of said copied first	If the fourth rule set is the .NET assembly developer's declarative statement(s) within
11	portion of said first protected information.	the .NET assembly's header, it governs the use of the .NET component.
12		If the fourth rule set is the conditional
13		syntax statements of the .NET assembly developer's signed .msi file, it governs the
14		offer/installation of the .NET component.
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	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,915,019	
- 4 5	85 (second alternate scenario for .NET)	Infringing products include the .NET Framework SDK, Microsoft Visual Studio .NET, the Microsoft Installer SDK, and products that include the Microsoft .NET CLR, and the Microsoft Installer technology.
	A method comprising the following steps:	
7 8	a first rule set and first protected	The first protected information is a .NET component.
. 9		The first alternative for the first secure container is the signed and licensed .NET
10		component. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET
11		component.
12		The second alternative for the first secure
13		container is a (signed or unsigned) .NET component with license support contained within a cabinet file signed by the .NET
14		assembly developer. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising
15		the LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
16		The third alternative for the first secure
17		container is a .NET component whose hash is included in the assembly header of a
18		NET assembly. The first rule set is the set of declarative statements comprising the
19		LicenseProviderAttribute in the .NET component.
20	storing said first secure contained in a C	The Control
21	storing said first secure container in a first memory; creating a second secure container	The first secure container is stored at the NET assembly developer's location.
22	comprising a second rule set;	The second secure container is the signed msi file in which the .NET assembly developer packages its signed assembly.
23		The second rule set is the conditional syntax statement(s) written by the .NET
24		assembly developer and placed into the signed .msi file.
25	storing said second secure container in a second memory;	The second secure container is stored at the .NET assembly developer's location.
26	copying or transferring at least a first	The .NET assembly developer places the
27	portion of said first protected information to said second secure container, said	.NET component into the third secure container, which is the signed .NET
	copying or transferring step comprising:	assembly.
28	creating a third secure container comprising a third rule set;	The third secure container is a signed .NET
#	comprising a unital rule Set.	assembly and the third rule set is

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1		declarative statement(s) within the assembly's header.
2	copying said first portion of said	Copying the .NET component to the .NET assembly.
. 3	first protected information; transferring said copied first portion	Transferring the .NET component to the
4	of said first protected information to said third secure container; and	.NET assembly.
5	copying or transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	When the second secure container is the signed .msi file and the third secure
6	information from said third secure container to said second secure	container is the signed .NET assembly, the .NET assembly is placed into the signed
7	container.	.msi file.
8	87. A method as in claim 85 in which said copied first portion of said first protected	The entire .NET component is copied.
9	information consists of the entirety of said first protected information.	
10		
11	90. A method as in claim 85 in which said first memory and said second memory are located at the same site.	First and second memory is at the .NET assembly developer's location.
12	are located at the same site.	assembly developer's location.
13	93. A method as in claim 85 in which	
14	said step of copying transferring said copied first portion of said first protected	When the third secure container is the signed .NET assembly, it is placed in the
15	information from said third secure container to said second secure container	signed .msi file.
16	further comprises storing said third secure container in said second secure container.	
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26		
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3	<u> </u>	
	96. A method comprising performing the	A signed and licensed .NET component
.4.	following steps within a virtual distribution	(first container) is part of a .NET assembly
•	environment comprising one or more	(second container), which is packaged in a
5	electronic appliances and a first secure	signed .msi file (third container).
	container, said first secure container	
6	comprising a first control set and first protected information:	
. 7	using at least one control from said first	The first secure container is a licensed and
•	control set to govern at least one aspect of	signed .NET component governed by the
. 8	use of said first protected information	set of declarative statements comprising the
•	while said first protected information is	LicenseProviderAttribute (one control).
9	contained within said first secure container;	The second secure container is a .NET
	creating a second secure container comprising a second control set for	assembly, the protected information is the
10	governing at least one aspect of use of	assembly and the second control set is
11	protected information contained within said	declarative statement(s) within the
11	second secure container;	assembly's header.
12	incorporating a first portion of said first	Included in the .NET assembly is the .NET
	protected information in said second secure	component.
13	container, said first portion made up of	
	some or all of said first protected information;	-
14	using at least one control to govern at least	The declarative statement(s) govern the use
15	one aspect of use of said first portion of	of the .NET component and the custom
	said first protected information while said	LicenseProvider class (first control set)
16	first portion is contained within said second	controls the .NET component.
	secure container; and	
17	incorporating said second secure container	The third secure container is the signed .msi file in which the .NET assembly
18	containing said first portion of said first protected information within a third secure	developer packages its assembly. The third
10	container comprising a third control set.	control set is the conditional syntax
19	container comprising a time control con	statements written by the assembly
		developer and placed into the signed .msi
20		file.
21		

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12. Infringement is based on Microsoft's Visual Studio NET and/or the .NET framework licensing tools (in the .NET framework DK) and/or Microsoft Installer SDK. A system for supporting electronic commerce including: means for creating a first secure control set at a first location; The first location is a .NET component developer's site. The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of a first .NET licensed component that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. The component is encapsulated in a signed .NET assembly. The second location is the .NET application developer's site where a .NET application of evoloper's site where a .NET application comprising one or more assemblies is created. The second secure control set comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first. NET component. The control set can include a set of security permissions demanded by the .NET assembly containing the licensed components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license security) integrating said first and second control sets from said first location to said second location, and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. The first NET location developer uses the Netter should be application component, whereby the permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can passe the securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed adbit the second location, the solution developer uses the propo	2	INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART		
Infringement is based on Microsoft's Visual Studio NET and/or the NET Framework licensing tools (in the NET Framework SDK) and/or Microsoft Installer SDK. A system for supporting electronic commerce including: means for creating a first secure control set at a first location; The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the LicenseProvide-Attribute of a first. NET licensed component that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. The component is encapsulated in a signed NET assembly. The second location is the NET application component is encapsulated in a signed NET assembly using or calling the first NET component. The control set can include a set of security permissions demanded by the NET assembly containing the licensed component, whereby the permissions are demanded of components that calls be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed ansi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed ansi file.	. 3	FOR U.S. PATENT NO. 5,949,876		
Infringement is based on Microsoft's Visual Studio NET and/or the NET Framework licensing tools (in the NET Framework SDK) and/or Microsoft Installer SDK. A system for supporting electronic commerce including: means for creating a first secure control set at a first location; The first location is a .NET component developer's site. The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the *LicenseProviderAttribute* of a first .NET licensed component that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. The component is encapsulated in a signed .NET assembly. The second location is the .NET application comprising one or more assemblies is created. The second secure control set comprises the declarative statements (s) (including licensing statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET component. The control set can include a set of security permissions demanded by the .NET assembly containing the licensed components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set special can also be extended by control set components. The control set components is a signed ansi file c				
SDK 8 system for supporting electronic commerce including: means for creating a first secure control set at a first location; 10 set at a first location; 11 The first location is a .NET component developer's site. The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements component that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. The component is encapsulated in a signed .NET assembly. 12 means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; 13 means for creating a second secure control set comprises the type of license validation that occurs. The second location is the .NET application comprising one or more assemblies is created. 14 The second secure control set comprises the declarative statements (s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET component. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license securally integrating said first and second control set to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. 12 means at said second location for securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. 13 The first location is a .NET component developer use the statements occurs the control set is the set of declarative statements in a .NET application components the control of components that call the application components that call the application components that call the application components that call the application components that call the application components that call the application components that call the application co		2.	NET and/or the .NET Framework licensing tools (in	
means for creating a second secure control set at a first location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set at a second location; means for creating a second secure control set an include a signed .NET assembly. The second secure control set comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET component. The control set can include a set of security permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .ms file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license scenario). means for securely communicating said first secure control set from said first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed assembly, within a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .Ms in the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation meachanism for the control or component in the context of use of the .NET.	.6			
means for creating a first secure control set at a first location; The first location is a .NET component developer's site. The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the <i>LicenseProviderAttribute</i> of a first. NET licensed component that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. The component is encapsulated in a signed .NET assembly. The second location is the .NET application developer's site where a .NET application comprising one or more assemblies is created. The second secure control set comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET component. The control set can include a set of security permissions demanded by the .NET assembly containing the licensed component, whereby the permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license secural). The first licensed component developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed dained in a signed assembly, within a signed eabinet file or within a signed mist file control set to romprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component in the context of use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET.	7			
The first secure control set is the set of declarative statements comprising the <i>LicenseProviderAttribute</i> of a first. NET license domponent that provides for a design-time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. The component is encapsulated in a signed. NET assembly. The second location is the .NET application developer's site where a .NET application comprising one or more assemblies is created. The second secure control set comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET component. The control set can include a set of security permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set can also be extended by control set permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set can also be extended by control set permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by control set can also be extended by control set can also be extended by control set is securely communicated from the first .NET solution provider by either being contained a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed assemb	8 .		site.	
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one or more assemblies is created. The second secure control set comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of a signed .NET assembly using or calling the first .NET component. The control set can include a set of security permissions demanded by the .NET assembly containing the licensed components whereby the permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license scenario). The first .NET control set is securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .msi file. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component in the context of use of the .NET	12		The second location is the .NET application	
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component. The control set can include a set of security permissions demanded by the .NET assembly containing the licensed component, whereby the permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license seconario). The first .NET control set is securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .msi file. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET.	15		statements, and code access security statements) of a	
containing the licensed component, whereby the permissions are demanded of components that call the application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license scenario). The first .NET control set is securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .msi file. The first .NET control set is securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .msi file. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the .NET	16		component. The control set can include a set of	
application components. The control set can also be extended by controls expressed as conditional syntax statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license scenario). means for securely communicating said first secure control set from said first location to said second location; and means at said second location; and means at said second location for securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the .NET	17		containing the licensed component, whereby the	
statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license scenario). means for securely communicating said first secure control set from said first location to said second location; and location to said second location; and location to said second location for securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. Statements in a signed .msi file containing a click through end-user license (the end-user license scenario). The first .NET control set is securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .msi file. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the .NET	18		application components. The control set can also be	
means for securely communicating said first secure control set from said first location to said second location; and location to said second location; and means at said second location for securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. Scenario). The first .NET control set is securely communicated from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .msi file. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	19	,	statements in a signed .msi file containing a click	
first secure control set from said first location to said second location; and means at said second location for securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. from the first location developer to the .NET solution provider by either being contained in a signed assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed .msi file. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	20		scenario).	
assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a signed msi file. means at said second location for securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	21	first secure control set from said first	from the first location developer to the .NET solution	
means at said second location for securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. At the second location, the solution developer uses the .NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	22	location to said second location; and	assembly, within a signed cabinet file or within a	
securely integrating said first and second control sets to produce at least a third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	23	means at said second location for	At the second location, the solution developer uses the	
third control set comprising plural elements together comprising an electronic value chain extended agreement. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	24	securely integrating said first and	.NET runtime that includes the LicenseManager.	
electronic value chain extended agreement. licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	25	third control set comprising plural		
component. A value chain is created through the creation of a run-time license for use of the first .NET component in the context of use of the .NET	26	electronic value chain extended	licensed component), the license manager accesses the	
component in the context of use of the .NET	27	agreement.	component. A value chain is created through the	
	28	· .	component in the context of use of the .NET	
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1 2 3		license controls for the runtime license (derived from the design time license) are bound into the header of the .NET application assembly, along with the second control set.
4 5 6 7		The creation of runtime license controls is securely handled by Visual Studio.NET or the LC tool. Runtime licenses are embedded into (and bound to) the executing assembly. The license control attribute included in the first .NET component is customized in the second location to express and require the runtime license. In a different scenario, the LC tool is used to create a ".licenses file" containing licenses for multiple components, including runtime licenses for
8.		components and classes created by the license provider. This licenses file is embedded into the
9		assembly. The third control set is an extended value chain
11		agreement that comprises the runtime license controls for the first NET licensed class (that had been bound
12	. ·	to the assembly), the declarative controls provided by the solution provider in the solution provider's assembly, and any runtime licenses for other
13		components included by the solution provider in the solution provider's assembly, and any end user license
14		agreement provided by the application provider. The controls are typically integrated into the header of the
15		.NET application assembly calling the first .NET licensed component.
16 17		A further "end user licensing scenario" occurs when, at the second location, the application developer
18		packages the application into a signed .msi file that includes conditional syntax statement controls that
19		require that a user read and agree to an end user license agreement for the application and the embedded first component. The third control set
20		includes a plurality of elements that include the run- time licenses mentioned above, security permissions
21		controls, EULA controls (a fourth control set), all securely bound into the signed .msi file.
22		
23	11. A system as in claim 2 in which said first location and said second location are	The Microsoft .NET Framework provides a Virtual Distribution Environment. Here the
24 25	contained within a Virtual Distribution Environment.	nodes are the Common Language Runtime instances that interpret the controls
26		contained within .NET assemblies (among other functions).
27		
28	29. A system as in claim 2 in which said first secure control set includes required	The licensing control in the first control set specifies the method required to validate
		Exhibit B

1	terms.	the license.
3	32. A system as in claim 2 in which said second secure control set includes required terms.	The security permissions demanded (as described above) are required terms for execution of the application code elements.
4 5 6 7 8	60. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for securely integrating said first and second control sets includes a fourth control set.	In the scenario where the application assembly is distributed using a signed .msi file, the secure integration of the first and second control sets is enhanced by the tamper protection afforded by the signed .msi file. In the end user license scenario, a fourth control set consisting of conditional syntax statements is included in the .msi
9 10 11	130. A system as in claim 2 further including means for executing said third control set within a protected processing environment.	The third control set is executed under the auspices of the CLR
12 13 14	132. A system as in claim 130 in which said protected processing environment is located at a location other than said second location.	The third control set is executed at an enduser site within the CLR.
15 16 17	161. A system as in claim 2 in which said third control set includes controls containing human-language terms corresponding to at least certain of the machine-executable controls contained in said third control set.	In the end user license scenario, the third control set includes a fourth control set that requires that the human user agree with license terms displayed to the user. These human readable terms are referenced in the conditional syntax statement controls contained in the signed .msi file.
18 19	162. A method as in claim 161 in which said human-language terms are contained in one or more data descriptor data structures.	The .msi file is a data descriptor data structure.
20 21 22	170. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for creating a first secure control set includes a protected processing environment.	The creation of the first licensed component, including its licensed controls is carried out under the auspices of the CLR.
23 24 25	171. A system as in claim 2 in which said means for creating a second secure control set includes a protected processing environment.	The application design time environment and the creation of the .NET application is carried out under the auspices of the CLR.
26 27	172. A system as in claim 2 in which said means at said second location for securely integrating includes a protected processing environment.	The means for integrating the runtime license with the application controls is carried out under the auspices of the CLR.
28	329. A system as in claim 2 in which said	VS.NET runs under Windows.

	.	
	means for creating a first secure control set	T
	2 includes an operating system based on or	
	compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
	3	
	330. A system as in claim 2 in which said	VS.NET runs under Windows.
	means for creating a second secure control	
	set includes an operating system based on	
	or compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
4	331. A system as in claim 2 in which said	VONDO 1 NO
,	means at said second location for securely	VS.NET runs under Windows.
	integrating said first and second control	
•	sets includes an operating system based on	
8	or compatible with Microsoft Windows.	
9		The third control set in the scenario
• •	comprising means by which said third	described in the claim map for claim 2
10	control set governs the execution of at least one load module.	governs a portable .NET executable
11		designed to be loaded into the CLR
11		environment (a CLR host).
12	347. A system as in claim 2 farther	The third control set in the scenario
	comprising means by which said third	described in the claim map for claim 2
13	control set governs the execution of at least	governs a .NET executable. This
	one method.	executable contains one or more methods.
14	T	
	349. A system as in claim 2 further	The third control set in the scenario
15	Il comprising moons by which will 1: 1	in the second of
15	comprising means by which said third	described in the claim map for claim 2
16	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This
16	comprising means by which said third control set governs the execution of at least one procedure.	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This
16 17	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	control set governs the execution of at least	described in the claim map for claim 2 governs a .NET executable. This executable contains one or more

. 3		
. 4	CLAIM LANGUAGE	CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT
5	48.	Infringing products include Microsoft SMS (Systems Management Server) 2.0 and subsequent versions.
6	A method for narrowcasting selected digital information to specified recipients, including:	Successful Control of the Control of
8	a) at a receiving appliance, receiving selected digital information from a sending appliance remote from the	The receiving appliance is the client (e.g., end user computer in an Enterprise setting) receiving digital information (packages and/or
9	receiving appliance,	advertisement files) from the sending appliance, the centralized SMS database via a
10		Client Access Point and/or Distribution Point set up on a server.
11 12	the receiving appliance having a secure node and being associated	The "node" is "secure" as a result of SMS security, as well as how it identifies and selects
13	with a specified recipient;	clients. The "specified recipient" is the result of the collection identifying a specific client that
14	·	meets the criteria for a package or advertisement.
15		
16 17	i) the digital information having been selected at least in part based on the digital information's membership in	The digital information is a software package or advertisement. The "first class membership was determined in part using rights
18	a first class, wherein the first class membership was determined at least in part using rights management	management information" reads on creating software packages (or advertisements) based on attributes of the software.
19	information; and	
20 21	ii) the specified recipient having been selected at least in part based on	The "specified recipient" is the client selected to receive a package or advertisement. That recipient is chosen based on a collection rule,
22	membership in a second class, wherein the second class membership was determined at least in part on the basis	or on the recipient's possession of a license.
23	of information derived from the specified recipient's creation, use of, or	
24	interaction with rights management information; and	
25	b) the specified recipient using the receiving appliance to access the	The receiving appliance is the client computer. The SMS agents on the client computer
26	received selected digital information in accordance with rules and controls,	receive, evaluate and take the appropriate action based on rules and controls governing
27	associated with the selected digital information.	the package and/or advertisement (i.e. the selected digital information).
28		
	the rules and controls being enforced	Rules and controls are enforced by Agents on

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1

1	by the receiving appliance secure node.	the client (the secure node)
2		
3	59. The method of claim 48 wherein	Event information includes SMS event
4	said received selected digital information is at least in part event	information, including Scheduling Classes.
5	information. 63. The method of claim 48 wherein	All SMS packages must include a minimum of
6.	said received selected digital information is at least in part executable	one program.
7	software. 70. The method of claim 48 wherein	A control governs whether a MIF
8	said rules and controls at least in part govern usage audit record creation.	(management information file) is sent back to the SMS db after installation is done to report
9		on the success or failure of the installation.
10	89. The method of claim 48 wherein said receiving appliance is a personal	The primary purpose of SMS is to manage software on personal computers throughout the
11	computer.	Enterprise.
12	,	
13		
14		

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.4	ESECUTION OF THE PROPERTY OF T	THE REPORT OF THE RINGE MENTS
5	48.	Infringing products include Windows Media Player and Windows Media Rights
J		Manager
6	A method for narrowcasting selected digital information to specified recipients,	This claim pertains to Windows Media Player with Individualized DRM Client and
7	including:	Windows Media Rights Manager used in the context of a narrowcast pay-per-view (hear) media distribution service.,
8		simulcast and/or subscription services.
.9	(a) at a receiving appliance, receiving	Receiving appliance is a user's PC with individualized DRM client (secure node).
10	selected digital information from a sending appliance remote from the receiving	Specified recipient is a user using the
11	appliance, the receiving appliance having a secure node and being associated with a	specific individualized DRM client to access and render narrowcast pay-per-view
12	specified recipient	media, simulcast and/or subscription services for which the user acquires a
13		license.
14	(i) the digital information having been	The digital information is media that is
15	selected at least in part based on the digital information's membership in a first class,	narrowcast to licensed recipients. These narrowcast streams are licensed to users
16	wherein the first class membership was determined at least in part using rights	who have acquired licenses and whose PCs (appliances) support WMPs that have
17	management information; and	individualized DRM clients. This attribute is included in the signed WMA file header
18		and is used in the process of acquiring licenses for access to the media. Media that
19		are licensed to the recipient have their licenses bound to the recipient's
20	(ii) the specified recipient having been	Individualization module. The recipient is selected for this content
21	selected at least in part based on membership in a second class, wherein the	based on the fact that the recipient is a member of the class of recipients who have
22	second class membership was determined at least in part on the basis of information	a license for the narrowcast media and whose devices support WMP and
23	derived from the specified recipient's	individualized DRM clients. The recipient's machine must indicate support
24	creation, use of, or interaction with rights management information; and	for individualization in challenges that are sent as part of requests for media in this
25		narrowcast class.
26	(b) the specified recipient using the receiving appliance to access the received	Recipient's machine uses WMP and the individualized DRM client to access the
.27	selected digital information in accordance with rules and controls, associated with the	narrowcast media in accordance with all rules associated with the media and
28	selected digital information, the rules and controls being enforced by the receiving	contained in the media license – in particular, requirements that
20	appliance secure node.	individualization be supported.

Exhibit B

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2	61. The method of claim 48 wherein said	The digital information is Windows Media,
3	received selected digital information is at least in part entertainment information.	which encodes audio/visual entertainment content.
4		
5	62. The method of claim 61 wherein said entertainment information is at least in part music information.	Reads on narrowcast Windows Media Files that are music or audio/visual.
6		
7	67. The method of claim 48 wherein said rules and controls at least in part use digital certificate information.	The license contains a digital certificate. The DRM client uses the certificate in the license to verify this signature and to verify
8		that the header has not been tampered with.
9	72. The method of claim 48 wherein said	The signed header contains at least one
9	rules and controls in part specifying at least	URL that indicates to the Windows Media
10	one clearinghouse acceptable to rightsholders.	Rights Manager the license clearinghouse to be used in acquiring licenses.
11		
12	75. The method of claim 72 wherein said at least one acceptable clearinghouse is a rights and permissions clearinghouse.	This clearinghouse is a license clearinghouse responsible for mapping rights and permissions onto requested
13	rigine and parimeters of the first section of the f	content or narrowcasts and binding them to the requesting client environment or user of
14		this environment.
15	89. The method of claim 48 wherein said	Windows Media Player and the
16	receiving appliance is a personal computer.	Individualized DRM client run on a personal computer.
17		
18		

INTERTRUST TECHNOLOGIES CORP. v. MICROSOFT CORP. INTERTRUST INFRINGEMENT CHART

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	FOR	U.S.	PAT	ENT	NO.	6,112	,181

3		, ,
3	91	Infringing products include Windows
4		Media Player and Windows Media Rights Manager
5	A method for securely narrowcasting selected digital information to specified	This claim pertains to Windows Media Player with Individualized.DRM Client and
6	recipients including:	Windows Media Rights Manager used in the context of a narrowcast simulcast, payper-view (hear) media distribution service.
7		and/or subscription services. The content
8		is delivered in a Protected Windows Media File.
9.		
	(a) receiving selected digital information in	Narrowcast content is received in a
10	a secure container at a receiving appliance remote from a sending appliance, the	Protected Windows Media File. Receiving appliance is user's PC with individualized
11	receiving appliance having a secure node,	DRM client (secure node).
10	the receiving appliance being associated with a receiving entity	
12	(i) the digital information having	The digital information is media that is
13	been selected at least in part based	narrowcast to licensed recipients (for
	on the digital information's	example, a sold-out concert is narrowcast
14	membership in a first class,	on the Internet to "the class of" licensed (or ticketed) viewers).
15	(ii) the first class membership	These narrowcast streams are licensed to
	having been determined at least in	users who have acquired licenses and
16	part using rights management information	whose PCs (appliances) support WMPs that have individualized DRM clients. This
17	momation	attribute is included in the signed WMA
*		file header and is used in the process of
18		acquiring licenses for access to the media.
		Media that are licensed to the recipient
19	٠.	have their licenses bound to the recipient's individualization module.
20	(b) the receiving entity having been	The recipient is selected for this content
20	selected at least in part based on said	based on the fact that the recipient is a
21	receiving entity's membership in a second	member of the class of recipients who has a
	class,	license for the narrowcast media.
22	(i) the second class membership	The recipient class is determined by the
22	having been determined at least in	license bound to the user's device that supports WMP and individualized DRM
23	part on the basis of information derived from the recipient entity's	clients. The recipient's machine must
24	creation, use of, or interaction with	indicate support for individualization in
-	rights management information	challenges that are sent as part of requests
25		for media in this narrowcast class.
	(c) receiving at the receiving appliance	Receives a protected Windows Media File
26	rules and controls in a secure container,	
22	(i) the rules and controls having	Receives a license that is bound to the file
27	been associated with the selected digital information; and	as well as to the specific DRM client individualization information.
28	(d) using at the receiving appliance the	Recipient's machine uses WMP and the
~	selected digital information in accordance	individualized DRM client to access the
Ħ	selected digital hijoimation in accordance	"

Exhibit B

1

	1 4			
	with the rules and controls,	narrowcast media in accordance with all rules associated with the media and contained in the media license – in particular, requirements that individualization be supported. The WMP and DRM client enforce the		
3				
4	(i) the rules and controls being			
٦	enforced by the receiving appliance	rules embedded in the Protected Windows		
5	secure node.	Media File License.		
. 6	104. The method of claim 91 wherein said	The digital information is Windows Media,		
-	received selected digital information includes entertainment information.	which encodes audio/visual entertainment		
. 7	merudes entertainment information.	content.		
8	109. The method of claim 91 wherein said	The license contains a digital certificate.		
_	rules and controls at least in part use digital	The DRM client uses the certificate in the		
. 9	certificate information.	license to verify this signature and to verify		
10		that the header has not been tampered with.		
	114. The method of claim 91 wherein said	The signed header contains at least one		
11	rules and controls specify at least one	URL that indicates to the Windows Media		
12	clearinghouse acceptable to rightsholders.	Rights Manager the license clearinghouse to be used in acquiring licenses.		
13	117. The method of claim 114 wherein said	This clearinghouse is a license		
	at least one acceptable clearinghouse is a	clearinghouse responsible for mapping		
14	rights and permissions clearinghouse.	rights and permissions onto requested		
. 15		content or narrowcasts and binding them to the requesting client environment or user of		
	11	1 Comment of about of		
16	 	this environment.		
16	131 The method of claim 91 wherein said	this environment.		
16 17	131. The method of claim 91 wherein said receiving appliance is a personal computer.	Windows Media Player and the		
17	131. The method of claim 91 wherein said receiving appliance is a personal computer.	this environment.		
		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20 21 22		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20 21		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26		Windows Media Player and the individualized DRM client run on a		

3

1

2

CLAIM OF INFRINGEMENT CLAIM LANGUAGE #124 #24 4 Products infringing: Microsoft Visual Studio 5 .NET. .NET License Compiler, .NET Framework SDK, and .NET Common 6 Language Runtime A method for producing a third .NET. A method including 7 component (application) that incorporates first and second .NET component whose 8 distribution is license controlled. 9 The first secure container is a first signed creating a first secure container including a NET component that includes a license first governed item and having associated a control. The governed item is the .NET first control: component. 11 The first control is the set of declarative 12 statements comprising the LicenseProviderAttribute of a first .NET 13 licensed component that provides for a designtime license to use the control. This attribute 14 also specifies the type of license validation that occurs. 15 creating a second secure container including a The second secure container is the second 16 signed .NET component that includes a license second governed item and having associated a control. The governed item is the .NET 17 second control; component. 18 The second control is the set of declarative statements comprising the 19 LicenseProviderAttribute of a second .NET licensed component that provides for a design-20 time license to use the control. This attribute also specifies the type of license validation that 21 occurs. 22 The creator distributes a signed and licensed transferring the first secure container from a 23 .NET component. first location to a second location; 24 An application developer at a second location downloads a first .NET component for 25 inclusion into an application. 26 A creator distributes a signed and licensed transferring the second secure container from a .NET component from a different location. third location to the second location; 27

Exhibit B

application.

Application developer downloads a second

.NET component for inclusion into an

at the second location, obtaining accelleast a portion of the first governed it access being governed at least in part first control;	tem, the developer uses the .NET runtime that include
	Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the first .NE licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism fo the control or component.
	The first control comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of the fine. NET component.
at the second location, obtaining acceleast a portion of the second governed access being governed at least in part second control;	ditem, the by the developer uses the .NET runtime that include the LicenseManager to access a second governed item. Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated (here, an instance of the second .NET licensed component), the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control or component. The second control comprises the declarative statement(s) (including licensing statements, and code access security statements) of the second .NET component.
at the second location, creating a third container including at least a portion of governed item and at least a portion of second governed item and having asso least one control, the creation being g at least in part by the first control and	of the first developer uses the .NET runtime that include the LicenseManager to access a first governed item and second governed item to construct a application, the third secure container.
second control.	Creation governance is accomplished by invoking the .NET runtime to access the first governed item and the second governed item.
	Whenever a class (control or component) is instantiated the license manager accesses the proper validation mechanism for the control of component
· .	The portions of the first governed item and
	second governed item that are being included in the third secure container will typically include the governed items themselves, ie. th
	The associated control in this case is the LicenseProviderAttribute, created and inserte

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